# Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program **URL:** \ **Category:** Finalized AIPs\ **Created:** [November 19, 2025, 5:25pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249 "2025-11-19T17:25:34Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 9
**Author:** ![blockful](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/forum.arbitrum.foundation/blockful/32/13867_2.png) [@blockful](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/u/blockful)\ **Post date:** [November 28, 2025, 4:55pm UTC](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/9 "2025-11-28T16:55:15Z")
The proposal appears to have incorporated the delegates’ feedback after DIP 2.0 failed to pass governance. However, there are still some open questions regarding the decisions made within the RAD. ## Payments Per Proposal What is the rationale for making payments on a per-vote basis in governance? We understand that OpCo will handle the operational side, but this structure may incentivize a higher number of votes (whether Temperature Checks or _on-chain_) purely to increase delegate compensation within the DAO — effectively creating a _sybil_ vector for delegate remuneration. While this could potentially strengthen the DAO’s economic security — with more people voting and helping to reach quorum — it may also end up consuming the entire budget allocated to the RAD, potentially exceeding the US$32K/month illustrated in the proposal. In addition, clearer rules for compensation should be established, such as requiring a minimum level of participation in votes, as is already the case with DIPs. This would ensure that only delegates who consistently maintain a defined participation threshold remain eligible for compensation. Has any simulation been conducted to demonstrate that this approach is more efficient than a fixed monthly payment tied to a minimum participation requirement from delegates? ## Minimum Voting Power to Be Eligible The minimum Voting Power (VP) required to be eligible for rewards is set at 200K $ARB. As discussed during the Arbitrum event at Devconnect, the goal was to strike a balance between the 500K $ARB threshold of the previous proposal and the previous 50K $ARB threshold. However, this is still a high threshold for most delegates. When DIP 2.0 was proposed, there were already criticisms regarding the exclusion of many delegates from the incentive program. We understand the logic of incentivizing wallets with higher VP to participate in governance, helping to reach quorum and keep the DAO operational. Nevertheless, this decision reduces incentives for broader participation in Arbitrum governance, effectively preserving the same 8 to 10 delegates who are paid to vote and engage in forum discussions. As [suggested by cp0x](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/56), a smaller incentive program for delegates with VP below 200K could be designed by OpCo or by the broader community. This way, the programs would be separated, but incentives for both large and small VP holders would remain aligned. Another suggestion is to hold another “redelegation week”, as already done on Arbitrum. This would allow smaller delegates interested in participating to obtain more VP, receive incentives, and participate in governance. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249)._