Everyone with their free bag of governance tokens (which have no stated value to begin with) suddenly DAO government experts overnight…
There have been more serious mistakes in DAO spaces than this. They provided an explanation, which should suffice. They have to satisfy their partners. Token holders do not own or entirely rule the DAO; that’s a fantasy of Web3 purity. If you think differently, you can always give (not sell) the tokens back and leave the project.
If the team needed funding, they should have made that clear. You can’t pretend all it good, then secretly loot the treasury and expect the people to be ok with this.
putting the word ratification on it, after the fact, doesn’t fix it. People don’t want it, and didn’t know it was happening. This is the same as any project launching and selling tokens into the FOMO of the investors.
Now that the “ratification” is not “officially valid” you have driven a wedge between the investors and the community, and the team. It’s apparently obvious that you attempted to squeeze your funding into a large encompassing proposal, hoping it would go unnoticed. This is presumptuous but likely the sentiment of most people reading this now.
This proposal from the start was wrong. It was a proposal to nullify the need for governance, which was already nullified.
NOW, I do support the idea that teams do work, and dam well should be paid well for doing so, but you can’t do it secretly in DeFi, you have to put yoru cards on the table so we can all work together to make things right.
Yes there will always be greed of the individual, but we can socially reduce the greed of the groups.
I am not an airdrop participant. I bought your tokens looking at your official information. unfortunately you fooled us. you also fooled the participants of the DAO by launching a fake vote. show us an information from the distribution of tokens, wallets, companies. Community needs to see your actions and otherwise you will not be trusted
Firstly, you centered polygon which is not right because polygon is never a governance token and they operate like a centralised infra where there’s not much dependency on community to participate.
Secondly, there can be miss communication but the day you guys internally discussed to launch a DAO didn’t you know the the status of the runway and why you guys all of the sudden need ARB for operations?
Thirdly, it’s better you take the inspiration of MakerDAO where they transparently communicate every action taken by CUs and their work, financial info in the forum and viewable.
We’re all learning, mistakes are common in such revolving space. But governance need to be respected at any cost.
What exactly is the purpose of loaning $50 million to wintermute, and who made this decision? I understand that companies that IPO often pay an investment bank to make a market in their shares, but ARB is not a stock - it is a “valueless” governance token. “Valueless” is the operative word, because, in hiring Wintermute as a market maker, you are elevating Wintermute’s opinion as to what the valuation of ARB should be, over and above other DAO members and tokenholders. There was simply no reason to hire a market maker at all - especially when Arbitrum is chock-full of trustless DEXes, and many ARB holders were willing to provide liquidity on them, so the decision to do so has rightly been met with skepticism. Instead of consulting the ARB holders on a decision that affects the liquidity/market dynamics of their own token, the team opted to shower favors on a centralized, opaque private market maker.
@stonecoldpat Please clearly explain the thought process behind hiring Wintermute for this service. What are the exact terms of the contract? What terms has Wintermute agreed to, and who at Offchain Labs authorized this contract? What is the benefit to the Arbitrum Foundation which Wintermute was hired to deliver? If the only answer is “more liquidity” - then there is no NET benefit to the DAO because any added liquidity in the token is being paid for by the foundation itself…
I fail to see how having more liquidity in ARB token furthers the goals of the foundation. In the stock market you can rationalize this behavior by saying that, from a corporate governance standpoint, if there is better liquidity in a stock, then more sophisticated institutions with larger bankrolls may be more comfortable to finance the company – so the added liquidity theoretically increases the value of the firm’s equity. But there is no equity in the Arbitrum Foundation, so what exactly is the DAO optimizing for when they hire a 3rd party market maker?
You may argue that with more liquidity, more people will be willing to buy the token, but the goals of the Arbitrum Foundation are not tangibly improved by deeper liquidity - it is only 3rd party investors who benefit from the liquidity. Indeed, swiss foundations are only tax-exempt because the are funding public goods that are non-excludable - but the added liquidity in ARB only benefits buyers and sellers of ARB, not the public at large, and disproportionately benefits the team/investors in a private, for profit company.
