We sincerely appreciate the thorough and insightful work Entropy has dedicated to preparing this comprehensive proposal. It is clear that considerable time, careful consideration, and extensive engagement with the community went into crafting these recommendations. We believe most of the updates provided reasonable, and below is our additional perspective on several key points of this proposal that we wanted to share:
Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy
We strongly align with Curia’s stance regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy. Although it’s clear that enforcing this policy universally poses significant challenges, given exceptions like vote-buying services, maintaining it as a normative standard remains essential. The openness inherent to DAO governance naturally precludes universal enforcement, yet this policy continues to hold cultural and ethical value, particularly for roles such as delegates and AAEs who respect it in practice. Thus, we echo Curia’s viewpoint:
Cancellation of Ongoing Initiative Process
Regarding the cancellation of ongoing initiatives, it should be explicitly stated that anyone meeting the existing standard threshold of 500k ARB voting power can submit a cancellation proposal, consistent with regular proposals (referencing current guidelines). Moreover, even if an original initiative includes provisions that limit cancellation proposals to specific parties, such restrictions should be explicitly disallowed. It is essential to maintain openness and transparency by ensuring that cancellation proposals remain accessible to all eligible DAO participants.
Enforcement of the Code of Conduct
We believe creating simplified operational guidelines for program managers, councils, or other responsible facilitators could streamline enforcement. Although setting rigid definitions of behaviors warranting warnings, suspensions, or removals might be overly restrictive, establishing a guideline where suspensions typically follow prior warnings, particularly when behavior fails to improve, seems feasible. Such guidelines would likely have mitigated friction in past DIP evaluation cases, such as this one.
Self-voting Policy
We urge deeper reconsideration and discussion on self-voting policies, given that Arbitrum’s unique governance structure where delegates and AAEs can overlap, and that the previous discussion took place a long ago. This structure inherently allows scenarios where the same entity could serve as both the requester and the approver, creating potential conflicts of interest or self-serving decisions.
Although we acknowledge that completely preventing such conflicts may not be possible, introducing defined restrictions against self-voting specifically by entities that stand to directly execute or benefit financially from a proposal is a necessary step. It is generally acceptable for proposal authors themselves to participate in voting, provided they are not also the entity responsible for executing or benefiting directly from the initiative. This measure introduces meaningful friction and social accountability, altering the incentives and costs associated with potential self-serving behaviors.
We believe addressing these points will reinforce the robustness, fairness, and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance.