RFC - Delegate Incentive Program v1.1 or v1.5?

[SEEDGov]

Special thanks to all those who have provided comments during the creation of this proposal @mmurthy @Entropy, @JoJo, @cp0x, @maxlomu, @olimpio, @Pepperoni_Jo3, @Cole_404, @krst, Frisson, Bob-Rossi, jameskbh.

TL;DR

• This proposal has been updated based on the feedback received from delegates. You can check the changes here

• Expand the program by introducing a new and improved version, to be implemented over the course of a year.

• We propose a total budget of USD 4.2 million (in a year) in delegate incentives, with a maximum monthly compensation of 7000 USD or 16,500 ARB per month per delegate.

• Creating Delegates’ compensation tiers:

  • Tier 1: TP between 65% and 70%. Compensation range: $3,000 to $3,250. ARB cap: 8,000.

  • Tier 2: TP between 70% and 85%. Compensation range: $4,200 to $5,100. ARB cap: 12,000.

  • Tier 3: TP between 85% and 100%. Compensation range: $5,950 to $7,000. ARB cap: 16,500.

• Elimination of the special multisig, the DIP adheres to the MSS

• The DAO can cancel the program or modify parameters, such as the scoring methodology, through a Snapshot vote.

• Min threshold requirement change: Participation Rate (Karma) >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days. Previously, the requirement was 25% of total historical votes. A new delegate, without prior participation history, must meet the above requirements (>50k voting power and >60% participation in onchain votes) for a period of 3 months to be eligible for the program.

• Soft enforcement for DAO’s social agreements: Each delegate must adhere to and comply with all social agreements reached through Snapshot in order to receive incentives.

• Adding the possibility of revoking DIP Ban via Snapshot vote and also creating the DIP Suspension.

• Proposal Feedback (PF)/Delegates’ Feedback Update: There are two proposed options to make changes to this parameter.

• Scoring Weight Changes:

  • Participation Rate (PR): Previously weighted at 20% and based on historical participation rates in Tally. Now, it is reduced to 15%, calculated based on the participation rate of the last 90 days in on-chain votes (as calculated by Karma).

  • Snapshot Voting (SV): The weight of this parameter has increased from 15% to 20%.

  • Communicating Rationale (CR): The weight of this parameter has decreased from 25% to 10% or 15% depending on the DAO’s choice.

  • Proposal Feedback (PF): The weight of this parameter has increased from 15% to 25 or 30% depending on the DAO’s choice.

  • Total Participation (TP): The requirement for total participation has increased from +60% to +65%.

• Bonus points update: Adding Bonus Points for delegates who attends to the “Arbitrum Open Governance Call” (monthly) and the “Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance Call.”

  • For the monthly call, 2,5% BP will be awarded for attendance.

  • For the bi-weekly calls, 2.5% BP will be awarded for attending each call.

Abstract

We propose renewing the ArbitrumDAO Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) for one year. This renewal will include adjustments to the parameters, requirements, budget, and incentives awarded to delegates.

Motivation

We’ve reached the fifth month of the current version of the incentive program, which ends on August 31.

As outlined in the mid-term report, the program has positively impacted ArbitrumDAO during the first three months.

However, simply renewing the program will not generate enough value. Therefore, we propose adjustments to improve the program and increase its impact on ArbitrumDAO.

These changes are based on our experience as administrators, the reports we’ve conducted, and feedback from delegates, the Karma team, and key community members.

Note: As mentioned in the initial proposal, SEEDGov will deliver an end-term report once the six-month period is complete.

Strengthening DIP’s Mission & Vision

As we mentioned in the report, it is crucial to keep delegated voting power active within ArbitrumDAO. We believe the Incentive Program should focus on the professionalization of delegates.

By professionalization, delegates should dedicate a significant amount of time to staying informed about developments in ArbitrumDAO, gaining knowledge of Arbitrum’s technology, and making meaningful contributions to the DAO. This includes active participation in most DAO activities like providing feedback on proposals, attending to Governance Calls, maintaining high voting participation on Snapshot and Tally, and providing a rationale for such votes.

To achieve this, we also need to establish transparent and predictable incentives. Delegates should be confident that if they align with the DAO and improve their contributions over time—essentially if they professionalize—they will receive better incentives. These incentives should be transparent and attractive without being subject to manipulation or arbitrary changes in their amount. Delegates should focus on their role and DAO activities, not on understanding complex economic mechanisms to receive compensation.

We want delegates to be motivated to participate actively in ArbitrumDAO. In order to do this, incentives must be attractive enough for them to either participate directly or hire competent individuals to represent their interests, those of their community, or their protocol.

It’s important to note that while managing the incentive program, we realized that it doesn’t address all the challenges faced by the DAO, such as vote distribution, attracting new contributors, and other aspects. Expecting a single strategy to tackle all issues overlooks the diversity of factors involved. However, we’re pleased to see initiatives like ARB Staking, (Re)delegation Week, and the Public Good Citizen Enfranchisement Pool are underway to address these challenges. As each initiative matures, we can align them to achieve a more significant collective impact.

With that in mind, we propose the following changes to the Delegate Incentive Program.

Delegate Incentive Program v1.1: Specs

The proposed changes below are based on the experience we’ve gained while managing the program. We look forward to receiving feedback from the community to refine this proposal further.

If you want to view the parameters of the previous program, click here.

Duration

The program’s first phase lasted six months, as it was designed as an experimental foundation. This stage allowed us to evaluate the program’s framework and analyze its strengths and weaknesses. Extending the duration to twelve months is appropriate, providing greater predictability and flexibility for implementing future changes.

ArbitrumDAO may cancel the program or modify parameters, such as scoring methodology, through an instantaneous vote.

Budget

• USD 4,200,000 in Incentives. Delegates’ compensations are capped at 16,500 ARB per delegate per month (Tier 3), which means the maximum spending on incentives would be 9,900,000 ARB per year (16,500 ARB x 50 delegates x 12 months). This amount represents 0.31% of the DAO’s treasury. The ARB cap already includes a 30% buffer and it will be recalculated before Tally.

• USD 69,600 +30% ARB buffer for Dashboard maintenance and upgrade

• USD 152,000 +30% ARB buffer for Operational Costs/Program Administration.

Total: USD 4,421,600

Here is a summary of the budget, buffers and final amounts to be requested (see notes):

Note: USD costs are fixed, meaning that if the price of ARB increases, the USD costs will remain the same. At the end of the program, any remaining ARB tokens from the program will be returned to the treasury.

Note 2: Any remaining funds from the experimental incentive program multisig will sent back to the treasury.

Note 3: Final amounts in ARB will be recalculated on the basis of the ARB price at the time of submitting the proposal for voting in Tally.

