In all of these, can we as soon as possible proffer solution(s). From what I have read, Foundation have sold tokens and expended some of the fund already. It is obvious foundation erred and acted wrongly, but we shouldn’t ruminate too much on this. Also I think the foundation needs to give official response to the community as soon as possible and in the response they should provide way(s) to remedying all of these! Arbitrum is too big for it’s DAO to be handled unprofessionally.
looks really bad… i’m against
As the third largest delegate on the entire chain with over 13,5M votes, we feel the obligation to share our thoughts on this highly controversial proposal. We have been internally going over the proposal over the past couple of days and have found ourselves disappointed in the distinct lack of transparency regarding the Foundation’s 750M ARB tokens, apparently earmarked and moved beforehand without a vote. We completely understand the need for funding, but the Arbitrum DAO deserves a more detailed breakdown of where the money is going and what it’s being spent on.
In its current state, Plutus is voting no on AIP-1.
If AIP-1 fails, we would like to see the following from an improved proposal:
- Clear breakdown of how the 750M ARB are going to be spent and reasoning behind that number - current reasoning feels very arbitrary
- A vesting schedule for the 750M ARB tokens - we see no need to have them all available in one go
- If no vesting schedule is instituted, we believe the number of tokens should be significantly smaller
More importantly, the Arbitrum Foundation has now backtracked on the legitimacy of the vote, claiming that it is a ratification of decisions and actions that have already taken place. This is an extremely worrying stance that reflects incredibly poorly on Arbitrum’s governance process in general. We encourage the Foundation to reconsider, listen to the community and return to good governance practice.
Arbitrum’s governance is now under a magnifying glass - we believe that honoring the DAOs voting process is foundationally important and however this situation is handled will set an important precedent for the future.
> “The Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO”
> Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14-16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
> If the AIP fails to pass, the process ends after this Phase 3.
I’ve summarized my thoughts and offered a possible solution on how we can move forward on this issue in this post.
I’m very interested in hearing everyone’s thoughts on how we can move forward and amend the proposal to ratify the DAO creation.
(Posting on behalf of TreasureDAO as a member of its DAO council - Karel Vuong, Co-Founder.)
TreasureDAO, on behalf of its delegates, is voting AGAINST AIP-1 in its current form. Treasure asks that Arbitrum resubmit this proposal with (i) greater clarity over the purview of the special grants program, (ii) breaking AIP-1 into several proposals rather than one.
As a DAO, we have learned firsthand how difficult it is to maintain a fast-paced organization while upholding decentralized governance. We have empathy for other builders in this position, who must juggle their operational plans and community input at the same time. It is an arduous, unenviable model to which builders in web3 remain committed to in order to facilitate the decentralization of technology.
We do not find AIP-1 to be inherently problematic in terms of the token allocations. The ArbitrumDAO should ensure ample funds are allocated to mission critical programs, and the Arbitrum Foundation team supported by Arbitrum’s original creators, Offchain Labs, is in the best position to evaluate what the ecosystem needs at a core protocol level to continue growing. However, we agree with the voices in our community requesting that more detail be provided regarding the special grants program. Early proposals for ArbitrumDAO will set best practices for future governance. Providing transparency into how funds will be allocated, particularly for a budget of this size, will set a positive norm for the DAO’s own grant administration through the treasury. The Foundation should set an example for the community on what appropriate grant administration looks like so that the treasury funds are put to best use.
Moreover, AIP-1 is multiple proposals packaged into one and is currently being decided by a razor-thin margin. A proposal as multifaceted as this one should only be enacted with overwhelming support from the community. It sets a bad precedent for the DAO to normalize proposals containing rider conditions. Governance should be nuanced and granular.
We discuss both arguments in detail below and conclude with quotes from our community members that helped inform our decision-making.
