# Camelot Delegate Communication Thread **URL:** \ **Category:** Delegate Statements\ **Created:** [February 17, 2025, 12:41pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/camelot-delegate-communication-thread/28469 "2025-02-17T12:41:55Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 6
**Author:** ![Camelot](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/forum.arbitrum.foundation/camelot/32/12121_2.png) [@Camelot](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/Camelot)\ **Post date:** [June 13, 2025, 8:24am UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/camelot-delegate-communication-thread/28469/6 "2025-06-13T08:24:45Z")
# **June 2025 voting** * * * * * * ## **Snapshot votings** ### [Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratify the Agentic Governance Pivot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x9ea3f5ef5b6c838ffc24430bb927baa13bf25dcf5f444358e89f0958bb41a5e7) **Vote: B - Reduce delegation to 100K** > [@\[RFC\] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-proposal-to-adjust-the-voting-power-of-the-arbitrum-community-pool-ratifying-the-agentic-governance-pivot/29280/26): > > Camelot supports Option B to reduce the delegation to 100,000 ARB. > At the time of the original proposal, Camelot voted against the initiative since we believed it was not bringing any meaningful value to the DAO. The subsequent change in scope from voter enfranchisement to AI-agentic governance provides, in our opinion, one more additional reason to reassess the delegated amount. > However, we recognize the potential value in experimenting with agents in governance, with an amount that is limited to 100,000 ARB delegated versus the initial 7M used by not too many users. AI is increasingly pervasive across various sectors and will likely find relevant use cases in DAO operations and decision-making processes. This represents a legitimate area for controlled experimentation. > > Due to this recognition and the fact that only a few months remain for this proposal’s original term, we suggest reducing the delegation to 100,000 ARB and analyzing the results in Q4. This approach allows Event Horizon to continue their agentic governance experimentation while significantly reducing the potential impact on DAO voting outcomes. ### [Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1de2707ab4cf792721544a8f82eee98535c16ce437ba2ac95a78c85c20b6d8b0) **Vote: Wind Down the MSS** > [@Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/20): > > Camelot supports this proposal to transfer multisig operations to the Arbitrum Foundation and, later if deemed necessary, to OpCo when it becomes operationalized. While there is value in involving the DAO in various functions, multisig management represents the typical task where efficiency and security are the most important features. For this reason, placing these responsibilities in the hands of Arbitrum-aligned entities makes considerable sense: the Foundation’s, having the role of compliance member and having full-time employees that are better trained in OpSec compared to DAO members, and the internal legal capacities, makes them the most suitable interim custodian of these functions. > > We also have a general preference for the transactions related to the DAO programs being timely executed. For whoever operated multisigs, is easy to recognize how the current 7/12 or 8/12 threshold is slow and inefficient; but we also can’t realistically go below this threshold in DAO operated multisigs. We realistically see as the only path forward consolidating the functions under Foundation first, and OpCo later. ### [Reallocate Redeemed USDM Funds to STEP 2 Budget](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xfd373c58adbb013a05c778b71ccffb19e5bbefb8a100232f67eced33c58e22f7) **Vote: For** > [@Reallocate Redeemed USDM Funds to STEP 2 Budget](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/reallocate-redeemed-usdm-funds-to-step-2-budget/29335/3): > > Camelot supports this proposal as it represents the most logical step forward given the circumstances. The reallocation of redeemed USDM funds to the STEP 2 budget is, in our view, a straightforward administrative action. > We obviously believe these funds should be allocated as soon as possible to avoid losing any interest on the principal. > > More importantly, we think this precedent should set a standard for similar cases in which the DAO needs to recover stablecoins and wants to redeploy them quickly. For future instances where external factors force the redemption of approved treasury assets, we shouldn’t be required to go through a snapshot vote for redeployment into previously approved allocations. Such administrative decision should fall directly into the entities managing the treasury of the DAO. ### [Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x65b2b835f03bc18aa401b88702145e6b7686e8d7ddddfd956837251f8a7a7da1) **Vote: For** > [@Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/36): > > Camelot has voted “for” extending the OpCo capabilities. While there are some specific details in the proposal, it is our strong belief that this is a natural path toward supporting the people we collectively decided to vote for in the OAT. > > > [@Camelot](#): > > > > We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo. > > Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way. > > We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well. > > We believe, as we did previously, that both the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs should be put in the best position possible to exercise direct leadership on both the ecosystem and the DAO. For what it’s worth, we did forecast in the last six months how a healthy OpCo should have evolved toward a more