# \[Constitutional\] DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters **URL:** \ **Category:** Finalized AIPs\ **Created:** [January 29, 2026, 3:51pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484 "2026-01-29T15:51:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 35
**Author:** ![cp0x](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/forum.arbitrum.foundation/cp0x/32/5455_2.png) [@cp0x](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/cp0x)\ **Post date:** [February 24, 2026, 4:18pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/35 "2026-02-24T16:18:58Z")
**Ahead of future on-chain vote** By approving DTV quorum, we may be addressing the quorum issue, but we are overlooking another, potentially more serious one. 1. I’ve seen arguments claiming that as delegations grow, new delegates will naturally join and voter apathy won’t be a problem. That feels overly optimistic. What exactly would drive that? 2. The more concerning issue is security. At current ARB prices, with the reduced quorum, roughly $17M worth of voting power would be enough to reach constitutional quorum and very likely determine the outcome of almost any proposal. Governance attacks become significantly cheaper. One might argue that the Security Council serves as a safeguard. But what prevents someone, at relatively low cost, from influencing the next cohort election and placing aligned candidates on the Council – individuals who may not block certain decisions when it matters most? If quorum reform is pursued, it must go hand in hand with strengthened governance security. Reducing quorum without addressing attack vectors risks solving one problem while creating a much larger one. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484)._