Proposal: Experimental Incentive System for Active ArbitrumDAO Delegates

Proposals Finalized AIPs
41

Final Version for Tally with Option 2 (Karma)

Abstract

We introduce an Experimental Incentive System aimed at the ArbitrumDAO delegates with a duration of six months. The goal is to assess the incentives’ impact on the delegates’ active participation and involvement in the DAO’s governance. This proposal is subject to changes.

Motivation

This proposal is the final result of the proposal published and voted in favor of option 2 in snapshot. It contains some minor changes.

Spec: Delegate Incentive System

Duration of the Incentive System

We’ve allocated an initial trial period of 6 months. This timeframe should allow us to gather initial metrics to gauge the system’s functionality and its anticipated impact.

Total Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives

We have set the number of eligible delegates to 50. This figure isn’t based on specific reasoning, but we believe it’s a good starting point, these ranking is based on the score they achieve each month.

Funding

  • 1,500,000 ARB Incentives
  • 30,000 ARB Karma development
  • 20,000 ARB Admin costs
  • 30,000 ARB Multisig signers

Total costs: 1,580,000 ARB

Delegate Selection Process

Requirements

Based on the feedback received, we’ve opted for a single tier instead of a multi-tiered program, allowing a wider array of participants, the requirements would be as follows:

  • Voting Power: >50K ARB, corresponding to 194 delegates. (Source: Arbitrum Delegates and Voting Power - Dune Analytics).
  • Delegates to Receive Incentives: 50.
  • Budget Allocation: 1,500,000 ARB (5,000 ARB per delegate per month).
  • Historical Participation Rate (Tally): Over 25%

Note:

  • So following this model, the top fifty delegates - defined by their final score - within the range, would be compensated
  • The 5000 ARB per month is the max amount a delegate could earn, but this amount could be lower depending on their score.
  • Certain votes won’t be counted towards the Tally Participation Rate, as detailed in the following links:
  1. Core Test Proposal
  2. Treasury test proposal
  3. [OLD] AIP-1.1 - Lockup, Budget, Transparency

Incentive Program Application

Delegates matching the requirements must confirm their participation in the Incentive System in the forum (a dedicated channel will be established for this). They must post using the template provided below, within a 14-day application window.

Incentive Program Confirmation Template:

  • Forum Username (Link):
  • Twitter Profile (Link):
  • Snapshot Profile (Link):
  • Tally Profile with Exact All-time Participation Rate % (Link):

Note:

  • Failing to send a confirmation message will exclude you from the incentive system, regardless of eligibility.
  • Applicants should ensure accuracy in numbers and links, facilitating quicker verification.

Eligible delegates for the incentive program will be announced on the forum.

Scoring and Framework

To determine which delegates will be paid monthly, we will use a point system and a framework. Please note that this framework will be developed by Karma. Delegates can track their activities using this template.

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Framework - Experimental Incentive

Details: Terminology, Symbols, and Formulas

We explain in detail the framework and points system:

  • Delegates (DD): Delegates with right to access to incentives

  • Ranking (TOP): Delegate’s position in this Dune table https://dune.com/pandajackson42/arbitrum-delegates-and-voting-power

  • Funds ARB (FARB): The amount of ARB allocated per month to the delegates’ payment

  • Activity Weight (%): Represents the weight assigned to each key activity to be measured in delegates.

    • Participation Rate (PR) - Weight 20: Percentage of the total participation of the member in votes. Karma pulls the participation activity directly from onchain transactions. This is the only parameter that is not reset monthly.
      • PR% formula: (PR * 20) / 100
    • Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 15: Percentage of delegate participation in snapshot voting. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.
      • Tn: Number of total proposals that were sent to snapshots for voting in the month.
      • Rn: Number of proposals the delegate voted on in the month.
      • SV% formula: (SV(Rn) / SV(Tn)) * 15
    • Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25: Percentage of delegate participation in on-chain voting in Tally. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.
      • Tn: Number of total proposals that were sent to Tally for voting in the month.
      • Rn: Number of proposals the delegate voted in Tally in the month.
      • TV% formula: (TV(Rn) / TV(Tn)) * 25
    • Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 25: Percentage of communication threads with the justification of the delegate’s vote on the proposals sent to snapshots and Tally (if necessary if the vote does not change). This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.
      • Tn: Total number of proposals that were submitted to a vote.
      • Rn: Number of real communication rational threads where the delegate communicated and justified his/her decision.
      • CR% formula: (CR(Rn) / CR(Tn)) * 25
    • Commenting Proposal (CP) - Weight 15: Percentage of proposals where the delegate asked questions or generated important discussion for the advancement of the proposal. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.
      • Tn: Total number of formal proposals posted on the forum.
      • Rn: Number of actual proposals where the delegate made a genuine and quality contribution. Spam messages will not be considered.
      • CP% formula: (CP(Rn) / CP(Tn)) * 15
    • Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30% TP: This parameter is extra. If the delegate makes a significant contribution to the DAO, he/she is automatically granted +40% extra TP. This parameter is at the discretion of the program administrator. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month

  • Total Participation (TP): Sum of the results of activities performed by the delegate. A TP% of 100 indicates full participation.

    • TP% formula: PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + CP% + BP

  • Payment ARB (PARB): Final amount of ARB that the delegate will receive based on his TP% and his position in the table.

    • PARB formula: IF(TP% >=100; 50000 ;(5000 * TP% / 100))

Parameter summary

  • Activity Weight (%):
    • Participation Rate (PR) - Weight 20%
    • Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 15%
    • Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25%
    • Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 25%
    • Commenting Proposals (CP) - Weight 15%
    • Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30% TP (Total Participation)
  • Total Participation (TP):
    • TP = PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + %CP + BP

Weight and activity considerations

The activities that have been considered in shaping the framework and scope are measurable activities that we believe can positively impact governance.

We have distributed the weight according to the type of activity, as we believe this is the fairest way to do it at the moment.

Surely both the activities and the weightings are far from being the final parameters, ideally after these 6 months we should have a clear idea of how to modify certain parameters or which ones to add/remove.

Note:
We have not included the governance call in the list of activities because we feel that it may be difficult for delegates in different time zones to attend because of the specific timing of the call. Plus some delegates might not want to dox their voices.

Total Participation (TP)

The 50 delegates who conclude the month with a TP score of +60% will be the ones to receive incentives based on the result provided by the PARB parameter.

Should more than 50 delegates have a TP score of +60%, only the top 50 scores will be selected.

If fewer than 50 delegates have a TP score of +60%, only those meeting the criteria will be compensated

Note:
In the exceptional circumstance where scores are identical or more than 50 delegates exceed +90%, the entire month’s budget may be distributed amongst all delegates with such scores. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator.

Bonus Point

Should a delegate propose or actively participate in an enhancement proposal for Arbitrum DAO and execute it, like the Arbitrum’s Short-Term Incentive Program (Arbitrum Improvement Proposal), they will be granted an additional +30% to their TP score for making a valuable contribution to the DAO. This could also be a governance process enhancement proposal or a template for grant selection.

We understand that this is one of the weakest points of the proposal and we believe it is very objective. To assess this point we will try to answer these questions

  • Is the proposal of interest to the ArbitrumDAO, does it cover any vertical that has not yet been worked on?
  • Is the proposal well described, does it have details of the objectives it wants to achieve?
  • Does the proposal generate debate among delegates, is there interest among DAO members (for or against) about the proposal?
  • Does the proposer exhaust existing resources to demonstrate that their proposal adds value to ArbitrumDAO (governance calls, responds in the governance forum, etc).
  • Was the proposal put to a vote: was it a close vote or a resounding no?

When evaluating the bonus points we will try to answer these questions and the administrator will have to upload a post to the forum with the answer and a justification of why he/she grants the bonus point. We also look forward to hearing the community’s opinion on the matter.

Parameter Snapshot

When we refer to a month, we consider from the first day of the month 00:00 UTC to the last day 23:59hs UTC of each month. Within these days and hours, delegates have the opportunity to perform all actions to meet the parameters. The month’s activities conclude on the last day of the month, so delegates must be punctual.

Incentive System Administrator Responsibilities

On the last day of each month, the incentive system administrator is responsible for collecting and carefully reviewing the data provided by Karma. During this initial stage, several inconsistencies are likely to be identified and corrected. Subsequently, the administrator should announce on the forum the names of the delegates selected to receive incentives, as well as the amounts allocated to each. This procedure must be completed within 10 days.

After the publication of these results, the delegates will have a period of 2 days to present any dispute, in case they disagree with the amounts or the selection made.

Dispute

Delegates have a 2-day window to dispute if they disagree with the results presented by the Incentive System Administrator.

To raise a dispute, they must do so via a forum post with the following template:

  • Title: Dispute
  • Username
  • Reason for dispute (be detailed)

The system administrator must promptly address the issue, resolving it within a maximum of 2 days.

Incentive System Ban

Should a delegate or any community member attempt to deceive or game the incentive system, they will be banned. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator.

We must remember that this system is experimental, and we hope for community members’ cooperation for its success.

Payment Execution

If all goes according to plan, the delegate payments are expected to be executed from the programs multisig, with full details of the payments posted on the forum, between the 13th and 14th. This will be repeated for the duration of the program.
Payments are made in ARB tokens.

Considerations

Like every new and experimental system, there may be delays, so please be patient.

Incentive system administrator

Given the short duration of the program and the lack of a DAO Facilitator, SEED Latam is willing to assume the administration of this program. This means that our delegation won’t participate in it and that the adminstration won’t be carried out by myself, but by the organization SEED Latam.

However, we’re also open to a group of delegates or potentially a third party administering this program, in which case we would obviously provide any assistance necessary.

For the adminstration of said program the budget would be 20,000 ARB. This payment will also be divided into 6 months and will be sent in the proposal to Tally along with the payments to the delegates. In this way the DAO will have control over the administrator.

Karma automation for delegate incentive program

Features summary

Karma will develop features to enhance administrator efficiency and provide transparency to the Arbitrum community. The features that will be built include:

  1. Automated fetching of all delegates with Voting Power (VP) over 50k, along with their details.
  2. Profile display for each delegate, showing their voting history and voting reasons they post on Snapshot, Tally or Forum.
  3. Calculation and display of PR, SV, TV, CR, CP (TBD if CP can be automated) for each delegate as specified in the proposal.
    Karma will implement automatically fetching delegates’ forum data
  4. Functionality for the Administrator to allocate Bonus Points.
  5. Computation and presentation of the final Total Points (TP) and PARBB for each delegate on: arbitrum.karmahq.xyz/delegate-compensation.

This automation eliminates the need for delegates to manually report their monthly activities.

Timeline

  • Week 1: Collaborating with administrators and community members to finalize the project requirements.
  • Weeks 2 and 3: Initiating the sprint to design and develop all the features
  • Week 4: The product will undergo comprehensive end-to-end testing and be deployed to production. At this stage, the community will gain full access to all features.
  • Week 5 and Beyond: Implementation of bug fixes and enhancements based on insights and feedback gathered.

Payment Schedule

  • Payment 1: 10k ARB when the proposal passes and the project is kicked off.
  • Payment 2: 10K ARB on successful launch of the product (After week 4 per the timeline above)
  • Payment 3: 10K ARB 2 months after launch as we continue to fix bugs and make enhancements (week 12 of program kickoff)

Karma payments will also be executed from the DAO and tracked by the program administrator.

Multisig Management

Since it would be very complicated to KYC 50 delegates (or more) for this program, and following the Foundation’s recomendation, we’re going to proceed with a multisig to manage payments.

We propose to use a configuration similar to that of Plurality Labs. Having a 3/5 multisig where apart from myself, there would be a mix of DAO delegates + contributros, each recieving a 1,000 ARB payment per month for the duration of the program.

Gnosis Zodiac OZ governor module

  • DAO can clawback funds from multisig direct to its treasury with a vote
  • Protects from a corrupted set of multisig signers
  • This multisig will be configured with a Gnosis Zodiac OZ governor module looking at the Arbitrum token contract. This means that the DAO can at any point reclaim the funds in this multisig with a vote on Tally. (Quorum is set at 100 million ARB for non-constitutional vote)

Signatories

We propose that the signatories be:

SEED Latam Commitment

Seed Latam is committed to monitoring the proper functioning of Karma and collecting feedback from the community on the dashboard’s performance. We also commit to collaborating with Karma so that the dashboard meets the needs of the incentive system.

We will also assume the responsibilities of the incentive system administrator, as mentioned in the previous points.

Disclaimer

SEED Latam does not have any commercial relationship with Karma nor does it receive any payment from them for incorporating them into this proposal.

The only link between SEED Latam and Karma is that both want the success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Overview

Duration of the incentive system

  • 6 month

Total Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives

  • 50 delegates

Selection process

  • Voting Power: >50K ARB, corresponding to 194 delegates. (Source: Arbitrum Delegates and Voting Power - Dune Analytics).
  • Delegates to Receive Incentives: 50.
  • Budget Allocation: 1,500,000 ARB (5,000 ARB per delegate per month).
  • Historical Participation Rate (Tally): Over 25%

Eligible delegates must confirm their participation in the incentive system by posting a message on the forum.

Key Points

Scoring

  • Karma Delegate Dashboard

Minimum score to receive incentives

  • TP= +60%

Bonus Point

  • +30% TP

Parameter Snapshot

  • Last day of the month 23:59 UTC

Dispute

  • 2 days

Payments

  • On the 13th-14th of each month from a multisig.

Incentive system administrator

  • SEED Latam / Any delegate or entity willing to collaborate

Total Cost: 1,580,000

  • 1,500,000 ARB Incentives
  • 30,000 ARB Karma development
  • 20,000 ARB Admin costs
  • 30,000 ARB Multisig signers

Note
Costs may vary, since we probably won’t give the max amount to every delegate every month, so the cost mentioned would be the max this program would cost assuming we compensate 50 delegates per month for 6 months with the maximum allocation.

Reports

SEEDLatam commits to deliver two reports, one after the third month and one after the sixth (and final) month of the program with metrics on its impact, delegates’ performance, and expenditures. They will also collect feedback from both the community and participating delegates.

The reports will be a detailed forum post and also accompanied by a community call explaining the metrics and feedback collected.

ArbitrumDAO has the power to:

  • Change the direction or parameters of the program when it deems necessary, with a snapshot vote.
  • Terminate the program at any time, with a snapshot vote.

Conclusions

Please note that this initial incentive system is experimental and is not intended to be the final version. With this initiative, we aim to evaluate the performance of the DAO and determine its impact. We also anticipate collaboration from both the DAO and facilitators to ensure its success.

At the end of the six months, SEED Latam commits to delivering a report containing the gathered data and feedback from the governance.

Modifications introduced post-snapshot

  • Karma integration (since option 2 won)
  • One additional parameter to include forum activity
  • Multisig since it would be operationally unviable to KYC every delegate

Next steps

Onchain Vote to fund the Multisig.

9 Likes
42

I am opposed to the current incentive proposal program as stated in this post.

My analysis and thought process on the above.

Lack of Clear Objectives:

  • Original Text: “The goal is to assess the incentives’ impact on the delegates’ active participation and involvement in the DAO’s governance.”
  • Redefine Objective: While the goal is mentioned, it lacks specificity. Concrete objectives could include quantifiable targets such as increasing the overall voting participation rate by a certain percentage or achieving a higher diversity of proposals.

Arbitrary Delegate Selection aka Trust Us Bro:

  • Original Text: “We have set the number of eligible delegates to 50. This figure isn’t based on specific reasoning, but we believe it’s a good starting point.”
  • Less Arbitrary: The selection of 50 delegates is acknowledged as not based on specific reasoning. A more data-driven approach, such as considering historical participation rates or voting patterns, would add transparency and fairness to the selection process aka Don’tTrust Me Bro!
    Overall I would like for more delegates to be incentivized to vote, voting power is a real concern for me.

Complexity of Scoring Framework:

  • Original Text: “Delegates can track their activities using this template.”
  • Frameworks made simple: The scoring framework involves various parameters and formulas, which may be complex for delegates to navigate as they complained about time management. Simplifying the system or providing user-friendly interfaces could encourage broader participation, although I do not have a proposed solution for this myself I would encourage the community to push for simplified frameworks.

Bonus Point Subjectivity:

  • Original Text: “We understand that this is one of the weakest points of the proposal and we believe it is very objective.”
  • Less Subjective: Acknowledging subjectivity in the bonus point system without providing clear guidelines on what constitutes a valuable contribution could lead to potential disputes. Establishing objective criteria for bonus points would enhance fairness.

