[Non-Constitutional] DePolis, collective sensemaking for Arbitrum DAO

[DePolis]

@duokongcrypto

• The proposal mentions that DePolis is better suited for large-scale discussions compared to forum voting and Snapshot. However, these tools are not mutually exclusive. Specifically, how do the results generated by DePolis complement forum debates or Snapshot voting? For example, might the community perceive this as a redundant process?

I’d say that DePolis, forum, and Snapshot operate on different levels:

• DePolis: gathering the opinions of the broader community, finding points of consensus and disagreement;
• forum: in-depth discussions among skilled participants;
• Snapshot: voting on options formulated during the forum discussions.

Therefore, there’s no reason to perceive a DePolis conversation as a redundant process, since for its participants (ordinary Arbitrum users), it will be the only process they’re involved in. If you’re interested in the role of the original Polis in decision-making processes, you can explore Polis case studies here and the decision-making framework in vTaiwan here.

@duokongcrypto

• The DePolis proposal emphasizes participant screening based on on-chain criteria, such as requiring accounts to hold a certain amount of ARB or perform specific actions. However, if a malicious user controls multiple accounts that meet these criteria, how can manipulation be prevented? Have additional security verification mechanisms been considered, such as integrating off-chain identity verification?

Compliance with the participation criteria in the conversation will be verified as of a specific date or block (but not at the time of participation in the dialogue). Additionally, the wording of the criteria can include safeguards against manipulation (e.g., holding >100 ARB over the past month). Off-chain identity verification is definitely not an option.

@duokongcrypto

• The proposal mentions rewarding participants who receive the most upvotes or identify points of divergence. How is the reward amount determined? If the reward is too low, might it discourage user participation? Conversely, if the reward is too high, could it result in an influx of low-quality “spam comments”?

The reward amount will be determined by the conversation organizer. If a user considers the reward too low and the potential reward is their only motive to participate, they are unlikely to join such a poorly incentivized conversation. The problem of spam comments is partially addressed by the built-in comment routing logic in DePolis and partially through moderation.

@duokongcrypto

1. The proposal’s development budget is $60,000, with no additional maintenance costs mentioned. However, if DePolis becomes an essential part of the DAO’s decision-making process, wouldn’t future upgrades and user support create additional long-term expenses? Who will bear these costs? Why not request more funding to sustain long-term development?

The short answer is: “let’s first build a functional system and make sure it works as intended, then we will think about long-term plans”. For a more detailed answer, kindly check this reply.