A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum

[Hawheik]

My first thought is that while I recognize the issues being targeted by this proposal and agree that the way to address them is to empower entities or individuals with more direct decision-making authority, the way proposed here does so in a very centralizing fashion, one that seems like it will create de-facto permanent institutions that will serve to ossify the entire organizational structure.

@Arbitrum

Transformational Change #1 - Operations: Once a proposal is approved by the DAO, then there should be no discretionary, strategic or operational decisions conducted by anyone other than Arbitrum Aligned Entities. It will be up to the respective AAE to pick, negotiate the scope of work and hold accountable the involvement of any vendors and service providers.

A good adjustment, but each operational proposal ought to include a section about what AAE (or other appropriate organizational entity) is delegated this kind of responsibility.

This is a very reasonable section to cover for any proposal, but I think it should always be explicitly stated and declared, to make it clear and up-for-discussion in case the DAO finds it misaligned, rather than ever be left implicit. It is too important.

@Arbitrum

Lack of Accountability. After a proposal has passed, there is a tendency in the DAO to overlook its execution and final output. Although a proposal’s author will publish progress reports, not all delegates will read the report as they are often burdened with numerous other responsibilities ranging from reviewing proposals, offering feedback, and voting on proposals. This has allowed proposals not to fully deliver on their promises to the DAO without significant recourse. The DAO has attempted to experiment with oversight committees to aid accountability, but this is sometimes overkill depending on the nature of a proposal and it makes more sense to rely on existing structures for oversight like leveraging an Arbitrum Aligned Entity.

I will say for myself, whenever reading progress reports or follow-up, results-reporting of any kind, I experience an acute lack of authority. I am merely a delegate, I am able to vote on proposals but when accountability is required, I am not aware of any accountability-process for me other than asking pointed questions (which may be uncomfortable but ultimately harmless) or drive the issue to a clawback-proposal (which comes across as a rather nuclear option).

I think this proposal is appropriate in moving in the direction of addressing this, but right now it feels very heavy-handed in doing so in a way that may end up being an overcorrection. We can do incremental improvement, it doesn’t have to be a revolution.

This issue is important to address, but I’m not sure every part of this proposal as currently stated is necessary to start addressing the issue.

@Arbitrum

Non-AAE Submitted Proposals: As mentioned above, the eligibility requirements for submitting to the forum should not change. But we expect the number of proposals will significantly diminish in favor of more informal feedback loops between the idea generator and the relevant AAE undertaking such an initiative. Our expectation is that new proposals would largely be for new initiatives not within the scope of any existing AAE that are developed in conjunction with OpCo.

Yet, should a delegate choose to submit a proposal, the following process should be followed:

• Step 1: Proposal Submitted
• Step 2: OpCo should identify the relevant AAE tasked with this scope of work and solicit feedback on the proposal.
• Step 3:
  • Viewed Favorably: If the AAE thinks that this initiative is a good idea and can be completed within existing budgets, they can either add it to its existing work and the proposal should not proceed to vote, or if additional funding is required to execute on the proposal, the OpCo should inform delegates that the proposal should proceed to vote, with a recommendation to vote in favor of the proposal.
  • Viewed Unfavorably: If the relevant AAE thinks that the proposal is not a good idea, the OpCo should report back to the delegates the position of the AAE with a recommendation to vote against the proposal.
• Step 4: If necessary, the proposal proceeds and delegates vote to accept or reject the proposal.
• Step 5: If it was a proposal viewed favorably by the relevant AAE and the proposal has passed, the AAE should be tasked with implementing the scope of the proposal. If, however, the proposal passes despite the recommendation of the AAE and OpCo to vote against, the AAE should not be responsible for implementation. We do not want the AAE to be distracted from its goals by initiatives that it does not think are worth prioritizing. In the event that such a scenario occurs, OpCo should be responsible for ensuring that the proposer complies with all of its obligations pursuant to the proposal.

Here is where I get a sinking feeling in my stomach. This seems like something that actively moves away from decentralization towards centralizing power in a few AAE’s, by explicitly giving them the power and creating the expectation that they may “call dibs” on any proposals that they feel fall within their expertise.

Am I reading this correctly that an AAE that likes what they’re seeing in a proposal, are expected
and encouraged to move in and say “step aside, we will do implement this instead”? Furthermore, if they don’t like it, possibly because it in some way interferes with the other objectives of the AAE in question, they are expected to formally recommend against the proposal using the OpCo as their proxy?

Remember, AAE’s are Aligned, but we have to be realistic and remember that they will likely have their own interests to look after as well. In a large organization different institutions normally end up defending their own “moat” for political power and influence, if nothing else.

This feels like it grants AAE’s huge amounts of power and sway, which I am certain will serve to cement their place and role within the DAO to a point that they shortly become nearly impossible to divest from, or even argue against.

@Tekr0x.eth

Since AAEs will hold a lot of responsibility, the voting process to select them becomes incredibly important. I fully support the current five AAEs, but I can’t help but feel the setup feels fairly centralized.

@GensDAO

Beyond that, ideas cross my mind. Have you considered limiting the term of office of each AAE (e.g. 2 years) or requiring periodic re-evaluations by the OAT?

These are two examples of great points made. Currently the proposal is very heavy on defining what powers AAE’s are to be granted, but very lacking in defining through what mechanisms the DAO appoints AAE’s, delineates and limits their power, as well as demotes or ultimately divests from them.

A DAO and the delegates that make up it often have a hard time organizing decisively and in a timely manner, which is something that this proposal seeks to address. But that same weakness also makes a DAO very vulnerable to well-organized and driven organizations, who are able to act far more coherently and effectively to the point that the DAO become under the control of said AAE’s.

Will there be limits placed on delegates with conflicts of interests with AAE’s, in voting on proposals?

Because of the heavy alignment it seems only natural that people involved with AAE’s will also be involved with the DAO as delegates in some extent so excluding them from voting seems heavy-handed, but at the same with with the great amounts of power this proposal suggests to imbue AAE’s with I don’t think also allowing them to act as delegates would be a good idea. At the same time with how heavy their influence will be over the DAO as an organization, just based on their heavy entrenchment given this proposal, I’m not sure restricting them from acting as delegates would be doing enough to curtail their influence, in the long term.