Details into this grants program are vaguer than we would have hoped. Treasure evaluated this proposal by the standards with which we try to conduct our own internal governance and found the explanation to be lacking. It is unclear if our community would have approved this proposal if submitted in the context of TreasureDAO. As much as we support Arbitrum and appreciate the ongoing help they provide our team, we have a duty as a delegate to evaluate this proposal by the standards that earned us trust among the ARB token holders.
The proposer references “voter fatigue” as the rationale. We agree with this argument and would add that it would be unwise for ARB stakeholders to exercise too much influence over core protocol decisions. The overall community does not have the same technical expertise as the Arbitrum team itself, and subjecting blockchain design to popular consensus would likely have bad results. Ethereum has eschewed design by committee for a reason.
Nevertheless, ARB is a governance token, and the credibility of ArbitrumDAO as a decentralized organization depends on governance proposals such as AIP-1 being fully transparent. We identified several problems with the presentation of the grants program in AIP-1:
- insufficient discussion of the kinds of grants that would be approved;
- missing explanation of vesting or other timelines, if any;
- insufficient explanation for how grants would be reported to the community; and
- no proposed accountability framework by which the community could evaluate the efficacy of the program over time.
We ask that the proposer resubmit the proposal with a detailed response to these questions. In particular, we would like to see more discussion about the purview of the grants program, which includes examples of the types of grants that would be approved or not approved.
AIP-1 contains a lot of separate action items for the DAO to consider. It should be split into granular proposals with their own rationales and plans. The proposals should be broken into:
- Security Council
- Special Grants
- Reimbursement for Foundation Setup Costs
- Data Availability Committee
Allowing the DAO to vote on these issues separately is important to nuanced governance and also ensuring that a proposal is able to pass. Bunching too many items into a single proposal causes parties to vote “no” simply because one part may be untenable.
We appreciate Arbitrum providing a detailed response to this issue. We agree with the points being made: setting up a DAO requires preliminary legwork that has to be done, and the initial setup cannot be logistically completed by a DAO.
We also agree that Arbitrum should have a large ecosystem fund available for completing special grants. The issue is not the size of this fund but rather transparency of the program. The response from the Arbitrum team is a justification of the size but does little to address the primary controversy. It also does not explain why formation of the DAO requires $3.5 million in reimbursements. Moreover, AIP-1 should be broken into several proposals. We do not think it sets a good model for future governance to have the first proposal enacted by the DAO include several rider provisions not germane to the central controversy here.
The Treasure community has been engaged in a passionate debate surrounding AIP-1 on Twitter and in our Discord channels. We wanted to acknowledge some key community input that informed our decision-making. We also would like to thank all of the community members that weighed in on this discussion and helped us reach a decision that we feel best represents the interests of the entire delegation.
The Treasure community is in support of a grants program run by the team. Rahulio Jones commented,
“if the funds are used well, it will help Arbitrum accelerate and become dominant. Extend the lead over competitors. Use funds to attract and keep highly desired talent.”
Uncle Pennybags echoed this sentiment and compared the importance of ARB grants to Optimism’s program:
“Arbitrum grants will also be a pivotal moment for [the ecosystem] in general. Just like how OP eco was propelled by the generous OP emissions handed out to every defi protocol within the eco.”
DaddyDuckNugget agreed with Arbitrum’s reticence at turning mission critical questions fully over to the DAO:
“[It is] impossible to develop a project at the scale of ARB without a governing centralized body. [Full] DAOs are [incredibly] slow and at the whims of biased token holders who might not have the best interest at heart when it comes to governance. Decision-making requires leadership and ARB won’t be fully decentralized until the product is 100% complete.”
Some critics like Chris Blec have accused the Arbitrum team of “stealing” funds from the DAO. The Treasure community strongly rejects this polemical framing. Concerns were more about the manner in which the proposal was presented.
