Thank you for this great proposal. I carefully reviewed the entire content, and I generally agree with the points made. Delegates indeed need to follow a certain code of conduct, especially those participating in DIP and receiving incentives. I don’t want to see a situation where someone benefits from the system but undermines it at the same time. It would be terrible if some Delegates kept receiving compensation from Arbitrum DAO but continuously opposed its collective decisions, both inside and outside the community.
This brings us to the punishment mechanism mentioned in the proposal, which I believe is the key to the entire plan. Without a robust and enforceable punishment mechanism, the code of conduct will have little binding effect on Delegates and will remain ineffective, leading to a situation where “Code is code” rather than “Code is law.”
I reflected on the punishment mechanism outlined in the document and found two shortcomings. First, it does not clearly specify who will monitor the Delegates and how that monitoring will take place. Many violations of the code of conduct could occur discreetly. Second, some Delegates have only a few Delegators, or they may simply represent themselves, having bought and held a large amount of $ARB. For these Delegates, how do we regulate their behavior? It seems difficult to disqualify them as Delegates, as they could simply transfer their $ARB to another wallet and reapply.
Perhaps I’m mistaken in my words, and I’m open to correction. I’d be happy to hear more thoughts on this! Thank you!