Note 4: The funds will be sent to the recently approved MSS.

Making the incentives more predictable

In the initial iteration of the DIP, costs were denominated solely in ARB, which led to challenges due to the token’s volatility.

When the program launched in March, the token was valued at approximately USD 1.70, allowing a delegate with 100% Total Participation (TP) to earn around USD 8,500 per month. However, now, in the fifth month of the program, the token is valued at USD 0.55, reducing a delegate’s maximum monthly compensation to about USD 2,750—a decrease of over 60% for the same amount of work. This significant reduction could disincentivize delegate participation.

The same issue applies to operational, development, and maintenance costs, which have become increasingly misaligned.

To avoid this situation, we propose that payments be denominated in USD and made in ARB tokens. Again, the delegates’ incentives should be transparent and attractive without being subject to manipulation or arbitrary changes in their amount.

Requirements to Participate in the DIP

The requirements to participate in the program are as follows:

• Voting Power: >50K ARB, corresponding to 176 delegates. (Source: Arbitrum Delegates and Voting Power - Dune Analytics).

  • Change: This parameter will remain unchanged.

  • Motivation: Currently, only 30% of delegates meeting this requirement are part of the program. One of our goals for this renewal is to increase the number of participating delegates.

• Participation Rate (Karma): >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days.

  • Change: Previously, the requirement was 25% of total historical votes.

  • Motivation: As the number of proposals grows, the impact of each individual vote decreases, making it challenging to meet the historical 25% PR. This change aims to lower the barrier for new participants, ensuring that all delegates, regardless of when they joined Arbitrum, are recognized for their consistency and active participation in the DAO. In this way, the program’s approach encourages the active participation of delegates, ensuring a more accurate and up-to-date representation.

Note: A new delegate, without prior participation history, must meet the above requirements (>50k voting power and >60% participation in onchain votes) for a period of 3 months in order to be eligible for the program.

• Each delegate must adhere to all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future.

Incentive Program Application

Delegates who meet the requirements must confirm their participation in the DIP via the DIP Application Thread. Delegates can join the program anytime within 12 months, provided they meet the specified criteria. To minimize the potential for manipulation, delegates who sign up before the third day of the month will be included in the incentive calculations for that month. This three-day window, approximately 10% of the month, serves as the maximum grace period for delegates wishing to join the DIP at the time of registration. Those who sign up after the third day will be considered for the program starting from the following month.

Incentive Program Confirmation Template:

• Forum Username (Link):

• Twitter Profile (Link):

• Snapshot Profile (Link):

• Participation Rate 90 days - Karma (Link):

Eligible delegates for the incentive program will be announced on the forum.

Note: Any delegate who chooses to withdraw from the program can indicate their intention to opt out by posting a message in the forum.

Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives

We will maintain this parameter at 50 delegates. As of the date of this RFC, 53 delegates are enrolled in the program, with an average of 34 receiving incentives. We hope that during the next phase of the program, both the number of enrolled delegates and those receiving compensation for their contributions will continue to grow.

Incentive Budget

Budget Allocation: MAX 4,200,000 USD (up to 7.000 USD per delegate per month).

If we want to professionalize DAO operations as much as possible and stay aligned we should aim for delegates to have a certain seniority and dedication to Bringing Value to Arbitrum DAO. Thus, delegates who meet the requirements at the end of the month and achieve a TP of at least 65% will be eligible to receive up to 7,000 USD in ARB tokens as compensation.

Now, as program administrators, our goal is to create the necessary incentives to elevate the overall quality of contributions. During the first iteration of the DIP, we observed that the compensation for top delegates did not significantly differ from those with lower Total Participation (TP) scores. To address this, we propose the introduction of three compensation tiers based on the Total Participation Rate achieved by each delegate.

• Tier 1: TP between 65% and 70%. Compensation range: $3,000 to $3,250. ARB cap: 8,000.

• Tier 2: TP between 70% and 85%. Compensation range: $4,200 to $5,100. ARB cap: 12,000.

• Tier 3: TP between 85% and 100%. Compensation range: $5,950 to $7,000. ARB cap: 16,500.

This approach makes the program more cost-effective per USD spent because as the quality of contributions increases, more resources are allocated to higher-performing delegates (those in tiers 2 and 3). Conversely, if delegate performance is suboptimal, fewer resources are allocated, with more delegates falling into tiers 1 and 2.

We considered the volatility of the ARB token by suggesting an ARB cap for each Tier. In this way, while delegates’ compensation could still be affected after a drastic price drop, we would at the same time protect the DAO’s interests by limiting its “loss” somewhat. It also act as a mechanism to align delegates with Arbitrum DAO.

Note: ARB Cap for each Tier includes a 30% buffer and will be recalculated on the basis of the ARB price at the time of submitting the proposal for voting in Tally.

We’ll provide a simulation of what the payout would look like in 3 different scenarios:

• 1st scenario (base): ARB at $0.55

• 2nd Scenario: ARB at $0.35

• 3rd Scenario: ARB at $1.00

Note: We will use the Coingecko rate at the time of payment to determine the value of ARB each month.

As seen in the images, an increase in ARB’s price would significantly reduce the spending in ARB, allowing the DAO to benefit from the rise. In the other hand, if the price falls to $0.35, the token expenditure of the program is limited to mitigate the DAO’s potential “loss.” This approach also better aligns the program’s USD spending with the DAO’s new economic and financial reality.

Additionally, the use of tiers in this manner allows for a significant boost in incentives when efforts are increased, acting as a catalyst for delegate activity. The first tier serves as a ‘minimum payment’ for delegates who, for example, fulfill their primary duties: participating in every vote and providing some input in the forum.

Tiers 2 and 3 represent the leap in quality, requiring greater effort to obtain 70-100% of the TP, but offering a higher reward in return. A delegate who provides a high degree of dedication and high quality input can DOUBLE the incentives of the lowest tier.

Payments to delegates are expected to be processed in ARB from the MSS between the 15th and 16th of each month.

Conflict resolution

Dispute

If delegates disagree with the results presented by the Karma Dashboard at the beginning of each month, they have a four-day period to contest them.

To raise a dispute, delegates must post a message in the forum using the following template:

• Title: Dispute

• Username

• Reason for Dispute (provide details)

The DIP administrator will address the issue promptly, with a resolution expected within a maximum of 4 days.

DIP Ban

The program administrator will have the right to expel a delegate if they attempt to game or exploit the program or if the delegate does not meet any of the aforementioned requirements to be considered eligible. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator. In all cases the ban is permanent.

The affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change (for suspension), or revoke the Administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final.

DIP Suspension

The program administrator will have the right to suspend a delegate if he/she/they commits a fault that in the administrator’s judgment is insufficient cause for expulsion. The decision and duration of the suspension are at the discretion of the program administrator (duration can’t exceed the program’s current iteration).

The affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change, or revoke the Administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final.

Scoring

To determine which delegates will receive monthly payments, we will continue using the dashboard developed by Karma.

Note: The program manager may adjust the compensation parameters, provided they inform the DAO of the reasons for the changes.

We’ve listened to the concerns raised by some delegates regarding the weightings and the changes in the Proposal Feedback section, and we would like to share our perspective.

The current system, tested over the past six months, quantitatively focuses on analyzing delegates’ contributions. At the time, we believed this was the best way for delegates to verify their monthly scoring while also avoiding the introduction of subjectivity in the analysis of delegate participation. However, we understand that this might not be the optimal way to evaluate the feedback provided by delegates, as we have observed some drawbacks under this scheme:

• Delegates are incentivized to provide comments (forcefully) to avoid being penalized by the scoring system. This is problematic because not all proposals lend themselves to lengthy discussions, and we must also consider that delegates may have expertise in some areas while knowing little about others. Forcing their participation in such cases could result in inconsequential or repetitive feedback.
• Additionally, as @pedrob has pointed out, the current system only weights proposals or discussions that have reached Snapshot, overlooking the rest of the discussions within Arbitrum DAO. This opens the door to speculation and uncertainty about which RFC might go to a vote and which might not.

We are aware that setting metrics for everything happening off-chain in governance is a significant challenge. However, we believe it is worth addressing as many of these issues as possible, as they form the foundation for maintaining incentivized governance. With this in mind, we propose two potential paths forward:

Option 1 - Introducing Delegates Incentive Program v1.5: a New Evaluation System for Delegates’ Feedback

We propose changing the way we collect feedback from a quantitative to a qualitative way.
Instead of counting comments on proposals that reach Snapshot, we propose implementing a monthly analysis of the feedback provided by delegates, regardless of whether the proposal/discussion has reached Snapshot.

In this way, the Program Administrator would be responsible for creating a rubric that evaluates the value and timeliness of the feedback provided by delegates. The goal of this system is to:

• Incentivize quality over quantity of feedback.
• Extend the analysis across all contributions made by a delegate in the forum (instead of only considering those that reach Snapshot).
• Avoid unnecessary or spam comments made solely to achieve a higher score.
• Allow delegates to focus on contributing to proposals or discussions related to their areas of expertise.

Under this system, a delegate could achieve the same score with (for example) one big significant contribution or by making several smaller contributions. It also discourages actors who might try to take advantage of the program.

Evaluation Approach

This rubric assesses the overall feedback provided by the delegate throughout the month (from day 1 at 00:00 UTC to the last day of the month at 23:59:59 UTC), based on a summary of their participation in various proposals and discussions. The aim is to measure the consistency, quality, and overall impact of their contributions. We expect delegates to comment on and/or provide feedback on proposals and discussions both before and during the voting process. This feedback should aim to foster debate, improve the proposal, or clarify issues not explicitly addressed within it.

We trust the goodwill of the delegates to avoid meaningless/spam comments and ensure that all contributions are sensible.

• Key point: Feedback or opinions that violate community rules will not be considered. Your interactions should contribute constructively to the discussions and the deliberation and improvement of the proposals.

Rubric Specifications

The parameter “Proposal Feedback” should be renamed to "Delegate’s Feedback” in this case since we’re analyzing the overall feedback provided by the delegate (not just proposals on snapshot) and will maintain a maximum weight of 30%, the score will be awarded based on the following rubric:

• Relevance: Analyzes whether the delegate’s feedback throughout the month is relevant to the discussion.
• Depth of Analysis: It evaluates the depth of analysis provided by the delegate concerning the proposals or discussions. This serves as a metric to assess whether the delegate takes the time to thoroughly meditate on the discussion and demonstrates attention to the details. Key elements include solid arguments, relevant questions, and thorough reasoning.
• Timing: Considers when the delegate provides feedback, rewarding those who provide feedback earlier, as long as they meet the above criteria. Note that feedback will be considered as provided before on-chain/off-chain voting if it was published before the day voting starts at 00:00 UTC.
• Clarity and Communication: this is a review of the clarity, structured communication, and overall readability of the delegate’s feedback. Clear and well-written feedback is rewarded.
• Impact on Decision-Making: While the proposer ultimately decides whether to incorporate feedback, high-quality feedback from a delegate often influences the final proposal that goes to vote. This criterion evaluates whether the delegate’s feedback tends to drive changes in proposals/discussions.
• Presence in Discussions: This is a more quantitative analysis, intended to reflect the effort of delegates who participate in most discussions. This parameter serves as a multiplier to the score obtained across the previous five criteria. Note that the percentage of participation in monthly discussions could be not linear across all DAO’s discussions. Some proposals may carry more weight in the overall discussions (special cases such as LTIPP/STIP, gaming, treasury, etc.).

Monthly Evaluation Process

1. Data Collection: At the end of the month, the complete set of contributions by each delegate across all discussions on the forum is reviewed.
2. Overall Evaluation: The rubric is used to assess the delegate’s overall performance on each criterion, based on a holistic view of their participation.
3. Score Assignment: A level of 1 to 4 is assigned to each criterion, based on the consistency and quality of the delegate’s contributions over the month. Each level has its percentage range that will act as the final score of each criterion.
4. Monthly Report: A qualitative and quantitative report summarizing the delegate’s performance over the month is then produced.

Scoring Methodology

Each rubric criterion has levels with an assigned percentage range, from 0 to 100%, depending on the level achieved.

The initial score is obtained by averaging the first five criteria, while the final score results from applying the “Presence in Discussions” multiplier to the initial average score.

For illustrative purposes, here’s an example:

• Relevance: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 65%
• Depth of Analysis: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 45%
• Timing: Level 4 - Scoring achieved = 95%
• Clarity and Communication: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 40%
• Impact on Decision-Making: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 60%

Initial Score/Average: 61%

• Participation in Discussions: Level 2 - Multiplier assigned: 1.15x

Final Score: 70.15% or 21.05/30 Delegates’ Feedback points.

Trade-offs

We are aware that this proposed option introduces trust assumptions regarding the Program Administrator’s criteria for evaluating feedback. We view this layer of subjectivity as inevitable until we can implement automated tools, such as the AI that Karma is developing, to assess the quality of delegate feedback. It is important to note that, as Program Administrators, after analyzing proposals and feedback for the last six months, we have gained experience that (we believe) will help us correctly identify constructive feedback.

At SEEDGov, we are committed to being as transparent as possible, as we have been thus far. Therefore, the rubric and the monthly report will always be publicly accessible to all interested parties. During this phase, feedback from Arbitrum DAO will also be crucial in helping us refine our evaluation criteria.

