Arbitrum Hodlers and Investors Proposal Idea

Since we have alot of investors and HODLERS of Arbitrum.
and since $ARB is a Governance token with no utility just to vote.

For Holders and Investors to earn a passive income.

Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova network has a 2% Fee for every transaction.

Why dont you make it 3% add 1% for your transaction fee in our Arbitrum one or Arbitrum Nova network.

And the 1% added swap fee or Transaction fee will be distributed to HODLERS or Investors?

But you need to lock your $ARB tokens to earn passive income from the transaction or Swap fees.

Is that possible?



Although I think it would technically be possible, it may fall in the realm of turning ARB into a security. Check out this short thread:


I was thinking like if Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova is using ETH for gasfees.
they can add 1% more charge and that 1% charge will be distributed to HODLERS or Investors.

But first they need to stake it or lock it for years.

i think it will not turn into security since we are not using ARB for gas fee.

Correct me if im wrong thanks.


adding a 1% fee to benefit $ARB holders may incentivize holding, it could discourage users from adopting the network due to increased transaction costs



I agree with Kramnatius. Instead of relying solely on short-term incentives, we should focus on improving the infrastructure and tooling of the network to attract more users and promote adoption. Our goal should be to eliminate other chains from Ethereum and position Arbitrum as the go-to choice for decentralized applications.

By focusing on infrastructure and adoption, we can indirectly raise the price of $ARB by increasing demand and usage of the network. Furthermore, we should remember that the chain was built on the promise of lower gas fees, and we should not compromise that just to benefit ourselves. Our priority should be to create a better user experience and a more robust ecosystem.


…agreed, there are so many chains popping up, competition could be stiff, its imperative that the network should be bullet proof & PR/Promo’s used to inform why Arb should be used , all the benefits etc. Furthermore, with reference to the grant proposals - these grants will make or break the network. I’ve seen other projects dish money seemingly willy nilly, where many of the dapps created are never used and some even go offline. Huge amounts of money wasted on projects that dont achieve anything. Selecting the right grants to approve and promoting over use of the Arb are keys to future success.


Thank you everyone for sharing your answers & thoughts.
I’ve learned alot here. Thanks.

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I agree with this. Its best to encourage people to find their own sources of income for arb and not make it inherent in the token itself.


I made a thread exposing my points about the Arb DAO.
I mentioned your forum post in one of the tweets.

I still don’t like it enough to participate. Even though I’m a fan of the entire ecosystem (which has no direct relation to the token)

But what about SEC? =/

There is a regulation haunting several ecosystems. Arbitrum is one of them.

I think what we can see is protocols that do that for us to delegate voting power.

“eliminate” feels harsh. Do you really think that’s a good goal for Arbitrum?

Although some people may find my language overly dramatic, I think it’s important to emphasize the potential benefits of arbitirum in order to win over new users. Our objective is to expand the platform’s reach, which would have a positive impact on all users, regardless of their motivations for using it

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Agreed, this is a problem that will be faced sooner or later

Yes there needs to be a staking contract – governance is not enough of a reasons for people to invest, especially when DAO governance itself is in a rather infantile state.

Regarding SEC concerns;

Point 1. The SEC doesn’t even have clear guidelines yet to enforce, this was clearly highlighted in recent committee hearing.

Point 2. The Howey test criteria in question here would be ‘the expectation of profit from the work of others’. So if you redirected protocol revenue to staking contract then this would potentially be an issue – even though its not likely to get targeted as there is even less clarity on liability for DAO’s. If the staking rewards came from the protocols own inflation/distribution or minted fund pool – then this would not technically meet the criteria as “profit from others”; rather, it is a form of distributing shares or ‘equity’.

The big problem if there is no reward incentive added;
Currently we have grant funds going out, getting dumped on market against retail buying in exclusively for voting rights. If this continues without change, then market value of Arbitrum will decrease overtime. The big risk here is that voting power then becomes much cheaper, and governance itself can be undermined by temporary buyers or ‘vote buying’ through escrow. From that, there is additional issues that unfold – malicious proposals that favor special interest or large holders; competitors that could acquire cheap voting power and stuff their own proposal through to negatively impact the ecosystem.

The solution is to have ve-token system with timelock for voting power; this gives more power to those that lock in commitment (and therefor exposure) to the protocol and its proposal outcomes. In this way, you mitigate many issues and incentivize governance proposals that are for the greater benefit of the longterm prospects. i.e. if you are locked in for some years, you improve the mindfulness and thoughtfulness of governance proposals – as voters are vulnerable to the outcome.

Unlike how it is currently – vote buying can undermine the DAO completely. That is, people can purchase temporary exposure to create a permanent impact; this is why other DAO’s have went the route of timelock and staking methods – its not about “milking wealth” as some have said, its about the integrity of governance.

If this project is serious about being a DAO, then it needs better protections against the long understood issues that undermine token weighted governance. For now you have downward pressure from liquidating grant funding, and an exposed risk of ‘pay to play’ governance.

All in all, I think a snapshot should be created to vote on introducing a staking contract to better support price appreciation, and ideally combined as a locking contract for voting power. Letting the price fall too low is a risk to governance, and without timelocking for voting power you have another major risk to governance.

Whilst there is a veto panel, that itself undermines the whole point of having a DAO from a security and trustless aspect – there is little point in placing trust in a DAO or blockchain if it depends on also extending that trust to a veto panel of human operators. The point is to remove the dependency on centralized points of failure; this being the corruptible nature of humans in leu of centralized power.

Reward incentives need to be added for token holders otherwise you might as well not have a DAO aspect at all. If no one else wants to formally submit such a proposal with detail, then I will do this myself in a few days.

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I do not think any functionality should be added to the $ARB token in its current form. It’s a governance token. 1 token = 1 voting share