Thanks for putting this framework together - it’s clear you’ve put thought into creating structure around service provider relationships.
That said, I have some concerns about the approach. The oversight committee structure (7 members) seems to add an unnecessary layer between service providers and tokenholders. From my experience in governance, simpler structures tend to be more effective and resistant to bureaucratic capture.
The KPI framework is definitely a step in the right direction. Performance metrics are essential for accountability. I wonder if we could design this to be more directly accountable to tokenholders rather than routed through an intermediary committee.
Some suggestions that might align with your goals while reducing complexity:
- Consider scaling back the committee structure or making it more directly accountable
- Strengthen the direct relationship between service providers and tokenholders
- Ensure there’s a clean, simple mechanism for revoking privileges if performance lags
On a second note, I personally believe that the governance process is there to ensure resources are allocated thoughtfully. In regards to safety proposals like the one you used as an example, the DAO should have funds set aside for that. For other services where safety is not a concern, service providers should go through the full process—that’s why we have it, and it was designed carefully. That being said, we can always retrospectively assess if there are any flaws and modify it.
I know market conditions aren’t the best, but we also need to consider Arbitrum’s long-term consequences. Paying extra committee structures to speed things up and assist service providers is a double-edged sword.