Over the past few weeks I’ve reached out directly to several delegates and ecosystem orgss ( including Offchain Labs, Entropy Advisors) to gather feedback/their perspectives around bringing a utility/premium to the ARB token. So far, I’ve only received responses from three delegates.
Based on the limited replies and the broader lack of engagement, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that there is no appetite (at least in the near/short term) to bring a utility to ARB. The annual SOS is coming up soon, in which one of the potential objectives was bringing a utility/premium to the token. We’ll see if that passes through.
This post highlights a governance-related issue: delegates currently lack the motivation to move proposals beneficial to the DAO from discussion to implementation.
I think this can be compared to a two-party election in the US: delegates should act like candidates, vying for delegated votes around the proposals/agendas they want to promote.
simultaneously, the DAO could provide institutionalized incentives for those who truly advance proposals (emphasizing process and contribution, such as promotion, coordination, Q&A, iteration, and follow-up implementation).
This would break the current situation where many delegates are not proactively pushing forward, allowing things beneficial to the DAO and token holders to truly move forward.
I don’t necessarily think is a lack of motivation by many of the delegates. Based on the forum posts and messages, many of them do want some form of utility that can increase the token’s price. Based on the feedback received by some delegates and forum posts, my understanding its more of the larger delegates and orgs (Offchain Labs, Entropy, etc.) are not in favor/supporting relocating revenue to the token(ARB token investors) at this time so they can prioritize growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem so unless they are onboard not much will happen. Unfortunately..
It’s definitely discouraging as I believe a balance can be made between growth and the token but I can respect the direction.
My focus isn’t on incentivizing proposers, but rather on the fact that, as a decentralized DAO system, should delegates simply passively wait for proposals to be submitted and vote “Yes” or “No”?
When major voting delegates (like Offchain Labs and Entropy) disagree with a proposal, why can’t other delegates push for certain proposals to garner delegation from their token holders within the Arbitrum ecosystem? That’s what a DAO should be.
Therefore, I believe establishing a more suitable mechanism is crucial. Under the current mechanism, only proposals that gain significant voting power from Offchain Labs or other major stakeholders can be implemented; proposals they dislike can’t even undergo a simple snapshot temperature check.