gm, I am generally aligned and this sums up my view.
Inefficiencies are clear. Could you outline the misalignments you’ve observed so the DAO and the new Treasury Committee can address them?
This is a great call and I think it should be added into the requirements. It’s much more effective than a static report, and I’m sure Entropy’s data team can craft a useful interface.
I want to emphasise the points raised by Camelot, JoJo and TID.
The treasury has four objectives IMO:
-
Generate yield so the DAO is self-sustaining. This is the core of the Entropy plan and matches the focus of previous committees.
-
Grow the DAO’s real-world-asset exposure and diversify risk.
-
Support established Arbitrum protocols.
-
Bootstrap liquidity for new Arbitrum projects. Early liquidity means other users feel confident to deposit funds, and all the DeFi flywheels that protocols enable can actually work.
One million dollars spread across nascent protocols is probably far more valuable than the same sum parked in T-bills.
This is distinct from the DRIP incentives proposal; here I am speaking about direct liquidity provision, for example:
• The DAO provides backstop liquidity to tokenised houses from Estate Protocol at a predefined floor to anchor prices.
• $200k of liquidity is supplied to a new perpetual exchange to compress funding costs.
• $500k is lent to solver pools so intents can settle promptly (RIP Chain Abstraction Proposal ).
The Treasury Management Council should publish its intended allocation split for the year and retain discretion to redeploy capital quickly into high-impact liquidity pools.