We would like to thank the @Entropy team for the detailed and well-reasoned proposal following the initial trial of the Code of Conduct and DAO procedures. It is clear that the revisions are grounded in both practical experience and a strong desire to adapt governance processes to the evolving needs of the DAO. We support the general direction of this proposal and appreciate the transparency behind the reasoning for each change. At the same time, we would like to share several suggestions that we believe can strengthen the proposal and better preserve key community standards.
1. Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy
We understand the reasoning behind removing the Responsible Voting Policy, particularly due to the increasing difficulty of enforcement and the impact of vote-buying services. However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections. This guidance could be incorporated into delegate onboarding materials or contributor conduct documentation and tied to conflict of interest disclosure expectations. Preserving this standard in a non-binding form allows the DAO to promote responsible behavior while acknowledging the current limitations.
2. DAO-Elected Member Replacement Process
We support the addition of a clear fallback process for replacing elected members when no replacement mechanism is specified in the original proposal. This added clarity will help prevent unnecessary delays or disputes. Additionally, we believe it would be beneficial to define a clear resignation process. If a member wishes to step down, they should be required to notify the appropriate party, such as the program manager, the proposal author, or the Arbitrum Foundation, to ensure formal acknowledgment. The responsible party should then update the quorum on Snapshot if needed, coordinate the member’s removal from any relevant multisig, and communicate the resignation to the DAO through the governance Communication Thread.
In terms of the replacement itself, we suggest that the DAO consider adopting a runner-up mechanism as the first fallback. If the runner-up from the original election meets a reasonable minimum threshold of vote share, such as a percentage of the winning candidate’s total, they could automatically be offered the role. This would uphold the original election’s legitimacy and avoid unnecessary delays. If no runner-up meets the threshold, or if the runner-up declines, the fallback process outlined by Entropy would apply. We also recommend looking to frameworks in other ecosystems, such as
We also suggest reviewing the approach used by other ecosystems, such as Optimism, which could provide helpful guidance for establishing a consistent and transparent offboarding process.
3. Cancellation of Ongoing Initiatives
We agree that a default mechanism is necessary when proposals do not specify how an initiative may be modified or canceled. The use of a Snapshot vote with a 3 percent quorum is a reasonable baseline, and tying the outcome to the most-supported option where multiple choices exist adds flexibility. To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote. In addition, requiring a short update on the initiative’s status and budget before the vote would give voters better context to make informed decisions. It may also be helpful to include non-binary options such as temporarily pausing the initiative or conducting an audit, as sometimes reform or review is more appropriate than full cancellation.
4. Extension of Shielded Elections
We support the continued experimentation with shielded voting and appreciate the inclusion of data from previous elections. Shielded voting plays an important role in reducing voter pressure and minimizing coordinated influence. However, we note that many delegates continue to post their votes and reasoning in delegate threads during the voting period, which partially undermines the privacy benefits. To fully realize the intent of shielded voting, we recommend encouraging delegates to wait until the voting period has concluded before publishing their vote rationale. Alternatively, a formal post-vote feedback window could be introduced. This approach maintains transparency and accountability while protecting the independence of voting behavior during the election itself.
5. DAO Holiday Break (December 18th, 2025 to January 5th, 2026)
We support the continuation of a holiday break to give contributors a clear pause period and prevent governance fatigue during the year-end. The added flexibility in allowing forum discussions to continue and only limiting voting to emergencies is a reasonable adjustment. To improve planning, we suggest issuing a formal reminder in advance of the break so that contributors can finalize their proposals and votes on time. While the proposed dates are appropriate, we also recommend clarifying that some spillover may be acceptable when justified by timing constraints. This helps balance structure with flexibility.
In summary, we are supportive of the proposal’s direction and the intent behind each change. Our suggestions focus on preserving important cultural norms, improving transparency, and creating safeguards that support a more consistent and inclusive governance process. We appreciate the Entropy team’s ongoing commitment to thoughtful experimentation and look forward to seeing how these refinements continue to shape the future of Arbitrum DAO governance.