CJ explained it well by saying:
“I don’t think any serious ecosystem participant is buying that [nefarious intent] narrative (though I’m sure it gets Twitter engagement - I think the focus here is on the additional disclosure and projections required that would accompany the funding (e.g., what are the criteria for the special grants programs, how large is the program as a proportion of the overall 750mm tokens, a breakdown of startup costs already paid vs. what is still outstanding, projections for admin and operational costs). Remember that a “no” vote can also mean “revise and table the proposal again.” Similar to how Treasure has done in the past when the community wants amendments and additional information.
He went on to suggest the following guidelines for a future proposal:
“[Arbitrum] should draft a full business plan and exhibit deck and let the community digest that to make an educated decision rather than asking for almost $1bn in funding over a weekend.”
NFDoggo agreed and said,
“best to do a mea culpa and reset.”
Some in the community added that a revision of AIP-1 should also have some explanation of why the ArbitrumDAO setup costs totaled $3.5mm. It is unclear why the fees were this high. Omitting a detailed breakdown of these costs would set a bad precedent for future governance.
We would like to note here that the TreasureDAO council does not fully agree with this community perspective. Expecting a DAO to provide a business plan that accounts for every line item of a program is not advisable for a few reasons. Holding a token does not automatically qualify an individual to weigh in on how much things should cost. We have noticed from our own experience that non-experts tend to grossly underestimate the cost of expenses like game development. Moreover, allowing the community to have input into the minutiae of program funding could have disastrous consequences if the DAO decides not to spend adequate funds on legal fees or administrative necessities. It is more appropriate to grant a full amount towards a particular program and outline categories of expenditures rather than each line item.
This approach is distinct from that established by AIP-1. The proposal provides the ecosystem fund with a blank check without a discussion of the kinds of programs that will be funded. A better approach is to request allocations from the ecosystem fund on a case by case basis or for categories of expenditure with a clear transparency framework. We also notice that AIP-1 omits any discussion of the timeframe over which the grants will be dispersed and adds that “further funding of the administrative budget wallet shall require approval of an AIP by the ArbitrumDAO pursuant to the AIP process.” Leaving the door open for future funding warrants an explanation for the length of time that Arbitrum expects the initial allocation of funds to cover.
TreasureDAO’s own model for its ecosystem fund is to submit specific proposals on new programs that should be funded using MAGIC. We understand that programs like “core protocol development” will require a sizable amount of funding. Too much input from the community would be inappropriate here. For example, the token holders are not in the best position to judge how much it costs to build a competitive L2 or what resources are required to do so. However, the need for technical expertise in certain areas of decision-making does not absolve Arbitrum from making an effort to explain the purview of the grants program in more detail than provided in AIP-1.
A debate took place on the proposal forum in which ARB token holders were asking why the Arbitrum team preemptively moved the 750mm tokens into a new wallet and may have been moving these tokens onto CEXs before the DAO vote went through.
NFDoggo made a compelling argument in the Treasure Discord that it is unreasonable to assume that ArbitrumDAO could have gotten off the ground without preliminary work. He said:
“Everyone seems to be jumping on the fact that certain decisions have already been made - which the Arb team directly addresses in the feedback, pointing to the ratification language. The team took certain actions in preparation of launching the foundation and a first step for the DAO is to simply have the members ratify those decisions. [It’s] just legal housekeeping.”
NFDoggo ends by saying that the correct perspective that the ArbitrumDAO should take now is to focus on the desired amendments to the proposal rather than pointing to necessary preliminary actions that were already taken. He also raises a good point that AIP-1 effectively decentralizes the Arbitrum ecosystem more than the status quo, which is inarguable.
Like NFDoggo, we do not think that movement of the tokens was done in bad faith. Establishing market makers before the token went live on CEXs was in the best interests of every ARB holder to ensure deep liquidity across exchanges.
It was on snapshot and off chain not on tally. Idk what to say or do at this point, but I’ll side with the ARB team for now.
While more transparency and better communication is a MUST NEED from the team, this present occasion is being used by competitors and those against Arbitrum to attack an opponent.