Option 2 - Delegates Incentive Program v1.1: Maintain the current proposed system with some modifications

Proposal Feedback (PF) Update - Formerly Commenting on Proposals (CP)

In this option, some of the feedback initially raised in this post is still considered, reducing the weight of Proposal Feedback and narrowing the gap between early and late comments. The Communicating Rationale parameter would also be slightly revalued, resulting in more gradual changes in weights.

• Communicating Rationale (CR): Weight 15% (it was 10%)

• Proposal Feedback (PF): Weight 25% (it was 30%)

To incentivize delegates to provide feedback during the early stages of a proposal’s publication on the forum, we have made the following adjustment to the PF parameter:

• 100% Weight for Early Stage Feedback (ESF): Feedback provided until the day a proposal is sent to Snapshot (typically by Thursday at 00:00 UTC) will receive 100% weight. (previously was 2 days before the proposal was sent to Snapshot).

• 60% Weight for Late Stage Feedback (LSF): Feedback provided during the voting period (starting Thursday at 00:00 UTC) will receive a 40% reduction in weight. (previously was a 50% reduction in weight, also changed the day on which we consider the Feedback as “late” from a day before to the same day the proposal is sent to Snapshot).

To ensure predictability, we define the “day of publication to Snapshot” as Thursdays at 00:00 UTC since according to the proposal Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations by @Entropy, all proposals must be published on a Snapshot every Thursday.

Example

Next steps regarding Feedback

During the experimental phase of this delegate program, we have been closely monitoring forum activity, particularly during the feedback stage of various proposals. As this phase was a trial, we primarily focused on observing certain dynamics within the forum to better understand them and make adjustments for the next iteration.

One of the issues we identified is the use of AI to comment on proposals. While the use of AI for tasks such as translating text or correcting grammatical errors is understandable, we have seen instances where it has been employed to generate feedback based on other users’ comments. This has not been a widespread or alarming issue but, in the next iteration, we plan to take a more reactive approach.

Another issue we have encountered is regarding users who post “Reserved for later comment.” We want to clarify that we do not recommend or encourage such practices, which should preferably be avoided.

In this iteration we will try to provide feedback to delegates on this type of situation.

Scoring Weight Changes

After observing delegate behavior and some internal discussions, we believe it is necessary to adjust specific parameters of the program:

Participation Rate (PR)

• Change: Previously weighted at 20% and based on historical participation rates in Tally. Now, it is reduced to 15%, calculated based on the participation rate of the last 90 days in on-chain votes (as calculated by Karma).

• Motivation: The 90-day participation rate is a requirement for delegates to register in the program. Unlike the historical rate, this parameter is more accessible, so we have decided to lower its weight.

Snapshot Voting (SV)

• Change: The weight of this parameter has increased from 15% to 20%.

• Motivation: Snapshot voting is a crucial part of the governance process. It is essential to give it more weight to encourage delegates to vote in snapshots.

Communicating Rationale (CR)

• Change: The weight of this parameter has decreased from 25% to 10 or 15% depending on the DAO’s choice.

• Motivation: While providing a rationale for votes is important, we consider the feedback period even more crucial. Therefore, we have reduced the weight of Communicating Rationale and increased the weight of Commenting Proposals.

Proposal Feedback (PF)

• Change: The weight of this parameter has increased from 15% to 25 or 30% depending on the DAO’s choice.

• Motivation: Providing feedback on forum proposals is fundamental. We have raised this parameter’s weight above others and introduced additional changes to incentivize delegates to provide feedback during the early stages of proposals. These changes are detailed further below.

Total Participation (TP)

• Change: The requirement for total participation has increased from +60% to +65%.

• Motivation: After analyzing the program’s results, we observed that some delegates with high historical participation in Tally could meet the +60% requirement by voting on 100% of monthly proposals. We have decided to raise the TP requirement to +65% for compensation to encourage more contributions in the forum.

Bonus Point (BP)

• Change: Adding Bonus Points for delegates who attends to the “Arbitrum Open Governance Call” (monthly) and the “Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance Call.”

  • For the monthly call, 2.5% BP will be awarded for attendance.

  • For the bi-weekly calls, 2.5% BP will be awarded for attending each call.

• Motivation: We have received several questions about delegate participation in calls or working groups. While there is a trend to compensate work within specific WGs (and we want to avoid potential double spending by the DAO), we find it interesting to experiment with the idea of awarding Bonus Points to delegates who participate in both the “Arbitrum Open Governance Call” (monthly) and the “Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance Call.” We will continue to manage this parameter as in the previous program. Although it was a topic of discussion, we have yet to receive complaints about how these points were awarded. We welcome any feedback from the DAO.

Details: Terminology, Symbols, and Formulas

Activity Weight (%): Represents the weight assigned to each key activity to be measured in delegates.

• Participation Rate - 90 days (PR90) - Weight 15: Percentage of the total participation of the member in votes in the last 90 days. This parameter will be calculated at the end of each month.

  • PR90% fórmula: (PR90 * 15) / 100

• Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 20: Percentage of delegate participation in snapshot voting. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.

  • Tn: Number of total proposals sent to snapshots for monthly voting.

  • Rn: Number of proposals the delegate voted on in the month.

  • SV% formula: (SV(Rn) / SV(Tn)) * 20

• Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25: Percentage of delegate participation in on-chain voting in Tally. This parameter will reset at the beginning of each month.

  • Tn: Number of total proposals sent to Tally for monthly voting.

  • Rn: Number of proposals the delegate voted on-chain in the month.

  • TV% formula: (TV(Rn) / TV(Tn)) * 25

• Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 10 or 15: Percentage of communication threads with the justification of the delegate’s vote on the proposals sent to snapshots and Tally (if necessary if the vote does not change). This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month.

  • Tn: Total number of proposals that were submitted to a vote.

  • Rn: Number of honest communication rational threads where the delegate communicated and justified their decision.

  • CR% formula: (CR(Rn) / CR(Tn)) * 10/15

• Proposal Feedback (FP) - Weight 25 or 30: Percentage of Proposals where the delegate asked noteworthy questions or generated significant debate. This parameter resets at the beginning of each month and is divided into two sub-parameters:

  • Early Stage Feedback (ESF): Opinions and feedback, made in the early days after a proposal is published in the forum, will have 100% of the weight of this parameter.

    • Tn: Total number of formal proposals published in the forum. This parameter is the same for both ESC and LSC.

    • RnE: The number of genuine contributions a delegate makes at this stage that are not spam, AI-generated, or narratively lacking in the discussion.

    • ESF% Formula: (ESF(RnE) / ESF(Tn)) * 25

  • Late Stage Feedback (LSF): Opinions and feedback, made during the voting phase of the proposal on Snapshots, will have 60% of the weight of this parameter.