Lack of Community Input on Bonus Points:

  • Original Text: “We also look forward to hearing the community’s opinion on the matter.”
  • How do we provide input: While community input is mentioned, there is no specific mechanism outlined for how the community will be involved in the decision-making process for bonus points. A more structured approach, such as community voting, would enhance inclusivity. My weakest point tbh.

Dispute Resolution Period is Insufficient:

  • Original Text: “Delegates have a 2-day window to dispute if they disagree with the results.”
  • Solution: A two-day window for dispute resolution may be insufficient, especially considering potential time zone differences and the complexity of the scoring system. Extending this period could ensure a fair review. Maybe 5 days?

Thanks for writing up the proposal I believe it is a very good starting point but a bit insufficient as it stands today imho.

2 Likes
43

The Savvy delegation has some serious concerns about this proposal.

Initial concerns:

  • Incentivizes the largest delegates and ignores smaller ones that are still building up.
  • No path way for newer delegates to receive funds and continue to develop
  • Goes against the social inclusion value in the constitution

Next step: We will further review the proposal and recommend improvements early next week. We just ask for the opportunity to do this before it goes to Tally.

Why now? Honestly, we’ve been so overwhelmed by the amount of work in the DAO that Savvy missed this proposal and only seeing it now because we hired a governance analyst to help deal with the 10-15 proposals/work groups currently in the DAO.

@cattin I also reached out to you on Telegram - appreciate all of your work!

4 Likes
44

Good day, @SavvyDAO.
In my opinion, this is just an advantage:

  • The proposal encourages minor delegates to take more votes and engage in the DAO more responsibly
  • It also encourages you to gain votes to reach the minimum threshold of 50k ARB
  • Competition is good in this case. It is better to encourage 50-200 professional delegates than 10,000 small ones who vote without thinking. Each of the 50 will have to justify their vote. And everyone can see whether he agrees with this opinion or not, which, I hope, will affect the number of votes among delegates

As stated in the proposal above - 50 delegates is the initial number, which can be changed at the end of the first stage

6 Likes
45

SavvyDeFi’s opinion about Experimental Incentive System for Active ArbitrumDAO Delegates

TLDR

We analyze this proposal with the objective of understanding what we need to set up or prepare in order to determine if we qualify for this proposal. In doing so, and with the goal of continuing to grow in our journey of being delegates in the DAO, we seek to answer the question:

Do we qualify within the top 50 within the incentive measure framework? If not, what do we need to ensure that we qualify?

And in trying to answer this question, we find that we are still a bit confused by the following…

Presentation

Savvy is a synthetic credit protocol that enables you to access non-liquidating, auto-repaying lines of credit.

Savvy has five main focuses where it aims to cultivate an environment where self-regulation thrives through both on-chain and off-chain avenues: Empower the Community, Sustainable Incentivisation, Collaboration Over Competition, Innovation and Technical Excellence, and Holistic Ecosystem Growth.

About myself @ocandocrypto, I’m currently building web3citizen.xyz as core contributor. Web3 citizen is a community-driven open-source project aimed at simplifying the Web3 Ecosystem where we started by building The State of DAOs 2023 report and weekly governance highlights. Also, I built one of the largest blockchain school in Latin America at Platzi (developer bootcamps section) and now I’m excited on my decentralized journey starting to be part of the Arbitrum DAO and aiming to contribute more through Savvy Arbitrum DAO Committee.

Proposal Analysis and Questions

Great job on the development of this proposal, @cattin . At Savvy, we agree that a good incentive system could bring increased participation in the DAO and greater commitment from delegates, as well as more opportunities for new contributors.

You can also read this post where we’re really aligned:

A couple of days ago, we raised some questions that are still relevant, as follows:

Proposal Analysis and Questions

Furthermore, we have been analyzing whether Savvy, as new delegates, would have the opportunity to participate in this incentive program measurement framework that has been built, and we have some questions to better understand:

  • The majority of proposals in Tally occurred from June 2023 to November 2023. Keeping this in mind, only one proposal is currently active.

    If the goal of this proposal is to increase delegate participation, is it possible to achieve more than 20% of all-time Tally participation in the coming months when new proposals are on-chain? (talking more about the proposal timeline if we talk about bring more active delegates, etc)

    How was this variable selected? The 20% range.

  • We’d like to see if we have some chance and do the math. But we’re not on Karma.

    Is there a specific reason we cannot be there? Are there any conditions we need to fulfill?

