Long Term Incentives Pilot Program

Congratulations to Matt and the Liquidity Incentives WG, I’ve been following their efforts over the last few months and I’m glad to see a draft put out for feedback.

In its present form, I would urge all delegates to vote AGAINST this proposal. Giving 5 people the power to allocate 35 million ARB is not only deeply corrupting and against the spirit of DAOs, its also just bad marketing. For all the faults of STIP or RetroPGF, they take over Twitter and the collective mindspace for the time it was live; I don’t see that happening here when 5 people call all the shots.

You have identified a valid issue here ; rather than moving to a traditional philanthropy structure where a 5 person board allocates funds, are there other ways to overcome this issue?

One solution we are working on with our groups STEP proposal is having a council similar to what you propose, except their role is to screen applications and ensure only high quality providers are able to enter the round. After that, delegates can use weighted voting (dividing their voting power among different options) to show how much they support individual proposals.

Weighted voting would also free up delegates from having to review each proposal as they could allocate all their voting power to the few proposals they have confidence in.

At another level, I do wonder how this is different from the Questbook proposal. They too have domain allocators elected by the DAO for allocating grants; is this proposal just Questbook except for liquidity incentives only?

I also want to know how you have come up with this number - is it based on discussions with potential applicants and extrapolating from there? Or just taking half the amount of STIP 1?

I also wonder why you propose a specific number and not let the DAO vote on a range, similar to the earlier proposal.

Overall, I confess to being a bit disappointed with the proposal - its just a regular grantmaking structure where a 5 person board makes all the decisions. Boohoo