As one of the Research Members of the ARDCV2 we were asked to take a deep dive into vote-buying and other incentive-driven governance mechanisms that are beginning to shape decision-making in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Our research was three-fold:
- Map the landscape – catalogue the leading vote-buying and delegation platforms (e.g., LobbyFi, Event Horizon, MetaDAO, Butter, Hidden Hand) and explain how each one works.
- Assess the risks and incentives – quantify how much influence can be bought, identify manipulation vectors, analyse real-world case studies (OAT election, Rari/Tribe, Aave/CRV), and measure decentralisation using Voting-Bloc Entropy.
- Deliver actionable recommendations – lay out Passive, Active, and Interventionist options the DAO can adopt, from simple transparency nudges to treasury-delegation programmes or emergency response playbooks.
We have documented the full research in a Google Doc. The breakdown is as follows:
- Executive Summary – key findings at a glance
- Introduction – overview of vote buying and why it matters
- Platform Landscape – LobbyFi, Event Horizon, MetaDAO, Butter, Hidden Hand
- Risks, Incentives & Governance Impact
- Attack & manipulation vectors
- Altruistic use-cases
- Pricing analysis & swing-vote scenarios
- Decentralisation & Decision Quality – Voting-Bloc Entropy analysis
- Case Study: OAT Election – how a 10 % bloc could (or couldn’t) swing results
- Recommendations
- Passive approach
- Active approach
- Interventionist approach
- Appendix / Sources – data tables, methodology, conceptual foundations
Whether you’re a delegate, builder, or ARB holder, we hope this report equips you with the context and options needed to keep Arbitrum governance resilient as incentive markets evolve.