    Although Savvy does not yet meet the requirement of having at least 50k ARB, we have had active participation in the DAO for the past 3 months, as well as active participation in Snapshot and upcoming participation in the AIP: ArbOS Version 11.

    What other variables should we consider to evaluate participation within this measurement range?

    Is there something we may be missing?

Note: On another note, if any new delegate within the DAO, like us, would like to understand their position or possibility within this framework, maybe this document that I have been working on to better understand this process could be helpful:

We have been doing some maths for this.

We would love to understand in order to continue our improvement process as delegates of the DAO.

Thanks.

2 Likes
46

Hey, just to address some concerns raised by @SavvyDAO and @ocandocrypto:

As we mentioned before, the idea of this program is to serve as a way to compensate those delegates who have been actively contributing to the DAO and ensure they have a predictable compensation for their future contributions, incentivizing their further participation/reducing apathy, but at the same time acknowledging that this proposal is experimental and after 6 months it probably won’t look the same as how it does right now. The current cap used of min 50k VP + 25% historic Tally Vote is 1) to again, ensure we’re compensating active delegates and nudging them into being proactive plus critical on how they vote (especially the larger ones since they are the decision-makers in the DAO) and 2) serve as a very simple spam filter, given the experimental nature of this program. The intention of this program is not necessarily to onboard new delegates through incentives; however, this could be done later on with additional modifications.

As @cp0x mentioned, these parameters aim at nudging delegates into getting more involved in governance by introducing some degree of competition (by limiting those entitled to compensation to the top 50 by score).

More to @ocandocrypto question, in your case, you wouldn’t qualify for two reasons: 1) you would need a voting power above 50k and 2) have historic participation of 25% or more, which in your situation currently is of 7.69% since you’ve only voted in 1 proposal out of 13 valid proposals, so if you had voted on all three proposals that went live since your delegation was active on tally plus one proposal (hit a 4/14 ratio), then you would’ve qualified on this end for this system. If at any point during the 6 month period you manage to obtain a voting power of 50k and increase your historic participation to 25% (would simply have to vote in 4 future proposals out of 16 for example), then you could participate in the program.

And to make this clear, the top 50 are defined each month based on the score they get for each month, not based on voting power or any other metric.

8 Likes
47

Regarding bonus points, I believe that it should be more of a decay mechanism over x time and it should stack higher. There are delegates who add significantly more valuable input and those folks should be rewarded without a hard reset.

1 Like
48

Hey, @cattin, thanks for the prompt response.

Under this context and understanding the nature of the proposal, and of course, it was drafted in August under different circumstances and stages of the DAO. This we understand:

  • Having only started a couple of months in the delegation exercise, under the current conditions, there is no classification. However, if the program were to take place at any point, there would be integration, given the conditions and meeting the requirements.

    Btw, feedback here. If the idea is to continue with this premise, it would be good to provide more details as it can become confusing during the reading and comprehension exercise.

  • Regarding the karma dashboard, for this specific program, there will be a separate dashboard to measure the 50 score. Still, we’re going to reach out to them to check what happened with our address, thanks.

  • All-time participation in Tally is the ratio without the [OLD] proposals in terms of participation. Currently, there are 13 proposals, not 20. This will be resolved in the Karma Dashboard due to the nature of Arbitrum’s Governor.

With this in mind, these are metrics that initially work for us within the delegation exercise. It’s good.

Is there anything else we should take into account?

1 Like
49

I commend the team for the well-structured Experimental Incentive System Proposal. The detailed plan and innovative scoring framework demonstrate a thoughtful approach to enhancing delegate engagement.

Positives:

  1. Thorough Proposal: Clear details on duration, delegate selection, and funding allocation.
  2. Scoring Framework: Innovative point system with well-defined activities and weightings.
  3. Responsibilities: Clear roles for delegates and administrators, with a dispute resolution mechanism.
  4. Karma System (Option 2): Forward-thinking automation for efficiency.

Feedback:

  1. Budget Allocation Clarification: Provide more details on budget variance based on delegates compensated.
  2. Bonus Point Criteria: Enhance objectivity in criteria for awarding bonus points.
  3. Community Involvement: Encourage greater community participation in decision-making.
  4. Communication: Proactive communication and education for better understanding.

I’m excited about the potential of this experimental system and look forward to community collaboration.

