# Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program **URL:** \ **Category:** Finalized AIPs\ **Created:** [November 19, 2025, 5:25pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249 "2025-11-19T17:25:34Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 6
**Author:** ![JoJo](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/forum.arbitrum.foundation/jojo/32/2666_2.png) [@JoJo](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/JoJo)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2025, 2:37pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/6 "2025-11-25T14:37:46Z")
Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance. > [@Arbitrum](#): > > If we assume, in a given month, there are two temperature check proposals followed by a non-constitutional proposal and constitutional proposal, then the DAO as a collective will spend ~$32k. > > Based on the DIP 1.7’s September Cohort data, we estimate the following payments for certain sized delegates: > > - Above 8 million votes will earn ~$1.8k, > - Above 4 million votes will earn ~$1.6k, > - Above 1 million votes will earn ~$900. > > The estimates are subject to change based on participation by voting power. As more voting power participates, the rewards will be diluted, and it will be up to the OpCo every quarter to evaluate this data to set a new budget. Have a first question related to the amount posted here, 32K each month. This would put the annualized expenditure at $384k/year As of today, we have in [address for incentives around 7M arb](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x07e7ef4b87bb4115f7f507c89c2bac5f3342cc3c) equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$. While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years. In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year. Was any thought put into this piece of feedback? > [@The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/37): > > Budget composition: have the budget in stables, or at least a 50/50 stables-ARB mix. PM/OpCo could decide month by month which portion to use. If sell pressure is a concern, stable-sourced payouts could be converted to ARB via buybacks just before distribution. A bit clunky and complex operationally, but doable. In my opinion, not only for this, but for any DAO program that requires to pay out in ARB, we should keep the reserve in stablecoin and buy back the ARB in the open market when is time to redistribute. It will introduce predictability in budgeting for long term program, and effectively negate any sell pressure for financing programs. The main issue is operational; but with a more centralized approach like the one we are seeing is likely doable, if we do use twap prices for conversion at time of buyback that are “good enough” even in time of volatility. We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september. This is especially true due to this table > [@Arbitrum](#): > > ## Incentive Budget per Quarter > > | Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power | > | --- | --- | --- | --- | > | On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB | > | On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB | > | Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB | > | Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB | > | Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB | In here, I do see - a quarterly budget in USD - a payout cap in USD But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB. * * * On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway? It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period. * * * Finally, want to cross post in relation to the proposal that me and @jameskbh [posted](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-temporary-extension-of-the-delegate-incentive-program-dip-v1-7/30248/12) in the forum related to the extention of previous DIP. While I want to be clear that the proposal was crafted in a weekend, after asking if this or any other DIP proposal would have been voted before the Christmas pause and without knowing it would have been put up for public discussion, I don’t personally feel like is necessary to go for a contemporary vote of both. The goal of the extention was, as mentioned in the original post, to give time to AF and other to craft this very proposal. It seems like it has internalized most of the feedbacks of delegates; would also add how it lacks a bit some details, like rationality for certain decision, simulation based on the past year of activity, and projection on the future in different scenarios, but this part is also partially compensated by the flexibility of having OpCo ability to change parameters on a per quarter basis and eventually hire a service provider for management. My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough. As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios: - in case the RAD proposal is discussed, goes on vote on snapshot the 4th of december, and the 11th we see that the vote fails - in case the RAD proposals is not put up for a vote before the 11th of december (last legal date for votes accordingly to the pause we collectively decided upon that starts the 18th of the same month). That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means - consensus from most delegates - predictability of payout that allows to growth the stash of active delegates - avoid falling in an apathy of voters that, on a timeframe long enough, could create security issues. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249)._