    • Tn: Total number of formal proposals published in the forum. This parameter is the same for both ESC and LSC.

    • RnL: The number of genuine contributions made by the delegate at this stage. Spam messages are not considered.

    • LSF% Formula: (LSF(RnE) / LSF(Tn)) * 12,5

  • PF% formula: ESF% + LSF%

Note: We will explain how this parameter works in detail in the section on Proposal Feedback (PF) Update.

Note 2: Proposal feedback section only applies to option 2, if DAO chooses option 1 the calculation method is based on the rubric

• Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30,0% TP: This parameter is extra. If the delegate makes a significant contribution to the DAO, it’s automatically granted +30% extra TP. This extra is at the discretion of the program administrator.

• Total Participation (TP): Sum of the results of activities performed by the delegate. A TP% of 100 indicates full participation.

  • TP% fórmula: PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + PF% + BP

• Payment USD (PUSD): The final amount of USD that the delegate will receive is based on his TP% and his Tier.

  • PUSD formula: IF(TIER =3; TP/100x7000; IF (TIER=2; TP/85x5100;IF(TIER=1; TP/70x3250;0)))

• Payment ARB (PARB): The final amount of ARB that the delegate will receive is based on his PUSD, the ARB Price and the ARB payment cap of the corresponding tier.

  • PUSD formula: IF(PUSD/ARB Price > Tier’s ARB Cap; Tier’s ARB Cap; (PUSD/ARB Price))

Note: Here is the framework template for delegates to review the parameters.

Parameter summary

Activity Weight (%):

• Participation Rate 90 (PR90) - Weight 15%

• Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 20%

• Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25%

• Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 10 or 15%

• Proposal Feedback (PF) - Weight 25 or 30%

• Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30%

• Total Participation (TP):

  • TP = PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + %PF + BP

Management and development of the Delegate Incentives Program: Responsibilities, Deliverables and Budget

The SEEDGov team and Karma will continue to collaborate to maintain and manage this new version of the DIP.

Program Dashboard Management (Karma)

Over the past six months, our team has successfully built and maintained the DAO’s compensation dashboard. Based on this experience, we anticipate the following work for the upcoming year:

1. Infrastructure Maintenance and Expenses: We will continue to ensure that the dashboard operates smoothly, with real-time data updates for most metrics and daily overall calculations. This includes regular software maintenance, such as updating libraries and other necessary tasks to keep the system secure and efficient.

2. Ongoing Collaboration with SEEDGov: Regular calls with the SEEDGov team over the past six months have been instrumental in maintaining the program’s smooth operation. These meetings have allowed us to address bugs, resolve data discrepancies, and implement enhancements based on administrative needs. We will continue these calls to ensure ongoing improvements in operational efficiency.

3. Compensation Calculation Logic Updates: As outlined in the new proposal, we will implement necessary changes to the compensation calculation logic. This includes introducing a tier system, adjusting weights and metrics, and incorporating a 90-day calculation period.

4. Automation of Voting Statistics: Our current system fully automates voting statistics, streamlining the process for admins to determine compensation. Collecting data on Communication Rationale and Proposal Feedback has historically been time-consuming. A few months ago, we introduced an MVP that automates this process using LLM tools. We plan to continue enhancing this feature to further assist administrators.

5. Verification of Statistics: All statistics need to be verified for accuracy in a timely manner, specifically by the first of each month. We will continue to ensure that this verification process is completed on schedule to maintain the reliability of the data.

Budget (option 2)

We have updated the operational costs for administering this new program. This payment will be distributed over 12 months and sent regularly along with the payments to the delegates.

Details:

• $5800/month * 12 = $69,600 for continuing to build and enhance the dashboard.

Program Manager (SEEDGov)

Responsibilities

In the first iteration of the DIP, we encountered additional tasks that were not anticipated when drafting the proposal, which required extra effort to meet the program’s requirements. Therefore, in this new version, we have updated the responsibilities of the program administrator:

1. Check corresponding data to see delegates’ eligibility.

2. Collaborate with Arbitrum Foundation to ensure delegates complete the KYC/KYB process and perform the necessary follow-up.

3. Constantly monitor delegates’ activity.

4. Support delegates with any questions or concerns related to the incentive program through Telegram, forum, or Discord.

5. Collect feedback from delegates and the community to improve the program.

6. Review delegate comments in the forum and filter out spam messages.

7. Communicate any changes in the incentive program to the delegates

8. Publish monthly results in the forum.

9. Publish monthly program costs in the forum.

10. Solve disputes

11. Determine which delegates receive Bonus Points.

12. Collaborate with the Multisig to ensure payments to delegates are processed each month.

13. Periodic review of the information uploaded to the Karma dashboard.

14. Have weekly meetings with Karma to fix bugs and enhance the dashboard.

15. Prepare periodic reports.

16. Prepare a rubric and a monthly report about each delegate’s feedback performance. (option 1)

17. Monitor the participation of the delegates in the governance calls mentioned for the bonus points.

Deliverables

We commit to delivering:

• Monthly results of the DIP.

• Public cost reports to allow for audits by any interested party.

• Mid-term and final evaluation reports of the program.

Additionals

• Hold meetings with delegates to gather feedback on the program and provide them with updates.

• Constantly work on improvements to the program.

What else can we do?

We are committed to reaching out to each of the delegates who meet the requirements to be part of the program but are not yet enrolled. Our goal is to encourage everyone to join, helping to maintain and increase the diversity of voices in Arbitrum DAO.

Budget (option 2)

We have updated the operational costs for administering this new program. This payment will be distributed over 12 months and sent regularly along with the payments to the delegates.

Details:

• 2 Program Administrators (1 Part-Time - 1 Full-time): $117,000 over 12 months.

• 1 Data Analyst (Part-Time): $35,000 over 12 months.

Total: $152,000

Source: Salaries are approximate and based on U.S. standards. We extracted data from this website.

Considerations about budget for option 1

This option introduces modifications to the responsibilities and budget of the Program Administrators. Expanding the scope of the Delegate’s Feedback analysis will require more human resources to meet the objectives. Also more time and resources will need to be allocated to developing and training the AI that will eventually automate this process.

Additionally, Karma Dashboard will require to development of new tools and overall a new section for calculating and showing qualitative delegates’ contributions.

New budget details:

• On the Program Administrator side: $16,000/month - $192,000/year (2 program administrators, both full-time instead of 1 part-time and 1 full-time + 1 data analyst part-time)
• On the Dashboard and Tools provider side: $7250/month - $87,000/year
• Total administrative budget: $279,000/year (6,6% of the delegates’ incentives budget)

KPIs

In this new iteration of the DIP, we aim to establish the following KPIs:

• Achieve that 50 delegates receive incentives.

