# Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy **URL:** \ **Category:** Finalized AIPs\ **Tags:** proposal\ **Created:** [June 28, 2024, 2:49am UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-proposal-to-adopt-timeboost-a-new-transaction-ordering-policy/25167 "2024-06-28T02:49:58Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 83
**Author:** ![opmichael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/f6c823/32.png) [@opmichael](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/opmichael)\ **Post date:** [September 21, 2024, 7:08pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-proposal-to-adopt-timeboost-a-new-transaction-ordering-policy/25167/83 "2024-09-21T19:08:20Z")
I think this is a really interesting mechanism but I would love to see more discussion on the following scenario from the @chaoslabs report: > [@Timeboost Risk Analysis](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/timeboost-risk-analysis/26789/1): > > Example of potential Timeboost Ordering MEV on liquidation: > > 1. The express lane owner identifies a liquidatable account on a perpetual futures protocol. > 2. The express lane operator maximizes their profit by executing a sandwich attack, taking advantage of their 200ms latency edge (or however Timeboost is configured). This predictability allows them to execute the liquidation unopposed and complete the sandwich strategy: > > - They first sell a large number of perpetual contracts on the relevant market, driving the price lower by either consuming order book bids or impacting the protocol’s pricing inputs, such as open interest imbalance. > - They then liquidate the account, further pushing the price downward. > - Finally, they close their position by buying back the contracts at the now-lower price. > - As a result, users receive less collateral after the liquidation than they would have if the sandwich attack hadn’t occurred. Wouldn’t this create a massive risk for anyone holding a leveraged position or a stop-loss order? Also worth noting that MEV in general thrives when there is a lot of chaos and volatility in the market. When a single player can capture all MEV for a full 240 blocks on Arbitrum One, doesn’t this provide a big incentive to create chaos onchain (breaking stablecoins, liquidation cascades, etc)? I fully realize that I may be missing something here but I’d love to know if these kinds of attacks have been considered. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-proposal-to-adopt-timeboost-a-new-transaction-ordering-policy/25167)._