I’ve seen it, you can call it v2 but literally nothing on the platform changed or was revamped. They added small additions to their smart contracts, nothing on v2 was an overhaul to the platform as any normal user would expect from a v2.
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Appreciate the response, but it absolutely is not “small additions to the smart contracts”.
If you have a bias or truly believe GMX is undeserving of the ask that is okay, but there is no need to undermine the hard work that many worked to deliver, it’s rather disingenuous.
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No bias, just calling it like I see it as a dev. I don’t doubt they worked hard but this isn’t a charity and they’re asking for more than any other protocol and haven’t innovated in my opinion at all since they launched. Just riding that first mover status.
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Entitled to your opinion, it’s obvious you won’t change your mind so going to leave the discussion here.
Again thanks for the feedback.
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Is the purpose of these grants to discover what is the most efficient use of grants, or to reward past success? I simply have trouble believing that blowing the budget on GMX is beneficial. There will be future grants that may be more fitting to such a large amount.
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GMX bring users, GMX bring liquidity.
Proposal is well put and thorough.
Not here to argue against low takes, but instead sharing love to all.
Happy to be building on Arbitrum and GMX
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GMX is the defining factor for what has set Arbitrum apart from other L2s.
Taking the grant size at face value, it is easy to say “oh bollocks, GMX has taken all the grants what about everyone else!”
The GMX team has shown through action that they support buildooors in the space.
GMX accounts for 25% of Arbitrum’s TVL.
A massive number of protocols build on top of GMX with many more in the proverbial pipeline.
This is not just a grant to GMX. This is a grant to DeFi on Arbitrum.
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Seeing how the rest of the granting program is developing, I still believe the size of the grant being close to 1/3 of the entire budget goes against the goals of this STIP, which main goal is to bootstrap Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.
I see only 3 potential solutions:
- Ask size is reduced to not drain as much of entire budget as it does now (28%+).
- Total grant budget (50M) is increased to accomodate the high demand that these STIPs produced (over 150M+ in ARB asks between all proposals).
- An alternative side DAO proposal is made on top for GMX to get extra funding out of the STIP scope.
Yes, GMX deserves a big grant, but this isn’t just about meriting past performance, but more about making the future of Arbitrum better for the entire ecosystem.
PS: before I get another NPC response with an entire essay of why GMX is the future of finance. We already agree on that. Please stay on topic – grant size, goals of the STIP for the entire ecosystem and possible solutions.
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100% Support for this proposal
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This exactly summarizes my thoughts on this proposal and also why I am in full support of it.
Let’s be honest, the fees that GMX generated and brought to Arbitrum were the main reason for the chains success this far. GLP. enough said.
Now the DAO has an opportunity to help GMX v2 usher in the next waive of fee generation for the protocol, and it’s users/LPs. I would not underestimate the fact that Sniper brings up here - fee generation will lead to further development of existing protocols (umami, Jones, GMD, Dolomite, mux, to name JUST a few) as well as new protocols and builders bringing innovative ways to take advtange of this as well.
I saw a comment about the risk of putting all eggs in one basket with GMX - hate the say this but that’s already the case, it’s time to double down on GMX and also other deserving protocols within the space, we need to keep in mind that there is way more than 50m ARB at the disposal of this DAO and there will be other rounds of grants for more protocols.
Full send. For ARBITRUM! (Mel Gibson William Wallace voice)
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V2 consists out of more than ‘a few changes’, V2 is essentially a new protocol being build from the ground up.
Please take a look at GitHub - gmx-io/gmx-synthetics before posting comments like this as such remarks may suggest a potential bias or lack of current awareness regarding the ongoing iteration.
As other people in the perpetual space have mentioned it’s a work of art and is one of the most solid codebases they came across.
Tweet for reference:
1 Like
I hope you see the catch-22. If GMX had moved forward with a liquidity and growth grant to the Arbitrum DAO (which would have been more expansive in scope, time, and funding as well), I agree that the chances of it passing were quite high, but that was actually the problem.