enlarged scope, not specifically encapsulated by the rails of the initial proposal. Our goal is to ensure this entity can indeed have a meaningful impact on how the DAO acts toward the chain and in coordinating all other entities; at the same time, it is paramount to reaffirm how the privileged position of OpCo makes both the Foundation and the Labs even more accountable than before for the results of the ecosystem. ### [Let’s improve our governance forum with three proposals.app feature integrations](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x38663c36b26252acff6c6ca43663167858f51f960235dc0441bd2ad4a8f66fb1) **Vote: Against** > [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Let’s improve our governance forum with three proposals.app feature integrations](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-let-s-improve-our-governance-forum-with-three-proposals-app-feature-integrations/29398/70): > > Camelot has voted “against” this proposal. We are builders first and foremost, so we want to be mindful of the efforts of Andrej and Paulo. We do appreciate experiments in Arbitrum and we do appreciate the effort of moving from an early stage to a full-fledged product. That said, we don’t currently see enough value in the deliverables proposed nor in the price tag associated. All the updates are “nice to have” updates, that can surely improve the life of delegates, but are not meaningful enough to justify an initiative financed by the DAO. At the same time, we do believe that even the new cost, $60k for one year compared to the previous $100k a year for a total of $200k over two years, is still excessive, despite the 40% reduction. Finally, we think the DAO currently should be focused not on governance matters or governance tooling, but on approaching a competitive landscape that is slowly eating away the advantage Arbitrum has built over time. The focus of the DAO should be on increasing activity on the chain, volume, and daily active users. ### [Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xfab795313df4ef1023c5f7f9027857637cc3841d62dc0b54796fbfa5f8096919) **Vote: For** > [@Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-treasury-management-council-consolidating-efforts/29334/10): > > Camelot supports this proposal as we believe in consolidation principles and avoiding waste of resources to streamline organizational efficiency. > The current fragmented approach across TMC, GMC, and STEP committees has proven, at least on the side of cost, inefficient so far, and likely will show limitation in coordinating effort over time. > We understand that Entropy is stewarding this initiative and that Entropy responds to the DAO, so it is natural that they lean toward acting in the best interest of the DAO and, specifically, in making the DAO independent and positive revenue generating ofr itself. However, we want to avoid the same situation as previous GMC and TMC rounds in which inclusion of protocols, and especially Arbitrum native protocols, was extremely low. > > Camelot believes there is significant margin to create yield strategies for the DAO with well-balanced risk through the utilization of Arbitrum protocols, so that we realize both revenue for the DAO and growth of the ecosystem. We think this point should be of primary importance in the initiative. > There is even more merit to this approach because Entropy is positioned to manage the DRIP initiative if that vote passes. While the initiatives are totally different, from a practical standpoint Entropy would then be able to manage both incentive assets and treasury assets. This creates even more reason for accountability and for also being sensitive toward growth goals for the whole ecosystem rather than focusing solely on traditional yield optimization. We sincerely think there is room for both. > > We also want to be mindful about how this initiative represents another key one in which AF/OCL/Entropy have the lead. While it makes sense for AAEs to have this lead, since they are best positioned from a business, technological and ecosystem standpoint, we also need to remind ourself how these are just more reasons to keep the AAEs accountable since, at this point, all leverages are there for them to operate effectively. As expected from the Vision post, all strategic initiatives are now slowly transitioning in the hands or will be in the hands of AAEs. We won’t be able to have proper accountability without spelling out clearly what success looks like, and if something doesn’t play out as expected, the AAEs will have to properly analyze what happened, why, and find countermeasures that the DAO will have to agree upon. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xeb044e3bdeba71e74dea02abeab4c33fe4bf5ab9def50082863702d5e2112b93) **Vote: For** We are obviously in favour of cutting any excessive cost on Nova, especially now that we are seeing the Orbit stack becoming more and more predominant in the ecosystem. It would be interesting to understand if there is any specific strategic plan for this product; at the same time, the proposal is sounding and logic for the current time being. * * * ## **Tally votings** ### [DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13050485773425645466153415888358064378805606653363056526521393182333458879398?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) **Vote: For** Confirming the snapshot vote ### [[CANCELED] CONSTITUTIONAL Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/16288348195459185256236376597446433097934740027053618232242382845767010422421?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) **Vote: Against** Being the payload wrong we are voting against --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/camelot-delegate-communication-thread/28469)._