As a user/LPer, my option still remains to be to buy and lock RDNT, or to never use the platform, since I would be paying 3~7% net APR to borrow on Radiant against my stablecoins compared to Aave (~0%) or Silo (get paid to borrow).
Can’t disagree RDNT is a giant on Arbitrum, but also have to remember that a majority of the TVL is looped and mercenary liquidity that only makes the borrow curve worse for real users who use it for lending activities.
If we wanted to extract value through a trade we would simply buy RDNT and push to have this proposal forced through, which is quite the opposite of what we are doing.
The point we are trying to make is that if dLP works so well, won’t users of the platform just naturally lock dLP to gain higher rewards and utility in the ecosystem? Why does it need the majority of incentives?
Maybe we are missing something…
But from the outside, it is akin to GMX traders or GLP holders having to stake and lock GMX/WETH liquidity just to get their revenue share, trading rebates and other such perks.
On the above quote, we would like to point out we were not questioning the proposal isolating users, but that the token/product design, in general, may do so (albeit whilst maximising very close stakeholder gain) - it’s all a trade-off!
To reward those who contribute the most to protocol health. Same reason 60% of fees go to dLP lockers. The protocol is built around rewarding those with the most skin in the game, why would it make sense to change it now?
you’re right - people are committed to locked token to earn more to farm it.
I guess question remains - what edge does Radiant have besides nurturing more users who are effectively forced to use Radiant due to sunk opportunity cost?
In fact, the top 2 addreses that contribute to 28% of Radiant’s TVL simply claim and sell or claim and send to Binance (0x64b6ebe0a55244f09dfb1e46fe59b74ab94f8be1, 0xa0076833d8316521e3ba4628ad84de11830aa813), with the second address taking a delta neutral position on non stablecoin assets. At first glance, it seems that the money market is being used for farming the token, rather than normal borrowing and lending activities.
Are you sure this program is not nurturing parasite liquidity on Arbitrum that are hostaged into perpetually selling and hurting the ecosystem further? I support Radiant’s growth on Arbitrum and hope for its success, but if the proposal were to not pass as is, I would like to see some metrics on how the money market is currently being utilized, and how it can foster the Arbitrum community at large.
The point is if users are choosing to lock tokens for 6-12 months, they are less likely to leave the ecosystem. No one is forcing users to believe in Radiant or lock tokens. But they do.
The above proposal provides plenty of metrics around the first airdrop campaign and it’s effectiveness at growing the types of KPI’s the DAO is looking for. Your question as to what edge Radiant has is confusing, half the proposal is about that edge. To sum it up for you:
Milestone-based grant request
Case study & demonstrated success
Emphasis on white space users due to presence on other chains + LZ/SG integration
Growing Arbitrum together with protocols such as GMX, Camelot, Dopex, & Plutus.
How do you feel Radiant is hurting the Arbitrum ecosystem as you claim when the numbers indicate the opposite?
Are you applying the same level of scrutiny to all grants, analyzing the user base, and expecting none of the users to sell the native token?
Agreed, this simple reasoning only is enough, in my opinion, to delegitimize Radiant’s proposal.
Radiant V2 major “upgrade” was to turn into ponzinomics realm. Using this STIP for incentivizing/forcing the demand of their own token is just another chapter of this approach.
Tbh I don’t know how this proposal even passed the approval without being asked for changes. It’s clearly not aligned with the STIP purpose to my understanding. All the funds, or at least the majority of them (>90%), should be allocated to incentivize markets with a special focus on ARB.
It’s sticky for sure. They have no other choice really
I’m hoping to see info on how lending activities go on - as just from a quick glimpse, many top addresses are engaging in no net borrowing, just net looping to earn RDNT and sell. Then the ARB grant is being used on creating a wETH buffer for farmers to sell into with rebates - not really bootstrapping the ecosystem. Would be interesting to see metrics of the % of the TVL contributed by people who are not supplying the same asset they are borrowing =)
Also yes, I do apply the same scrutiny - I strongly believe that the grants should be given to ecosystem users, not token holders. This is pretty well reflected on my first Ramses post - but I don’t really want to get into the politics or scrutinize this proposal specifically.
Just wanted to point out from the perspective of a regular user, I felt like I would not be able to participate unless I BOUGHT the token, which not what I think the program is for.
Blockworks Research supports this proposal and finds the requested amount of up to 2,852,046 ARB to be justified based on, among other things, the anticipated sustainable impact on, and goodwill to, the ecosystem, metrics such as TVL / volume / fees on Arbitrum and overall, a comparative analysis of all submitted STIP proposals, the distribution of incentives across verticals, as well as, to a certain extent, the recommendations made by the Arbitrum Working Group through the four grant categories.
We understand how the entire system works in that you have weaved the requirement of RDNT into pretty much the entire protocol.
This tokenomics strategy has proven effective at mitigating mercenary liquidity, which is a concern one may consider with protocols that do not include ways to encourage user loyalty. Do we want to reward mercenary farmers who hop from one chain to the next?
not test token flywheels and search for product market fit of mechanisms.
Your opinion is that Radiant is testing a flywheel, but the data indicates that Radiant passed this test long ago. If you want to see what happens to protocols that operate the way you prefer, please refer to the Defi Index against ETH for many Defi 1.0 protocols that have not adjusted over time.
We do not believe allocating 70% to native RDNT/WETH liquidity is appropriate
That portion of the proposal is milestone-based and the main qualifier is overall TVL including lending activity. dLP and lending TVL are interconnected as the emissions within the money market are gated by this eligibility. Historically this does not appear prohibitive to new users as Radiant has some of the strongest activity and volume on Arbitrum. We have the requisite experience to execute positive results on these campaigns that have proven to attract and retain users, TVL, and sequencer revenue.
After thoroughly reviewing this proposal, we iZUMi team are impressed with the level of detail and the comprehensive execution plan presented, especially the vitality and drive demonstrated by your team throughout the proposal.
We believe that with the support from the Arbitrum grant, the project will not only achieve its objectives but also flourish at an accelerated rate. We are thrilled at the prospect of this project coming to fruition and would like to formally extend our support for your proposal. We look forward to the possibility of further collaboration in the future!
From @Seedgov led by the @cattin delegation, we want to convey our support to this proposal. The reasons why we agree are as follows:
It is the main lending of Arbitrum
Focused on enhancing three areas: liquidity, enrichment, and integration.
Safeguarding the DAO by avoiding overallocation of ARB in suboptimal performance situations. They have a successful track record, market experience, and liquidity from Radiant’s dLPs.
We want to clarify that this is not the final vote, since as we clarify in this release, the final vote is defined by our community. We also want to invite you to attend our Governance Call that will be held tomorrow in our discord.
Michigan Blockchain supports this proposal with the requested amount being justified given the sustainable benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem and having conducted an in-depth reviewal process of all submitted STIP proposals. We appreciate Radiant’s effort in delivering a promising proposal and working with the community throughout the process.
First and foremost, we would like to express our gratitude for your impeccable proposal. Upon reviewing your proposal, it is evident that it has been presented with great attention to detail, enriched with graphics and analyses. We find the implementation of the grant application, which varies according to the Proposal Milestones, to be quite appropriate. Furthermore, the individuals leading the project are proven and successful professionals.
As ITU Blockchain, we have no reservations about supporting Radiant.
Radiant is using 500k ARB tokens to fund some Ethereum Mainnet event https://twitter.com/RDNTCapital/status/1719846292401303586
Yes i know that they are not STIP funds but why the hell are we funding a project that got Arbitrum tokens months ago, and them showing they have a big bag of ARB tokens to throw on whatever they want, while there are lot of projects that got in line to get a few tokens and got nothing??
I think this is a very bad thing to see, embarrassing.
Update regarding the Camelot RDNT/ETH v3 incentive portion of the proposal:
Radiant will be incentivizing the following contracts:
0x8bb4c975ff3c250e0ceea271728547f3802b36fd — This is the MERKL distribution contract, which rewards users in varying amounts depending on the fees generated on manual v3 positions for Camelot’s RDNT/ETH v3 pool: Camelot DEX | Arbitrum native Decentralized Exchange