Regarding the 750m tokens for Arbitrum Foundation, its not an unreasonable propsal. As the team have said in their clarification, many token foundations have big allocations. Polygon is able to partner with big web2 companies like Starbucks and Nike and pay to get projects like DeGods to Polygon chain. These cant be done without funds. Polygon controls a huge % of their token supply and there is no DAO, none of the decisions are subject to oversight. All the decisions are made by the team in centralized manner. The same can be said about any other sizeable project in the Defi/web3 space.
Another L2 chain, ImmutableX has also been making big payments to companies like GameStop. ImmutableX gave GameStop $100m IMX tokens to further the adoption of ImmutableX.
As soon as GameStop received the tokens, they dumped a third of it.
These are business decisions that are required if any web3 project has to grow today.
Similarly, even Optimism Foundation is well funded and they are able to get partners like Coinbase.
Do we wish to see Arbitrum not have any future growth?
Crypto especially L2 space is fast heating up with heavy competition. Many projects are in the space trying to tie up web2 companies to move to web3, launch NFTs, tokens, use dapps etc.
Arbitrum is already in partnership with big companies like Reddit.
These things cost a lot of funds to nurture and grow. One cannot immediately put a fixed cost on nurturing such partnerships over the long term. Usually, they are the result of several weeks or months of work, backed by a team that does not have financial constraints.
Presently, Arbitrum is the 4th largest DeFi project in terms of TVL, only behind Ethereum, BSC and Tron. If we have to grow this even further, the Foundation must be able to bring in the kind of partnerships and adoption that other teams like Polygon, Immutable, Avalanche etc are able to get.
Considering these and the need to bring about adoption of Arbitrum chains, so that the Arbitrum DAO can eventually benefit, the 750m token grant to Arbitrum Foundation is not unreasonable. Arbitrum DAO at present controls 42% of the total token supply in its treasury. Making the 750m token grant to seed Arbitrum Foundation will bring Arbitrum DAO Treasury’s holdings down to ~34% while Arbitrum Foundation will be in a strong position for few years to grow the network, onboard well known partners to the Arbitrum ecosystem and bring about wide adoption of the network.
The opposition towards the 750m funding to seed Arbitrum Foundation seems to be misplaced. At the moment, many competitors are using this occasion to attack Arbitrum, while they themselves have a big centralized treasury that they control and use to onboard partners. If Arbitrum Foundation is not well funded, the Arbitrum chains and networks will be left behind completely and Arbitrum DAO as a whole will suffer.
However, the main things needed from the team are transparency around actual unlocked token at present, future unlocks and transparency on how they intend to use the 750m tokens. They cannot just claim the tokens are locked, then the community finds out that its not actually locked but has been sold. That is a bad situation that must be completely avoided.
These are my recommendations to move Arbitrum DAO forward successfully.
The special council & foundation directors are already set. Immediately pause all governance for 2 weeks. Let it be known that any attempts to pass a proposal on Tally will be stopped until a constitution and proposal process is ratified.
The DAO didn’t get to decide how much went to team/investors either. Whether the DAO likes it or not, if this had been an allocation decision it would all be mute. I do believe the foundation or whoever is driving this governance process (very mistakenly) thought this was a more democratic way to launch. It wasn’t. Let’s get over that.
Set a date that a new AIP-1 will establish a voting process and pass that proposal without the pork. I’d also recommend adding 1 week on the forum for discussion with at least 5 stewards commenting in support of a proposal before it goes to snapshot.
Show us how we can guarantee that 750 million ARB immediately available will not fully own the DAO making all of our participation moot. Maybe a vesting schedule. Maybe give some of that number up as a show of understanding. The way it is done isn’t important outside of it being enforced onchain.
Let’s keep the eye on the prize, our ability to direct a massive amount of funding for the Arbitrum ecosystem. If the top stewards can gain consensus on the initial allocation being just that, then the community can shift to thinking about all the development and innovation 3.5 billion $ARB can support! Forgive the foundation for making an error in how they approached this.