Please disclose all terms agreed to with wintermute, and how the decision was reached.
I do not think the issue here is on whether the Foundation should be have a budget for BD (or potential even whether it should do a loan to a MM).
Anybody sensible would agree with those points: those are required for Arbitrum to succeed.
For example, if the docs had been clear that the Foundation got a 750m airdrop (even better if suggested to vesting), I don’t think there would have been much of a debate here.
People would have simply debated on what is the best and most efficient way for the Foundation to use those. Nothing else, nothing more.
The problem is simply that
i) The docs did not mention it
ii) The circulating supply & the resulting market cap everybody used and made an investment decision on, was simply false. There was not 1.25bn tokens in circulation, but more. What should be used now? 50m more tokens to reflect 10m sold + 40m used by MM (sounds sensible)? Or 750m more tokens if the use of the word “ratification” implies those can enter circulation as early as today, without any vote?
iii) What was the rush to sell, without any transparency, 10m tokens which likely covers the cost of running such a foundation for quite some time?
iv) By saying that AIP-1 is simply a “ratification”, the governance powers of the ARB tokens are damaged, hence the token’s value suffer. If the proposal ends up being implemented as-is despite tokenholders voting against it, how does the token have any governance powers?
What is done is done and cannot really be undone. However, it is pretty obvious that ARB tokenholders do not agree with AIP-1 as it was put forward.
I am just an retarded anon with an absolutely irrelevant amount of tokens. However, using my 60 IQ, I suspect the best way forward is likely to
i) Never say again that votes do not matter
ii) Hold the bulk of the 700m tokens remaining in a contract with linear vesting (I doubt $1bn in ARB tokens need to be spent day1). The contract is not immutable and can be amended by subsequent governance vote
iii) Increase the number of directors in the Foundation to 5. At least 3 of the individuals acting as Directors should not come from Offchain Labs (nor any VC firm that invested in it) in order to improve decentralisation and give reassurances to token holders that the grants will be used to ensure the success of the ecosystem rather than be a slush fund (as it happened on some alt L1s)
iv) Give some transparency and detail around year 1 of budget (or at least what the setup costs & expenses in the coming months are) so people better understand why there was a rush to sell 10m tokens
v) Suggest what the application process and general criteria for grants will be (it does not need to be extremely detailed, just a framework should do the trick)
This should be enough for AIP-2 to pass easily and goodwill to be rebuilt
This continues to be my largest concerns with DAOs. Votes are just recommendations rather than reality. Why give us the ability to vote if the decisions will continue to be made by the small group of people who are signing the multi sig.
We are so far from decentralization that we should abandon the term DAO until it is more meaningful. This is an Organization.
AIP-1 did not raise any questions for me. In addition, it is pleasing that the community is involved in management. And community members are ready to put forward questions for public discussion, and not just be a holder of ARB tokens. In fact, now we are laying the foundation - the foundation of our DAO. And it is very important to have an understanding and transparency of the decisions that are being made.
So, is this merely a formality, with the result of the proposal being insignificant? You need to clarify the real-world implications if the proposal passes, as well as if it fails. The community requires transparency, and it’s honestly absurd to establish such a precedent for the DAO.
While acknowledging the positive aspects of the project, I have some concerns about the allocation of tokens to the Arbitrum Foundation in AIP-1. I believe that the allocation could have been distributed differently or may not be entirely fair. It’s important to voice these concerns and engage in the community discussion to help shape the direction of the project. I look forward to future proposals that address some of these concerns.
The Dao can start by asking for less and detailing what it will be using it for. Asking for 750 Mil tokens (almost a billy) is alot with basically no information. I get there is going to be pilferage here and there but a billy… no thanks