# JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

**URL:** <https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/jojo-delegate-communication-thread/24429>\
**Category:** Delegate Statements\
**Tags:** delegation, governance, delegate-statements\
**Created:** [May 25, 2024, 1:13pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/jojo-delegate-communication-thread/24429 "2024-05-25T13:13:11Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 8

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**Author:** ![JoJo](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/forum.arbitrum.foundation/jojo/32/2666_2.png) [@JoJo](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/JoJo)\
**Post date:** [November 1, 2024, 12:07pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/jojo-delegate-communication-thread/24429/8 "2024-11-01T12:07:27Z")

</div>

# **November 2024 voting**

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## **Snapshot votings**

### [Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x2e701a942a8ed6f9ec8302cea866ab08648eeef0d07170814e3a3c3eb4e48415)

**Vote: For**

> [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO's Operations](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/41):
>
> Voting in favour of the code of conduct.
> 
> First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.
> 
> While I can understand that most are concerned about hard implementation, I think the soft one is fine, for one reason: if we come to the point of having to exclude someone from the dao life (dip, or other), it is unlikely to come from just a single event. It will come from a behaviour, over time, that will show poor alignment with the dao as a whole, likely culminating with a single event that can be used as a proxy.  
> I am again positive, and optimist, on the fact that all the og and good delegates we have in here will just constantly observe what happens in the forum, in the chat, in the vote rationale, and also in twitter, and will do their best to solve conflicts and realign parties before we come to the point of having to take actions based on violation of the code of conduct.
> 
> Also thanks entropy for this!

### [[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x6065f661e3f2a5673284d3d5801dfa0126218c1840215426b576effc19fcc107)

**Vote: For**

> [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Treasury Management v1.2](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/51):
>
> Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: **in favour.**
> 
> The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
> 
> > [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Treasury Management v1.2](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/48):
> >
> > However, I don’t see this proposal as true treasury management.
> 
> I can kinda agree here. This is not necessarily treasury management at full scope, but is a management of a subpart of assets, with just a certain consciousness of DAO spending (regen reports) and no DAO budget yet. It tries to address some needs that we have, plus create yield on some assets doing, effectively, nothing for now.  
> So again: is it treasury management satisfying all the needs we have in term of spending, risk, yield etc? No. But we don’t have these info, and to me is a very good way to start.  
> It tried to go for low hanging fruits such as eth staking, stable convertion and some yield. Already with this, in the environment (our dao) that we have, historically quite resilient to these initiative, we see a decent opposition.
> 
> I think instead is good that we start exactly here, and evolve into what we need: in 6 months we might have the opco, likely another more aggressive type of market regime, we will have hopefully some insight into timeboost revenue, and other iniative laid down that will tell us if we will have to increase/decrease size, risk, type of assets, etc.
> 
> Now let’s go on doubt, margin of improvements and others.
> 
> > [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Treasury Management v1.2](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/19):
> >
> > Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives.
> 
> I don’t have an opinion as strong as this one but can understand the rationality. At the same time, I can understand the rationality like entropy said of the two buckets being run with different skillset in mind.  
> I think the effective answer is a mix of both: there could be different people in the operation of both buckets, but there should be a single overview to always have a tab on what is effectively happening from a risk standpoint. I think, for now, the current setup is good enough, and hope that in 6 months, at renewal or under opco, it will be instead made more cohesive.
> 
> Another big improvement part in future will be STEP: it necessarily has to converge in these initiative. While it also add a somehow very specific growth nature, even more so on a BD and advertisement level since it was also about attracting institution in our DAO, we don’t have to forget how in the end the goal of that initiative was to have stables deployed in RWA to produce yield for the DAO. In 6 months it should converge into whatever we will have here, and any phase 2 for step, if started in the meantime, should be setup with this merging goal in mind.
> 
> On a final note on the people involved and the process so far proposed.
> 
> > [@\[Non-Constitutional\] Treasury Management v1.2](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/44):
> >
> > More broadly, GFX usually votes against proposals that bundle _creation of an office_ and _ratification of specific persons to hold that office._
> 
> I can honestly say that this makes a lot of sense as a general approach, but not always. As usual, devil is in the details, and we are a DAO in which we tend to try and have a say in everything, always.  
> In this very instance we have a topic that is both extremely complex (treasury management), requires a lot of expertise and so specific figures, and a history of the DAO not finding right away the path (remember the karp/gauntlet proposal was on discussion i think in july, almost 5 months ago). The fact that we need to move toward _some sort_ of treasury management, the fact that in 6 months this will likely be revised, and the fact that Entropy made the DD on all candidates, to me is more than enough to support this initiative. And I hope others will see, more than the imperfections of it, the important step forward that it will be for the DAO, knowing that we will be able to adjust it along the road.