We also need to understand that just like other initial allocations, we may have lock-up info shared, but not doxxing of each individual.
If you are here to govern the funds that are allocated to the DAO, and you accept the mistaken approach was just that, then you should be ok with the Foundation maintaining some level of acceptable cover. Other DAOs have not doxxed every single director and multisig keyholder.
If the foundation has 750 million ARB and the turnout for this vote is 100 million ARB, then the governance we have is meaningless. Fix this for the next version.
Another way you can address this would be to enact a novel mechanism for making participation governance something that must be earned through staking $ARB. Perhaps something like I mention here: Active Governance - #2 by DisruptionJoe
This is great. If the foundation can clean up this mess, then let’s give them a year to get it right. If things are moving in the right direction (not talking about price), then we wouldn’t vote them out.
The only way for the foundation to save face now is to actually support decentralization and proper functioning of the DAO. We have learned a ton in the space over the last year. Here are a few things the foundation can do to hopefully survive the first year and maybe gain back the trust of the community.
- Commit to pluralistic funding. The one model of funding at a time thing isn’t working. Have some workstreams for long term projects where high context and low turnover are needed. Start running Quadratic Funding and Quadratic Voting rounds at a regular cadence. Commit to using new mechanisms which run on Arbitrum. Actually LEAD the space as you have done so far with tech!
- Own the fuck up and the brash solution. We all hate long political answers that don’t say anything. This launch of governance fucked up. Thats ok. The overall ideas and premise were mostly in line with industry standards (which have a lot of room for improvement). Maybe adjusting the overton window in favor of the people isn’t your thing, but make it reasonable for people to want to govern by fixing the overt governance problem with issuing 750 million ARB immediately.
- Talk with any partners you might have previous arrangements with and find another way. Trying to have confidential deals is not going to work. Everything is on chain. Its tough seeing you stumble on this 101 shit, but get it together. One more issue like this Wintermute thing is going to crush the DAO.
Pause governance. Own the fuck up. Present a viable solution. Win with competency from here forward.
I do trust the intentions of the Offchain team and the foundation, but at this point they will need to earn back the trust from the community. It sucks when you try to do something great for others but it wasn’t done perfectly and you get shit on for it. This is an opportunity for you, us, and DAOs as a whole to get our thumbs out of our collective asses and do something right. Or not… that is up to you.
Remember that assholes are the loudest people. The people that will help this project succeed are the constructive ones who aren’t saying ridiculous things about being owed some commitment to making number go up.
Thank you so much for taking the time and effort to put your communities thoughts forward here. Appreciate the in depth analysis and your teams experience in this process.
Blockchain at Michigan is committed to improving protocol transparency and ensuring the long-term sustainability of the Arbitrum protocol and the Arbitrum DAO. After reviewing the proposal in its current form and discussing it with our fellow delegates, we stand with the opinions of @BlockworksResearch and many others that AIP-1 does not promote this transparency that is deserved by the community.
We appreciate members of the Arbitrum team’s communication throughout this process, but the lack of clarity surrounding the 750 million $ARB token transfer to the Foundation when describing the initial token distribution is a failure on the Arbitrum Foundation’s part and has led to considerable complications with the initiation of this DAO. It is our current understanding that this transfer of 750 million $ARB has already occurred and that AIP-1 serves as a retroactive ratification of preordained decisions carried out without the DAO’s input.
The remainder of AIP-1 provides a proper framework for the establishment of the Arbitrum DAO. While 7.5% of the total supply is fairly common for protocol teams/foundations, Arbitrum is a highly valued protocol, with this transfer currently valued at around one billion USD. This issue opens the door to discussion on the % allocation a foundation is to receive versus the objective dollar amount they should be allotted. In other words, rather than stating that a 7.5% token allocation to the foundation is on par with industry peers, we should look at objective dollar amounts. Even more, we should critically analyze the true costs of funding a foundation along with the amount of money that is required for grants. Perhaps a better setup is to lock a fixed amount of tokens in a wallet for the foundation, only to be distributed by the DAO when and if they are needed, such as on a quarterly basis, for instance. This would require the foundation to become more lean and transparent. Nevertheless, amounts this large must be disclosed during the initial launch of the tokenomics. We understand, however, that prior to the establishment of a DAO, decisions need to be made for the aspects discussed in this “proposal” such as the establishment of the security council and constitution (Arbitrum spoke on this “chicken-egg problem” extensively in their response.