5 Likes
50

@cliffton.eth hey bro! can you tell me where to add this information about me? I want to participate in this program. I’d appreciate it if you could help me figure it out.

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1 Like
51

You must wait for the proposal to be approved. It is currently being voted on in Tally :

2 Likes
52

thank u sir :saluting_face:
already voted, waiting for the results.

2 Likes
53

Information about this will come a little later

2 Likes
54

After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) would like to vote FOR this proposal.

Our rationale remains consistent with the one we expressed during the Snapshot Vote which can be viewed here. Whilst there are some aspects of delegation not covered by this framework, we feel that overall this proposal still represents a step in the right direction.

4 Likes
55

Thank you for your support! I generally agree with the theses. My thoughts on what can be done to increase community interest in this program:

  1. Increase rewards. 5000 ARB per month is not enough for the amount of work that needs to be done. It needs to be announced loudly so that people will be motivated to do just that.
  2. Increase the number of delegates. 50 is too few, we need at least 100. Or 190 active delegates would make up the first cohort.
  3. Many of us have public media activities and talk about the opportunities of the Arbitrum ecosystem outside the forum. These resources are youtube, telegram, x, etc. For such activity should also be encouraged.
  4. KYC should be one time. Approved delegates go through the procedure and receive awards. Repeat KYC can be done after 6 months.
  5. Add a bonus for token hold in the delegation. Ratio or average (number of tokens and hold time). As an active delegate I have been voting since March 2023. I am sure there are many such responsible people. For the fact that we practically supported the project for a year we can add this multiplier.
2 Likes
56

Thank you Arbitrum. This has been the best chain for me.

57

Hello, @ruslanklinkov
Very interesting proposals, I will briefly (maybe not) comment:

  1. The amount of rewards depends on the number of hours delegates spent on this work, excluding gas costs for voting. If it turns out that this amount is not enough, you can always arrange an additional offer. In addition, at the moment the cost of ARB has increased significantly.
  2. It seems to me that we need to start somewhere. Let’s see what share of the votes a group of 50 delegates will have. If it is significantly more than 50%, then additional delegates will not be able to influence decisions, which means that these ARBs may be wasted on increasing the number of delegates.
    This proposal already has almost 2 million ARBs, if you significantly increase the number and payments for each delegate, then there will be significant amounts, without guarantees of results, so starting at 50 delegates seems to me to be a reasonable initial number.
  3. I think that media resources are transfered into the number of delegate votes. This is already a benefit.
  4. I don’t see much point in KYC, what advantages does it give?
  5. This is not a retrospective drop, so what was in March 2023 is not entirely appropriate to say, but the point is to draw more attention to the development of the ecosystem and thoughtful voting for each proposal. On the other hand, the number of vote tokens is perhaps an important parameter for rewards, but activity should be more important.
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58

Hey everyone, I’ll catch up with most questions by tomorrow, but just a quick update I got from the foundation - all delegates qualifying for rewards from this pilot program need to go through a KYC compliance process from the Foundation. The only advantage of having the multisig is that it simply would alleviate some governance burden from the delegates, but I’m down to switch back to simply having the DAO manage the payments directly through onchain votes down the road if the DAO seems to see it as a better alternative, as it was mentioned in the original proposal. Sorry for any confusion this might’ve caused.

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59

Hey, @cattin
But now I see a Tally description:

Since it would be very complicated to KYC 50 delegates (or more) for this program, and following the Foundation’s recommendation, we’re going to proceed with a multisig to manage payments

What advantages does KYC?
Why did complexity disappear?
And how is it possible that everyone voted for multisig, and you change it unilaterally?

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60

For the snapshot vote I didn’t suggest using the multisig, because I honestly didn’t want to, but the Foundation suggested we use one (they messaged me after the proposal had already been voted on snapshot) and, from the conversation I had with them, I understood it was for KYC purposes - these are required by the Foundation not by us. But now they reached out to me saying that regardless of the multisig they would still have to KYC the recipients of the incentives. So, there was simply a misunderstanding of how their KYC process works. We did add a zodiac module anyway, so the DAO can claw back funds at any time if it feels so ~ so, in theory, the funds are still under the control of the DAO.

Maybe @cliffton.eth can further explain how the foundation’s KYC process works and why they need it for this case.

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