What’s your understanding of the role of the veRAM Voter in the Ramses system?
I understand it reasonably well. Could you please answer if the below statement is correct?
if you remove your own token holders, there is no guarantee that anyone else would ever get the ARB. It is entirely incentivising veRAM, with no guarantee that the veRAM holders pass it to users.
This literally doesn’t make any sense at all. Do you think all veRam holders are protocols then? User who are invested in long term success of the protocol locks the Ram they “purchased”. Not every veRam is protocol.
For clarity, what’s your understanding of the veRAM Voter in this system?
You mentioned the term ‘holder,’ which has no significance in this system so to make sure we’re not talking past each other on this critical point, what’s a veRAM Voter as you currently understand it?
Thats literally the point. ARB will be distributed with aligned users on the Arbitrum ecosystem. Everyone can participate. Most current participants are projects building on Arbitrum and users that are aligned (4-year locked). I fail to see how distributing the ARB directly to mercenary rented LP liquidity is any better.
Can you confirm that the ARB will be distributed to only veRAM voters, and that there is no guarantee these veRAM voters then pass the ARB on to users?
Glad to see you answering again, hopefully the rest of my questions will be addressed as well.
Thank you for confirming the point I’ve been raising from the beginning regarding recycling.
ARB is considered “spent” = a large portion ends in the pocket of a circle of insiders/friends/partners/team at the end of the 3 months, and they don’t have to return it to the DAO.
It would be so simple to state in your proposal that airdropped partners and the team are forbidden to use their ve, so they don’t capture any of the ARB grant.
Hi all, the number of back and forth comments on this thread which are not addressing the grant application is getting out of hand, and any further comments which are not related to the short term incentive program application will be deleted. All necessary information relating to the STIP application will still be available to delegates to review. A 30 minute has been added to provide an opportunity for delegates to comment and ask questions.
Based on (appreciated) feedback, one edit we plan to make and discuss with delegates is the following:
Last week of the STIP, partner protocols that received ARB matches for Incentives they invested to drive emissions to their pools to build tvl during the STIP will place any remaining ARB as a direct LP Incentive. (Ramses will match that as an LP Incentive as well).
Also willing for this short STIP to similarly as the two founders of Ramses, place any ARB grant incentives captured via voting as direct LP incentives as well.
This is all easily verifiable and substantiated on-chain per the reporting mandates of the STIP.
We’re confident that the data resulting from this experiment will unlock deeper understanding of the efficiency of this approach and greater future funding that Ramses and long-term minded partners will leverage to continue building Arbitrum for sustained success.
Great! That’s an effective solution for those worried about making it fully trustless.
So now, it should be (more) clear that by epoch 12 when grant program ends, 100% of the ARB has been distributed and none of it has been recycled by any protocol or Ramses.
veRAM voters are Arbitrum users and Arbitrum protocols that are aligned with the longevity of the chain by locking their RAM for 4 years in order to receive those incentives …who else would you want ARB incentives to go to that has more skin in the game? You want to send ARB incentives to mercenary LPers who have will move on to the next L2 chain with higher incentives?
North is asking you your understanding of what a veRAM voter is to make sure you understand how this particular AMM actually functions. LPers receive emissions of RAM while veRAM voters receive bribes and they both share a portion of the fees generated.
So when you say there is a chance that “ARB incentives don’t go to anyone but the protocol/partners/Ramses users” who else should be receiving them? Who else is is more aligned with the success of Arbitrum long term than users who have invested their own money in an Arbitrum DEX that requires them to lock for 4 years and highly reputable protocols that want their dApp on a successful chain?
There seems to be a large push from some participants on this thread for direct LP incentives with the grant…to me that just sounds like mercenary capital talk and people who want easy ways to farm and dump ARB tokens. If you truly have a longer term vision for the chain then you can align yourself with that by establishing a 4 year locked veRAM position to earn ARB incentives…buying the token is open to everyone and there’s no “insiders” or “friends”, as shown in a previous post, Ramses is one of if not the most evenly distributed ve protocols in DeFi.