With all of this in mind, on behalf of our delegates, we have decided we will be voting AGAINST on AIP-1: Arbitrum Improvement Proposal Framework in its current form. This experience has shown the Arbitrum Foundation that there is a need for complete transparency throughout the governance process as well as the expectations we and our fellow delegates have for the Foundation to remove any ambiguity from future decisions on Special Grants and other usages of this token distribution. We look forward to continuing to work with our fellow delegates, the Arbitrum team, and the community as a whole to improve DAO and set up Arbitrum for long-term sustainability.
Thanks to all the DAO participants and delegates for their feedback on AIP-1. It likely will not pass and we are committed to addressing the feedback received from the community.
Before we dive in, we want to clarify why 10m ARB tokens were sold by The Arbitrum Foundation.
The Foundation is a separate entity to Offchain Labs and it was established with no funds. The 10m ARB tokens were sold to fiat to fund pre-existing contracts and to pay for near-term operating costs. For example, the $3.5 million setup costs outlined in AIP-1.
The Foundation does not exist to sell tokens, only sold enough to fund its current operating expenses and has no near-term plans to sell more tokens.
There are four central points of feedback raised by the DAO and we will cover them one-by-one here:
AIP-1 is too large and covers too many topics. We will follow the DAO’s advice and split the AIP into parts. This will allow the community to discuss and vote on the different subsections.
750m ARB (7.5% supply) being sent to The Arbitrum Foundation. This will be voted on in its own AIP and we’re working on options to add more accountability. For example, a vesting period of 4 years. Furthermore, tokens held by the Foundation cannot be used to vote.
AIP-1 does not discuss transparency over how the funds will be spent. As part of the budgeting AIP, we will propose transparency reports to make the community aware on how the funds are spent over time.
The Special Grants program is vague/lacks DAO involvement. We will rename it “Ecosystem Development Fund” and provide context on how the funds will be used to benefit the Arbitrum Ecosystem. Separately, the DAO can initiate new grant programs from its treasury at any time.
We look forward to proposing the new AIPs early this week and participating in an open discussion with the DAO. Arbitrum is the only L2 to seek DAO ratification of the initial Foundation funding and that transparency sparked this important discussion.
The objective in setting up the Arbitrum DAO was to lead by example to create the most decentralized rollup, and despite this blunder of communication, we will continue to aggressively pursue this goal.
To our knowledge, Arbitrum is the only L2 where tokenholders can simultaneously (1) control upgradability via on-chain executable governance, (2) appoint and remove Foundation directors and (3) directly control an on-chain treasury.
We believe that having a Foundation that is empowered to act in the service of the DAO is important for Arbitrum’s success. We clearly could have communicated that better, and will take this opportunity to improve and continue to build Arbitrum as the most community-centric L2.
We have also tweeted the above message.
As a DAO member. The 750M arb tokens should be sent back to the DAO Treasury as the approval of AIP-1 is not set to pass. This is I believe, the probably that has caused so much backlash. Once the problem with the 750M tokens has been address, which they have not, I believe the DAO should take vote to remove foundation members that approved his transfer of tokens before an approval even happened.
I am voting “Against”
First, I want to speak to AIP-1 as it stands on it’s own. So for a second, ignore the now known issue at hand and presume the Arbitrum Foundation had not moved tokens yet. I would have still voted “against” in this case, with request for the AIP to be broken into smaller pieces.
