Can we get the action contract verified? @offchainlabs
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The action contract has been verified. Thanks for flagging!
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Can you check the transaction?
I see that the text says 30,765.667501709008927568 ETH will be transferred.
In hexadecimal notation, itâs 0x683d954c97f692a910.
But the transaction has a different value: 0x683ceb5c7a099c63b50.
The difference is small, but itâs not explained anywhere, and it could be a problem if thereâs any legal action.
thanks! Looks good, voted FOR
Look carefully: 30,765.667401709008927568 ETH
Itâs a value from https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000DA0
You sent a different value 30,765.617401709008927568 ETH
Theyâre different, and thatâs important.
I donât want to vote for an amount that doesnât match what needs to be sent.
@cp0x You were correct, my mistake; I deleted my comment to avoid confusion.
It looks like the discrepancy, 0.05 ETH, exists to account for the tx fee (.05 ETH is the txâs gas limit * fee per gas). I think this is necessary because of the unusual way this tx is being created; i.e., a one-off unsigned EOA tx through the inbox.
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Yes, I suspect itâs for gas,
But Iâm sure the court wonât accept that explanation.
If funds need to be spent to transfer the stolen property, they must be spent by Foundation/DAO.
For the DAO, this is a trifle and an operating expense, but doing so will lead to legal problems later.
Iâm not a lawyer, but I canât imagine this would be an issue. The actual fact (I believe) is that for this transaction type, only funds already in the account can be used for the transaction fee; thus itâs impossible for anyone else to spot the cost in the transaction itself. If for whatever legal reason the Foundation/DAO needs to cover the cost of tx fee, that can easily be handled out of band. In dollar terms, weâre talking about a hundred dollar discrepancy in a 65 million dollar transfer.
(Regardless, it was a good call-out).
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The following reflects the views of L2BEATâs governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and discussion.
We voted FOR.
This amended proposal is materially different from the original recovery structure, even if the broader recovery objective remains the same.
We recognize that this situation raises difficult questions around governance neutrality, legal coordination, and the relationship between DAOs and traditional legal systems.
At the same time, from our perspective, this does not set a precedent or a concerning case of governance being forced by external legal pressure. The DAO was not compelled by the court to take this course of action. Rather, governance determined that this path was the most reasonable and responsible way to resolve the situation under the current circumstances.
Importantly, this approach allows the Arbitrum DAO to conclude its direct involvement in the matter while transferring responsibility for handling the recovery process appropriately to Aave LLC. It also preserves the recovery objective previously supported during temp-check and provides a clear support to move the situation toward a resolution.
Finally, we believe this was a proper course of action of the DAO. This resolution demonstrates that Arbitrum DAO is capable of acting responsibly in complex situations and takes its governance responsibilities seriously as a participant within the broader crypto ecosystem.
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Voting FOR this proposal:
Acknowledging the situation is far from ideal, the restraining notice currently in place makes this the most viable path forward, one that offers meaningful protection to delegates and tokenholders. The changes that followed are purely operational in nature and have not altered the spirit of the original proposal in the slightest.
While the critical path has changed, the reassurances and alternatives presented continue pointing toward the same objective. With our main concerns partially addressed, supporting this proposal allows the process to move forward so that Arbitrum users and other affected parties can begin restoring their positions.
gm, Voting FOR.
I understand the changes made to the original proposal and support the pragmatic approach: it helps move funds back to affected users while reducing the DAOâs ongoing role in a legally uncertain situation.
Voting FOR.
Releasing these already-frozen exploiter proceeds through the court-authorized Aave LLC transfer path is the most practical way to keep the rsETH recovery moving and reduce ongoing harm to affected users. I do think this process exposed a real gap, and Arbitrum should follow this with a standing policy for handling Security Council-frozen assets in future third-party exploit situations.
We are deeply in favor of utilizing the funds to reback rsETH on Aave. We wanted to comment that we are also in alignment with equally distributing the funds, and we are happy to see other delegates agree. Our reasoning is that the funds did not come from Arbitrumâs treasury, so Arbitrum does not necessarily have an extra claim to unique reimbursement. This shouldnât be an issue anyways because it seems Defi United has raised enough funds, ideally avoiding the haircut altogether.
Lastly we are in favor of speeding up the process in any way possible. We thought @daniel 's idea #1 of getting someone to loan the 30765 ETH was great. If itâs impossible to find someone to loan that much out individually, perhaps Defi United can add an option to loan ethâand then the frozen rsEth can be used to pay them back once the proposal passes.
Following the successful onchain vote, the proposal payload has now been executed and 30,765.6 ETH has been transfered to Aave LLC.
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