Hey everyone, here are the follow up responses to the new questions that have not been previously addressed.
Timeboost is at the beginning of the governance process and must undergo forum discussion here, a Snapshot vote, and an onchain vote (Constitutional AIP) before being adopted on mainnet. Collecting feedback from potential participants and the community is essential throughout the governance process. Changes to the design and/or implementation may be made to address feedback and impact the timelines.
It is worth clarifying that the participant would have to predict the amount of MEV generated between 15s and 1min 15s in the future - not 1 minute later. This is because the auction is closed and resolved at a maximum of 15 seconds before the start of the next round (in the current proposal). Willing participants are expected to bid continuously for the right to use the express lane in advance so that they (the participants) can profit from both (1) MEV opportunities they predict between 15s and 1min 15s in the future and (2) MEV opportunities in real time during the period of time that the participant is in control of the express lane (proposed duration: 1 minute), if the participant wins the auction. If the participant does not win control of the express lane, opportunities that they see in real time can still be exploited, but with a 200ms delay like all other txns (since only the express lane controller has experiences no delay for their txns).
We acknowledge FastLane’s work and the perceived similarity in approach, but we believe the design of Timeboost is fundamentally different from FastLane’s design. We further believe that both designs were aimed at solving different problems. It is our understanding that FastLane sold advantage separately for each AMM market and in txn propagation among peers. Timeboost, on the other hand, sells an advantage in txn inclusion timing and therefore sells the opportunity to profit from MEV altogether.