• Engage 100 delegates in the program.

• Achieve an average Total Participation (TP) of 80% among participants in the program within six months.

• Introduce improvements to the program after six months.

Continuous Upgrades

We know that this program still has room for improvement. While this new program version moves away from its experimental nature to become a more developed one, a delegate incentive program must continuously receive feedback from its participants.

The SEEDGov team and Karma are committed to gathering feedback, obtaining more information, and implementing the necessary changes to optimize performance. Considering the new duration of the program, the Program Administrator reserves the right to make changes in the scoring methodology by giving public notice in the forum.

Call to action

We invite all ArbitrumDAO members to provide their feedback on this proposal. It will be revised and evaluated based on the comments received.

In the coming days, we will schedule a public call to explain and discuss this new version of the delegate incentive program

[BlockworksResearch]

Overall, we support this proposal, but we do have one question about the Early Stage Feedback and Late Stage Feedback. These are good inclusions, but is there anyway to reduce the weighting for these to some degree? These metrics can be gamed by prior collusion for proposals, allowing some parties to have an edge on providing feedback rationale on the forums. We think these metrics are important, but weighting should change just slightly so that they are less punitive/rewarding, but enough so that people are still incentivized to take action.

[JoJo]

i was able to provide some feedback to the proposal before went live: and, at this point, i gotta agree with @BlockworksResearch about the potential gaming of early/late feedback like i am exactly doing in this very case. Since I had the pleasure to read it before going live, I am able to give a feedback right away.

Would it make sense for people who provided comments, like the one who are listed above, to have a “neutral” type of feedback? Meaning: same value if provided early or late? This would mean that anybody proposing something should add a small paragraph, at the very top or end, about people invoved in this, and it might be a bit too cumbersome to handle for the DIP managers.

For the rest: normalizing payments in usd terms i think is something we want to generally have across the board, and not only in this initiative. While everybody is happy when you have a crypto payment, and that crypto goes x2, the opposite can be a mood/commitment killer, and this is what we need to avoid.

The bonus for call to me is extremely interesting and echoed by others as far as i know, will be also interesting to see how it is effectively achieved (and my educated guess, without going back in a situation in which people need to type in chat their username like in college lessons during covid, is that the recording will be analyzed and marked or something similar). Might be worth thinking what calls should come in this list, and if there is a way for single delegates to have bonus point for participating to more specific calls for example, even tho I don’t know how tracking could be done.

Finally, would like to praise the budget: is not really about the size per se, but the size compared to the amount of manual work that needs to be done to keep this initiative, now extremely important, live in our ecosystem.

[pedrob]

@SEEDGov

Note: A new delegate, without prior participation history, must meet the above requirements (>50k voting power and >60% participation in onchain votes) for a period of 3 months in order to be eligible for the program.

I have a question for clarity, because the rule seems clear:

@SEEDGov

Participation Rate (Karma): >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days.

but the Note + Chart imposes a condition that doesn’t arise from the rule, and perhaps the actual intention of the rule is that one.

Is the requirement for participation over 60% for 3 months starting from the delegate’s first vote, or is it participation over 60% within the last 3 months (90 days)? A delegate could join the program in a month following a period of low activity (e.g., December/January) and quickly achieve the 60% despite not being active during 3 months. For instance, if you have 3 on-chain proposals during January and February but then a delegate joins in March, where we have 7 on-chain votes, he would comply with “>60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days”.

[Argonaut]

We agree with the proposals, however, we have some concerns regarding the Proposal Feedback. I understand the objective, and we think they are very good, but we are not sure that assigning a certain Weight in the equation is the fairest approach for all delegates, especially when adding a complication by introducing Early and Late Stage Feedback. By this, we mean that there isn’t a clear criterion that determines whether a comment adds value to the proposal or not, which could result in a lottery for those who provide good comments on the proposals, regardless of whether they are Early or Late.

[SEEDGov]

@BlockworksResearch @JoJo @Argonaut

We understand the concern raised in this case, and it’s somewhat ironic that this situation occurred with this particular proposal. The key point is that ideally, most discussions should take place on the forum, not just through drafts sent via direct messages, but also through conversations happening in private groups.

The goal here is to encourage delegates to provide direct feedback publicly on the forum, regardless of whether they have already given feedback through private channels. As for adjusting the weighting, we are concerned that it might diminish the impact of the change in criteria. However, we are open to hearing new suggestions that could help mitigate this situation.

Regarding Argonaut’s concern about the feedback criteria, for now, this modification is also aimed at improving response times on the forum so that proposals reach Snapshot with as much feedback as possible. As Program Administrators, we are already actively filtering comments, and Karma is working on AI tools that will further assist with processing feedback, as demonstrated in the following quoted section:

@SEEDGov

Automation of Voting Statistics: Our current system fully automates voting statistics, streamlining the process for admins to determine compensation. Collecting data on Communication Rationale and Proposal Feedback has historically been time-consuming. A few months ago, we introduced an MVP that automates this process using LLM tools. We plan to continue enhancing this feature to further assist administrators.

Hey @pedrob thanks for your question!

@pedrob

@SEEDGov

Note: A new delegate, without prior participation history, must meet the above requirements (>50k voting power and >60% participation in onchain votes) for a period of 3 months in order to be eligible for the program.

I have a question for clarity, because the rule seems clear:

@SEEDGov

Participation Rate (Karma): >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days.

but the Note + Chart imposes a condition that doesn’t arise from the rule, and perhaps the actual intention of the rule is that one.

Is the requirement for participation over 60% for 3 months starting from the delegate’s first vote, or is it participation over 60% within the last 3 months (90 days)? A delegate could join the program in a month following a period of low activity (e.g., December/January) and quickly achieve the 60% despite not being active during 3 months. For instance, if you have 3 on-chain proposals during January and February but then a delegate joins in March, where we have 7 on-chain votes, he would comply with “>60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days”.

New delegates are considered as such starting from the month of their first vote (since the note indicates that a new delegate has no prior participation). In the scenario you’ve presented, if this delegate votes for the first time in March, he would need to wait an additional two months, even if he reached 60% due to low activity in January and February because he wasn’t a delegate during those two months. So, to clarify, if his first vote had taken place in January instead of March, he would indeed be eligible.

Moreover, this modification is not only aimed at incorporating new delegates but also at reactivating Voting Power (VP) that currently remains inactive. Achieving 25% historical participation is becoming increasingly difficult, and this has been a significant barrier. For reactivated delegates—those with a history but who haven’t voted in the last 90 days—they will be eligible to register in the month following the one in which they meet the minimum requirements.