### [Restitution For Extensively Delayed ArbitrumDAO Minigrant Winners](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x76ebc8056e283411cfed5cefad171e245b56fe3bc3d36d702244aab3faae689c)

**Vote: Against**

> [@Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-for-financial-restitution-for-arbitrumdao-grant-winners/27020/93):
>
> > [@Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-for-financial-restitution-for-arbitrumdao-grant-winners/27020/53):
> >
> > Never chimed in the discussion so far, but let me reiterate what others already posted: in a grant program that is denominated in non stable currencies, the change of value in payment is expected.
> > 
> > Is quite unfortunate that this resulted in delay and a blocker for most projects; but this doesn’t necessarily entile the project to further compensantion because nobody would be here if arb would have gone from 2$ to 4$. And this is something i can say first hand because not only i have been in several grant programs, i also have been in programs with payments denominated in arb, in which grantee never complained when price was going up, but had some reservation when it was going down.
> > 
> > This to be clear is not to flip responsability on you. I simpathize with your situation, and having served a lot of small team with grants I know how important these milestones can be just for the survivability of a team, or to effectively ship the product. There was a problem in the program, a lot of delays, that had bad consequences on the operation of project. This will mean that the dao, next time, either won’t vote for the same people to run the program, or for the program itself.
> > 
> > But it doesn’t necessarily mean that the dao should compensate people who requested the grant and saw the dollar value going down. We could, at scale, apply this to the LTIPP program, in which 60M of arbs got distributed, with proposal coming in when arb was way above 1$, and projects receiving the stream for users up to the point in which it was worth 0.4$. While different (we are talking about opex in your case, incentive to users in this case), should there be an argument for it as well? The answer is obviously no.
> 
> Consistently with this, I have voted against this proposal.
> 
> I really sympathise with both the proposer and the team affected, I really do, and I can understand the frustration. But the grant program has always been denominated in arb.  
> To give an example, in LTIPP, proposers created specific kpi on economic value based on arb at the time of their proposal (around 1.7$). They effectively received arb at a value that was below 0.8$ or less, and we are talking about 30, 40M arbs. This extreme example is to show that for non denominated arb grants there will always be this problem; it’s unfortunately more prominent in grants that are for smaller team, because it can really make the difference for the survivability of a project.  
> But again the dao can’t take the burden of how volatile the asset is; the dao can for sure take in consideration how there was a big problem with the service provider involved, and try to find ways to correct this behaviour in future.  
> It’s really quite unfortunate, I don’t think it would be fair to set this precedent.

### [Hackathon Continuation Program](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf922eb584e616475100222fba40b0d6574ffc113bbb5b92b76e40bb2a91e45dc)

**Vote: In favour, yes onchain mechanism**

> [@Hackathon Continuation Program](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/hackathon-continuation-program/27492/62):
>
> Voting in favor, with the option of onchain.
> 
> First, the structure is quite interesting. I have chatted privately with Daniel on this proposal, the mentorship part is something that inheretly comes in grant programs for _some_ teams (young founders, founders with extremely good ideas but no experience, founders that got rejected but that have a bright future) but this happens on a spot basis, and is tied to the skill and will of the comimttee/person who evaluate it. And definitely we would need more, so is interesting to see a program structured to incorporate it.
> 
> I added the yes to the onchain vote cause i personally evaluated collaberry for a grant in questbook season 2, and I am looking forward to see them showing off their tool in the “real life”.

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## **Tally votings**

### [(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/36792157050667056852025000136263368859227883753318633087194112219909798752014?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4)

**Vote: For**  
Confirming snapshot vote

### [Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/83546392681388778220788629004310255202561156229718364611160970131196959784333?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4)

**Vote: For**  
Confirming snapshot vote

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_[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/jojo-delegate-communication-thread/24429)._