Overall, I support the intention to update the scope and boundaries of the OpCo to better align with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure. As the ecosystem evolves, it makes sense to refine roles and responsibilities to ensure better governance and operational clarity.
However, I’d like to emphasize that the effectiveness of these updates will depend heavily on how well the AAE framework is actually implemented. A clear and enforceable AAE structure is essential not only for shaping a viable execution plan for the SOS objectives but also for defining the operational details of OpCo in a sustainable way. Further thoughts on the AAE framework here.
That said, I have some concerns around how the proposal addresses the issue of conflicts of interest—something that is endemic to DAO governance and must be handled with more rigor. In particular:
- Restrictions Around Council Elections:
The proposed changes seem to reduce safeguards against conflicts of interest rather than strengthen them. The previous criteria around elections and eligibility were more appropriate in preventing problematic overlaps and preserving independence.
While I recognise the previously agreed terms limit access to valuable contributors, I think the relevance of OpCo within the DAO calls for clear boundaries.
- Declaring Conflicts of Interest:
The proposal underestimates the potential conflict posed by personal or institutional token holdings. A large stake in a competing project—even if there is no formal working relationship—can significantly bias decision-making. These situations should be treated with the same seriousness as direct employment with a competing project.
I suggest for holdings to be disclosed and considered in the evaluation when they represent more than 25% of one’s portfolio.