It is important to note that the minimum requirements are for eligibility, and after that, delegates must achieve at least 65% Total Participation (TP) to qualify for Tier 1. Simply voting is not enough to reach this threshold.

[pedrob]

Thanks for the clarification

@SEEDGov

New delegates are considered as such starting from the month of their first vote (since the note indicates that a new delegate has no prior participation).

So is it correct that the >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days only applies for those delegates that never casted a vote before those 90 days, right? If I’ve been active before and suddenly decide to come back, I don’t need to be active for 90 days before being eligible.

@SEEDGov

this modification is also aimed at improving response times on the forum so that proposals reach Snapshot with as much feedback as possible.

This can be tricky because, as a delegate, you can’t be sure that a proposal will go to Snapshot once it’s published. So, if I have limited time, which one should I respond to? All of them? How do I know it won’t be abandoned? Maybe we should establish a minimum content criterion for a proposal to go to Snapshot or to deserve feedback from the delegates.

@SEEDGov

The key point is that ideally, most discussions should take place on the forum, not just through drafts sent via direct messages, but also through conversations happening in private groups.

I agree with the goal, but isn’t it ironic that the opposite happened with this proposal. That’s just the nature of DAOs. People don’t like to expose and debate ideas in public without first gaining support from key stakeholders. That’s a fact that won’t change.

It’s also not a bad thing for proposers to seek feedback before going to the forum (in fact, it’s good for them to talk with delegates and attend calls before publishing, so they can get some feedback from people with context). A potential downside is that encouraging feedback on the forum might make delegates less inclined to respond to DMs, possibly leading to fewer or even lower-quality proposals reaching the forum.

On the other hand, will these comments or feedback be taken into account if the proposal doesn’t make it to Snapshot or gets rejected?

After reviewing proposals and feedback for six months, I imagine you have a good idea of what constructive comments look like and how they contribute to discussions. I’d agree with you arbitrarily managing some sort of ‘rewards’ or ‘bonus points’ for those who make such contributions until you develop (if it’s even possible) a system that can efficiently measure these types of interactions

Something that occurred to me while rethinking this is that if the goal is to prevent proposals from arriving at the forum fully cooked and with enough support to pass without much or any public debate, the DIP could include a requirement for proposers to respond to constructive feedback. I’m not sure if it’s the best tool since not many qualifying delegates are also proposers, but in some cases, it would give small delegates (like myself) the chance to have their questions answered when they are constructive

[cp0x]

I like:

1. New approach with Tier 1-3.
2. New accounting of % of votes for 90 days.
3. Redistribution of weights for different parts of the contribution to the vote.

Did I understand correctly that regardless of the cost of the ARB token, the delegate has a threshold above which he cannot receive, even if his range is lower than what is specified in the proposal?

[0xDonPepe]

I am very glad to see the Delegate Incentive Program being renewed and for it to be implemented over the course of a year. The budget seems reasonable, and the increase in monthly compensation for delegates is totally justified, given that the price of ARB has dropped over 65% YTD. Adding bonus points for participating in governance calls is something I was eager to see in this new version because I’m sure this will encourage active engagement that will translate into better-informed voting. Overall, I am very happy with the proposal and will, of course, be supporting it.

[Tekr0x.eth]

Happy to see that the delegate incentive program will be extended. I only have one comment. I believe it is essential for all delegates to attend monthly Arbitrum Open Governance Calls (online event).

It’s a chance for all delegates to meet and discuss proposals and comment on ongoing debates. I think this could also be part of scoring. Rewarding the delegates who attend and are active during these calls.

[EzR3aL]

Hi,
So I just recently (may) joined the DAO. And it feels like the DIP is getting more and more confusing.
There are so many rules and things to do and timings you need to take care of that it is hard to keep up with everything. So I would really like to see a graphic or dashboard that explains them in an easy manner.
Also as I understood the goal was to incentivize voting activity and more delegates joining the DAO. With the new threshold of over 60% I don’t see this goal being achieved. I’m rather saying less people will join from now on.
Being a full-time delegate isn’t something people do for free, but making it that hard to be eligible will probably stop most from being active at all.

Now I know there will be delegates telling me it’s not that hard to get 50k token. But that’s not true. The biggest delegates here are somewhere known people, early birds or people with good connections to protocols, holder etc.

How should a normie get in touch with someone holding enough ARB?

[Bobbay]

I don’t think CR should be that low.

Also is the proposal feedback weight not just encouraging people to write spammy comments? How do you filter their value?

A fair amount of the time, people write enough comments and discuss a proposal in-depth so I don’t see the need to write a comment. Not all cases, but most of the time, I have all the info I need.

Attending calls for additional weighting is quite tricky. A lot of delegates have other jobs.

[duokongcrypto]

In favour of the proposal, the proposal has been updated from the original, which I personally think will attract more voting delegates, and the overall focus is on the core principal of ‘Attract + Retain + Incentivise’.
The whole proposal shows that seedgoc has spent a huge amount of effort and research, thank you for your work.

[duokongcrypto]

@SEEDGov

评分体重变化 ：

• 参与率 (PR)： 之前权重为 20%，基于 Tally 的历史参与率。现在，该权重降至 15%，基于过去 90 天的链上投票参与率（由 Karma 计算）计算。
• 快照投票（SV）： 该参数的权重从15％增加到20％。
• 传达理由（CR） ：该参数的权重从 25% 下降到 10%。
• 提案反馈（PF）： 该参数的权重从 15% 增加到 30%。（以前称为“对提案进行评论”）
• 总参与度（TP）： 总参与度的要求从+60%增加到+65%。

See the parameter adjustment changes here. Proposal Feedback (PF) here, seeing as the proposal really needs more visual commentary. Although I’m a representative of a non-English speaking region and rely mostly on translators to participate, I can see that the governance session would like more representatives to be involved in the overall proposal.

[SEEDGov]

@pedrob

So is it correct that the >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days only applies for those delegates that never casted a vote before those 90 days, right? If I’ve been active before and suddenly decide to come back, I don’t need to be active for 90 days before being eligible.

Yes, if you suddenly decide to come back you still need to get >60% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days but if you achieve it before that term you will be eligible.

@pedrob

This can be tricky because, as a delegate, you can’t be sure that a proposal will go to Snapshot once it’s published. So, if I have limited time, which one should I respond to? All of them? How do I know it won’t be abandoned? Maybe we should establish a minimum content criterion for a proposal to go to Snapshot or to deserve feedback from the delegates.

This is already the case with the current version of the program; the scoring system currently includes only proposals that have reached Snapshot with their respective comments or CR. The introduction of tiers and the proposed changes to delegate compensation are specifically aimed at ensuring that delegates dedicate as much time as possible to the DAO.