The point I was trying to understand is quite clear, but I appreciate you trying to pressure my curiosity:
- The ARB tokens would go to veRAM voters
- A significant majority of the veRAM voters are the team or airdropped partners
- Therefore, the majority of the ARB incentives would go to the team or airdrop partners
- This proposal does not exclude the team or airdrop partners, which could then potentially be considered breaking the rule of “farming the grant”
- There are no guarantees that the team or airdropped veRAM voters do not farm this and do not distribute it back to the pools
Like I say, I am supporting Ramses getting a grant, but we need to be clear about what it means to give the ARB to veRAM voters.
There is a reason why North just edited the application above. This is a welcome addition.
- Whales/DAOs category which I believe encompasses the partner protocols holds 23% of veRAM
- North and Dog hold about 5.4% together
- Treasury has 11% - personally wouldn’t count this as it serves to incentivize as an eco fund but works case you include it
That’s leaves 61% of veRAM holders as Arbitrum users (much larger piece of the pie when you look at the other ve protocols, Solidly model and not).
So, imho it was still reasonable even prior to the recent change to the application, which I’m not complaining about as it makes it even better for non-protocol voters.
Hopefully delegators can see the value of the protocol and the capital efficiency it has created by merging ve3,3 and UniCL seamlessly. The relevant metrics like revenue/TVL and volume/TVL (especially on non-stable native ARB pairs) numbers are all readily available on defillama, dune, Ramses discord bot, etc. and numbers should be the main thing driving distribution of ARB grants imo, not emotionally charged debates with little substance.
Agreed. Volume/TVL and Volume are the metrics that matter imo and Ramses is doing great on both.
Here to support this proposal and being proud partners to ramses we know how hard working the team is. ve(3,3) dexes have the potential to create sustainable liquidity for the chain and help projects grow
Great efforts by the team that have created innovative tech and never stop building
- The ARB tokens would go to veRAM voters
Correct.
- Therefore, the majority of the ARB incentives would go to the team or airdrop partners
- This proposal does not exclude the team or airdrop partners, which could then potentially be considered breaking the rule of “farming the grant”
- There are no guarantees that the team or airdropped veRAM voters do not farm this and do not distribute it back to the pools
Not correct. Protocols and Ramses team will end up with 0 ARB tokens from their votes once the grant program has fully finalized.
Like I say, I am supporting Ramses getting a grant, but we need to be clear about what it means to give the ARB to veRAM voters.
It simply means that the DEX will be incentivized the way it works – by bribing voters. It has worked very well without any incentives so there’s no reason to believe it wouldn’t work even better with extra support.
Rather than “Recycling” the ARB tokens wouldn’t it be more prudent to simply only stream the rewards to the 61% of veRAM Holders and completely exclude everyone else. If I am understanding correctly this is already what the recycling of ARB is doing - since partners/teams cannot end with any ARB tokens in their hands why would they be distributed to them in the first place? Pardon me if I’m not understanding correctly but what is the reasoning behind recycling as opposed to complete exclusion of those veRAM holders in favor of non-internal parties? It seems to be an un-needed layer of complexity and trust.
Rather than “Recycling” the ARB tokens wouldn’t it be more prudent to simply only stream the rewards to the 61% of veRAM Holders and completely exclude everyone else
It’s literally how Solidly model works. You could consider “unnecesarily complex”, but that could be said about any project design. It makes no sense to force a DEX modify its core behaviour for no purpose either, that wouldn’t be fair. The game theory dynamics that having voters + vote bribing brings to a protocol is a complex topic that isn’t relevant to the discussion. You can check some articles about how it works, for example this one illustrates the point well (Title: Mastering Collaborative Bribing on Solidly ve(3,3) | by Lafayette Tabor @ DEUS | Medium)
It seems to be an un-needed layer of complexity and trust.
There isn’t any trust risk really – there is no economical advantage to not rebribe. Protocols would lose much more money than they would gain by not complying to rebribe (not to mention reputational damage). Every single vote is casted on-chain and easily verifiable to comply with STIP terms aswell.
Please, check out the terms of the proposal posted above:
This forum isn’t the place for conjecture like that. Spinning people simply speculating on a small mcap token (of which most is locked) getting a grant into some kind of conspiracy really isn’t conductive.
Hello, I’ve been reading through this thread and I’m wondering if maybe we can incorporate all the suggestions into one single strategy which can ensure there is no benefit at all for ram holders, veram holders, ramses partners, ramses devs, or the ramses community and platform altogether.