Analysis of Vote Buying Services

Arbitrum Research & Development Committee (ARDC) Research Member
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As one of the Research Members of the ARDCV2 we were asked to take a deep dive into vote-buying and other incentive-driven governance mechanisms that are beginning to shape decision-making in the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Our research was three-fold:

  1. Map the landscape – catalogue the leading vote-buying and delegation platforms (e.g., LobbyFi, Event Horizon, MetaDAO, Butter, Hidden Hand) and explain how each one works.
  2. Assess the risks and incentives – quantify how much influence can be bought, identify manipulation vectors, analyse real-world case studies (OAT election, Rari/Tribe, Aave/CRV), and measure decentralisation using Voting-Bloc Entropy.
  3. Deliver actionable recommendations – lay out Passive, Active, and Interventionist options the DAO can adopt, from simple transparency nudges to treasury-delegation programmes or emergency response playbooks.

We have documented the full research in a Google Doc. The breakdown is as follows:

  • Executive Summary – key findings at a glance
  • Introduction – overview of vote buying and why it matters
  • Platform Landscape – LobbyFi, Event Horizon, MetaDAO, Butter, Hidden Hand
  • Risks, Incentives & Governance Impact
    • Attack & manipulation vectors
    • Altruistic use-cases
    • Pricing analysis & swing-vote scenarios
  • Decentralisation & Decision Quality – Voting-Bloc Entropy analysis
  • Case Study: OAT Election – how a 10 % bloc could (or couldn’t) swing results
  • Recommendations
    • Passive approach
    • Active approach
    • Interventionist approach
  • Appendix / Sources – data tables, methodology, conceptual foundations

Whether you’re a delegate, builder, or ARB holder, we hope this report equips you with the context and options needed to keep Arbitrum governance resilient as incentive markets evolve.

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Tons to dig through here, thanks for sharing @DefiLlama_Research

Can you provide any more detail on this:

Butter can be considered a form of legitimate lobbying, where protocols selected in each proposal must make a case for why they deserve the votes. While indirect vote buying is always possible, it would come at a cost to the project itself, as it would reduce its overall incentive budget if the project is selected.

How does a protocol lobby for votes if the decision is made via CFM? Users predict the conditional expected value of the KPI, lobbying can’t affect the final result.

Perhaps you’re using these terms to describe the effective outcome of a protocol paying someone to trade to their benefit?

Also, we’d be delighted to talk if you’re still interested.

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