Regarding the criteria you mention, we believe it is a valid approach that goes beyond the scope of this proposal. Proposals can reach Snapshot anytime, whether in a few days or several months. We believe this issue could be handled as a soft consensus, similar to the Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations.

@pedrob

It’s also not a bad thing for proposers to seek feedback before going to the forum (in fact, it’s good for them to talk with delegates and attend calls before publishing, so they can get some feedback from people with context). A potential downside is that encouraging feedback on the forum might make delegates less inclined to respond to DMs, possibly leading to fewer or even lower-quality proposals reaching the forum.

It’s not that we are against obtaining feedback prior to publishing in the forum, but we believe that this process should be reflected within the forum itself. A good example is the comment made by @JoJo, where he publicly shares part of the feedback he had previously provided, helping the community to see who contributed to the drafting of the proposal. This transparency is important for maintaining openness and trust in the process.

@cp0x

Did I understand correctly that regardless of the cost of the ARB token, the delegate has a threshold above which he cannot receive, even if his range is lower than what is specified in the proposal?

Correct, if the ARB price drops low enough, the delegate can receive only up to the pre-set Cap in ARB for his tier. This is to take care of ArbitrumDAO’s treasury.

@EzR3aL

There are so many rules and things to do and timings you need to take care of that it is hard to keep up with everything. So I would really like to see a graphic or dashboard that explains them in an easy manner.

Also as I understood the goal was to incentivize voting activity and more delegates joining the DAO. With the new threshold of over 60% I don’t see this goal being achieved. I’m rather saying less people will join from now on.

Being a full-time delegate isn’t something people do for free, but making it that hard to be eligible will probably stop most from being active at all.

Hello, thank you for your feedback. We kindly invite you to revisit the proposal, as the new threshold of 60% is based on votes within the last 90 days rather than a calculation of historical participation. This adjustment is specifically aimed at facilitating the onboarding of new delegates or those who were previously inactive. Additionally, the primary goal of the program is to encourage delegates to engage more professionally within ArbitrumDAO.

@Bobbay

Also is the proposal feedback weight not just encouraging people to write spammy comments? How do you filter their value?

A fair amount of the time, people write enough comments and discuss a proposal in-depth so I don’t see the need to write a comment. Not all cases, but most of the time, I have all the info I need.

What you say makes sense, and throughout the process, we have consistently aimed to prevent potential abuse, such as spam or non-contributive comments. We also understand that many questions and concerns are often addressed through the feedback provided by other delegates, making it unnecessary to repeat the same inquiries. For now, we are manually assessing the comments, but Karma is working on a tool that will help automate this evaluation process.

@Bobbay

Attending calls for additional weighting is quite tricky. A lot of delegates have other jobs.

This is exactly what we aim to achieve with these incentives—ensuring that, despite most delegates being involved in other DAOs and projects, they have enough motivation to dedicate a portion of their time to ArbitrumDAO.

Additionally, not attending the calls won’t penalize the delegate, as participation is rewarded with Bonus Points. These points are optional extras, so it’s up to each delegate to decide if they want to earn them or not.

@duokongcrypto

See the parameter adjustment changes here. Proposal Feedback (PF) here, seeing as the proposal really needs more visual commentary. Although I’m a representative of a non-English speaking region and rely mostly on translators to participate, I can see that the governance session would like more representatives to be involved in the overall proposal.

The Proposal Feedback segment already has some visual support:

@SEEDGov

Example 1

Example 2

Additionally, we will soon be organizing a special session with the delegates to thoroughly explain the proposal and address any questions that may arise.

[Gabriel]

(>50k voting power and >60% participation in onchain votes) for a period of 3 months to be eligible for the program.

I think this desincetivates new delegates and perpetuates the current. A 50k voting power for 3 months is almost imposible to achieve for people that are not whales.

[EzR3aL]

Okay so >60% participation within 90 days.
But what does that mean for me for example? I started voting in May. Will I be reset and basically have to start from scratch?
Because I am now somewhere between 40-50%.
So I could reach 60% probably next month.

[Bruce]

Overall, I believe this new one-year program is more refined and will be more effective than the previous experimental program. Still, two piece of advice as follows:

1、Bonus Point (BP)
"If the delegate makes a significant contribution to the DAO, it’s automatically granted +30% extra TP. This extra is at the discretion of the program administrator.”
The reward for BP is quite substantial. It would be helpful to provide specific details or requirements, or examples of past rewards for special contributions to serve as a reference for other delegates.

2. Promotion of the Forum
This new incentive program frequently mentions the activity of forum users and the discussions that shape proposals on the forum. However, in reality, many users may simply vote online or offline and might not even know about the existence of the forum, thereby missing the opportunity to truly participate in the proposal formation process. As the official statement mentioned, “Currently, only 30% of delegates meeting this requirement are part of the program.” If the participation rate among users holding large amounts of tokens is this low, the likelihood of more regular users participating is even lower. The official channels could increase the forum’s visibility on social platforms.

[kuiclub]

• Total Participation (TP):
  • TP = PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + %PF + BP The whole formula covers the complete process of each proposal, with clear proportions, focusing on the early feedback of each proposal and optimising the feedback suggestions, and whether the BP part can be more diversified, such as social media publicity and promotion, education and governance, etc., so as to encourage more people to actively participate in arb governance. Understand the progress of the whole ecosystem and the related situation

[Deelabs]

By adjusting incentives and requirements, the proposal efficiently professionalizes the role of delegates, encouraging them to dedicate more time and effort to Arbitrum’s governance. This shift towards more informed decision-making and higher quality contributions should lead to better outcomes for the entire ecosystem.

The proposal also greatly improves predictability and fairness in delegate compensation. The new tiered structure, denominated in USD, provides stability for delegates while maintaining alignment with ARB token performance. This approach appears well-balanced and should attract proactive and committed participants while preserving the DAO’s interests.

The proposal is also efficiently embedding built-in flexibility and commitment to continuous improvement. By allowing for ongoing adjustments to program parameters and actively seeking feedback, the DIP can evolve with the needs of the DAO, ensuring its long-term effectiveness. We believe that the inclusion of such adaptability mechanism is often underestimated, yet it is very important.

The transparency that the proposal encourages is arguably its most meaninful component. By encouraging more public discussions and feedback in the forum, the program fosters an environment of default and inherent openness that is essential for building and cultivating trust and collective understanding of the rationales, thinking and mentality of others.

The only aspect in regards to which we have reservations pertains to the eligibility thresholds.
The 50k+ ARB voting power and 60% onchain voting participation over 90 days may be overly restrictive and discouraging towards potential, new delegates. We believe it is worth revisiting these criteria to ensure a diverse and inclusive delegate pool.

Other than that, Deelabs is in support of the proposal.