There is a reasonable chance that given the unclear way the DAO was approaching proposals, its not unreasonable to think that only GMX was in a position to garner that level of support in the ecosystem. Camelot’s proposal, despite broad support from builders, stumbled primarily on many delegates expressing reservations about a lack of a framework for the DAO to evaluate such proposals.
GMX contributors and community members, instead of just securing their own grant, which would have supported GMX, the GMX ecosystem, and Arbitrum, actively engaged in the DAO deliberation process to encourage the creation of a program. STIP provides an opportunity (not guarantee) that every other protocol in this vibrant ecosystem, including competing perp dexes, can also seek support and do their part in helping to grow Arbitrum. I personally advocated for the STIP budget limit to be as broad as possible so that, if delegates saw it appropriate could have greater flexibility to provide support to proposals (the 75m ARB original plan).
Today, to be accused of taking food off the plates of other protocols is definitely a difficult statement to read and one that I would strongly disagree with.
@flindy, having said this, I do appreciate your question and thoughtful feedback in both your posts on our proposal and that you have been diligently commenting on many proposals under the framework, this feedback and engagement is exactly what is needed as delegates evaluate all these proposals.
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in retrospect voting on a hard cap for the STIP before hearing how much teams wanted and what their proposals were was a mistake. We took a guess at what was needed without any information from the builders and underestimated how many teams were waiting for permission to ask for a grant.
GMX is taking food off the plates of competing perp dex, but its not GMXs fault its the design of the program. Teams should be free to outline exactly what they need to succeed and not low ball their own plans because they’re forced to consider the budget limit and other teams.
Something needs to be done, either the big players side step the STIP or the STIP budget is reassessed.
If some teams get their grant purely from a first come first served basis or because the voters are mindful of the budget limit and want to favour their favourite app, this is unfair and a future grant program wont help as being early to getting your grant matters when incentive programs boost your app. Making it even harder for smaller projects to compete after their competitors got their grant.
it would be a sad result if we continued as is out of fear that reshuffling the program might change the DAOs mind and ruin our first chance at incentive grants.
(not intending to put any stress or pressure on coinflip, he’s done enough)
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- They developed & implemented alongside Chainlink the new low latency oracles which work great and make the trading experience way smoother than rest of perp DEXes
- Change the whole model about liquidity pools to isolate risk to every pair
- Introduction of price impacts (both positive and negative) and funding fees to avoid unbalanced pools and higher risk to LPs
- Introduction of new markets
- …/… (countless other changes and added features)
You might prefer other protocols and that’s fine, but saying GMX has not innovated since launch is just a misinformed take or you clearly have a hidden agenda. It says more about you than GMX.
Have a nice day
3 Likes
I understand your point and don’t completely disagree, but efficiency is generally based on past data and success.
It has been raised by several people, and I don’t disagree that taking such a large part of the 50m when the total requested is already around 130m can be perceived as problematic.
But the real question is:
Is GMX asking for an excessive share of the grant compared to their role in Arbitrum ecosystem? Or rather is that the case for most of the other applications?
I tend to think it’s the latter.
If this proposal can make other protocols scale down their demands to more reasonable and adequate levels, then it is doubly worth of support.
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I understand if you disagree with that statement because you may not find it personally palpable. However, it is pretty transparent that this outcome is likely, if the grant proposal is approved in its full.
The situation necessitates GMX adjusting the requested amount to a more reasonable allocation that doesn’t overshadow the rest of the ecosystem. Numerous proposals are well-structured, justified, and deserving. I fully support GMX as a flagship protocol meriting a significant portion. However, the current request is exceptionally large. If granted in full, it raises concerns about the viability of competition for other perp dexes in the ecosystem. This is obviously not your concern, but should be a concern for the DAO and delegates representing the DAO.
I suggest GMX consider capping the grant allocation at 10m, specifically to be used for incentives for traders/liquidity.