I agree strongly with the first set of a DAO’s AIPs being about setting ground rules for the DAO moving forward, especially with one as large as this. Not having a formal process in place can lead to disaster, so this is important. However, I’m against trying to lump in too much at once. The obvious one is the 750M ARB to the Foundation Admin Budget, however things like squeezing in a very loosely defined “Special Grants” process aren’t a great idea either. Those are things that need fleshed out in their own debates / AIPs. This AIP should have been broken into about 3 or 4 separate things.
Now, with that said and as it stands now, I’m still continuing with my ‘Against’ vote. The issue I had before has only been exacerbated by moving funds before the vote. Others have surely said it better, but the fundamental issue is we can’t accept funds being moved without DAO approval or else what is the point of this process?
The best case moving forward is to do an AIP that singularly addresses the voting process. Then re-visiting the other aspects of this AIP in separate votes once that precedent is set. In the meantime, the already moved funds should be returned. Without that, there doesn’t seem to be any teeth behind those who vote.
Rock solid answer. Touches on all the pain points. Exactly what I hoped to see, personally.
Thank you for your response! A lot of the people used this forum today to run campaigns to make the token go the way they wanted with leverage today. If you go to chan/reddit/discord/twitter, you’ll see the coordination wall. It’s predictable people game ups and downs but this past week has really showed the mercilessness of speculative traders. I think you guys handled this situation well. You made markets and that was all the point of the wintermute funds and the 10m sell to keep the foundation making partnerships, like with service providers like Lemma. I know I’m probably misarticulating my points, but I’m appreciative. Thank you.
I think what is important here is that the criteria for selecting recipents and details about how all of the funds are going to be distributed need to be disclosed upfront. For example, how were the DAOs selected and what was the criteria for that? I think there were a lot of projects excluded from without explanation.
As a long term DAO participant, I would like to add my 2 cents. There has already been plenty of discussion around the ARB sold and the vote being meaningless, so I won’t go into that. There are two things within the AIP that as a DAOist I think are not the way to go about it.
750M ARB in 1 vote, and as first action is way too much. Either a team does a premine and proclaims they know what is best, and the market will have to price it in / judge for itself, or a DAO slowly but steadily builds trust with DAOplomats.
Since this Foundation is claiming to give out grants and fund overhead costs, it should have come up with a clear budget and a trial period with a way lower amount. Let’s say, a couple 100k perhaps. The Balancer Grants subDAO of which I was a founding member shows how a small initiative can build trust and grow to a larger entity.
co-founders of Offchain Labs are part of the Security Council (aka Admin Key multi-sig) and will get paid $5000 per month for this role. Didn’t these founders get a huge pre-mine allocation already? Why do they need to get a stipend for being on an admin key position for a project they created, got a premine of and are working on and got VC funding for to work on anyway?
These kind of brazen moves are not the way of a DAO. Arb team, you can do better.
The March Cohort getting paid $5,000/month each in ARB tokens is fair I think given they are all doxxed and have been known and trusted in the crypto community for years, each of them. I trust these people because their work records speak for themselves I believe. You can click the links of each of them and find their socials and the work they’ve done.
Why shouldn’t we delegate to a third party that does not own tokens or build any projects on Arbitrum? Because:
- If Arbitrum develops strongly, we - holders and delegates - also benefit.
- If Arbitrum unfortunately faces any incidents, we - holders suffer the most financially, but the delegates do not. Does that sound fair? You should think about it yourself!
I delegate my voting power to CamelotDAO because they are a native project on Arbitrum and, of course, they also own ARB. I trust that all decisions made by CamelotDAO are for the purpose of developing the ecosystem because only when Arbitrum develops strongly will they also develop strongly.
Regarding AIP-1, I vote “FOR” because it is necessary for the ecosystem, and I believe that the creators of ARB understand the benefits of ARB better than third parties who have no obligations towards its benefits.
And surely, i am an ARB holder and also an active member of the ARB ecosystem.