1 Like
Thank you for that. I think most DEX perps actually agree that this is very much necessary to bring both liquidity and volume on-chain. The goal here is not to cannibalise from competing platforms, but rather take a piece from the big cake, which clearly is trading perps on centralised exchanges.
1 Like
In short. I strongly support the proposal.
Now my reasoning about it:
- GMX has been and continues to be the main player in Arbitrum based on every metric out there (TVL, fees, gas consumption, number of users etc)
Dominance is way higher than most people think, currently represents almost 40% of all the TVL in the chain (counting staked GMX) and similar percentages in terms of generated fees and users.
Asking for 24% of the rewards seems pretty reasonable if you ask me.
- v2 is even a bigger building block than GLP
Tons of projects will build on top of GMX and will be directed benefited by the ARB rewards, it already happened with GLP and the potential with v2 is even higher for a number of reasons(higher capital efficiency, lower risk to LPs, introduction of funding rates/price impact etc)
These rewards have the potential to influence positively the whole ecosystem, not just GMX.
Very few protocols (if any) are on this level here.
The fact that so many legit builders in this chain are vouching for GMX gives a good measure of how legit the GMX contributors are and how they have tried to be +EV in Arbitrum.
- Other chains are heavily incentivizing liquidity and activity
Just to give an example, current proposal for GMX would be comparable to what SNX ecosystem is receiving in form of OP tokens, even though GMX has higher amounts of Open Interest, organic fees etc
To drive those traders back to Arbitrum or from CEX to Arbitrum GMX needs allocation adequate to it’s size, the volumes it drives and the generated fees.
- GMX is asking for the lower amount of ARB rewards compared to the size of the protocol, with a really big difference in many cases.
Here is a table comparison from Castle Cap that highlights it. Not sure why everyone is asking “only” GMX to reduce allocation, when proportionally is pretty clear the imbalance is not here.
This does not apply just to TVL, same happens with fees, users etc.
I understand it’s the low hanging fruit due to being the higher in absolute terms, but please let’s not miss the forrest for the trees and be fair here.
Onwards
5 Likes
Just a couple of questions to understand better your stance.
Rest of these allocations are ok in your view? Or how much you would reduce the top ones?
GMX is 40% of the Arbitrum eco, not sure why people find it alarming it’s asking for 24% of the rewards when it’s proportionally asking way lower allocations than most projects with the best track record in making it count.
Especially when the heat here is way higher than in the rest of proposals
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This grant program isn’t about handing out incentives based on an ecosystem’s TVL share.
The STIP’s primary goal is to aid in fostering the long-term success of Arbitrum. And how has Arbitrum achieved its current success to this date? By remaining an open ecosystem that promotes competition, rather than by predominantly supporting individual protocols within their sectors. This approach should continue in the future.
I would still insist that this proposal be presented directly to the Arbitrum DAO, to separate from the STIP. This way, it wouldn’t stifle the competition vital for the ecosystem’s long-term prosperity and it reduce any level of toxicity brewing amongst communities and protocols. If GMX v2 is truly a leading protocol, it will flourish, irrespective of where the incentives originate – the DAO or the STIP. Yet, monopolizing a significant portion of the STIP could undermine the very open competition the DAO should be encouraging.
While GMX undeniably played a crucial role in Arbitrum’s initial success, it would not be a diligent decision to continue relying indefinitely on a single protocol moving forward and therefore i struggle to see total justification to take a lions share of the STIP.
Arbitrum will continue to prosper if it persists in championing competition. By striking a balanced approach of supporting key protocols but also enabling some level of competition, the objectives of the STIP can be met whilst also adhering to the values of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I’m not going to start undermining all of those grants in the list provided. But in fact, I believe a majority should either be denied or have their sizes reduced. This especially applies to those near the top of the list, which seem either lackluster or excessively large in their requests.
To be clear, I support GMX’s proposal more than the five proposals that rank below it on the list but the top requested size needs far more scrutiny, particularly because it sets a precedence and standard for those beneath it.
6 Likes