Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
The proposal has had a substantial rewrite from its original showing, and it reflects the diligence by both Frisson and other DAO members. We would like to remain cautious about simply using inflation and not taking the time to think of other mechanisms for which the DAO may want to explore in incentivizing participation and allowing staking. Additionally, we would like all members to remember the legal implications of staking. We appreciate the high-level summary, but this should be treated with utmost caution, and should be in discussion at all times moving forward.
Before we begin, we would like to express our gratitude to you on behalf of ITU Blockchain for this proposal. The first thing that caught our attention is that the proposal is prepared with great transparency and detail. We believe that the impact of Arbitrum Staking justifies the requested grant. The data presented clearly shows the need to support governance and DeFi. We want to emphasize that we always support improvements in this direction on the governance side.
I voted FOR: I see this proposal as very innovative in the field of governance tokens. Utility of governance tokens is something that all DAOs face and as Arbitrum DAO we need to experiment with different approaches on this. I am excited to see how this proposal will reflect on the market price, open new possibles with stARB, and how will effect governance/delegation.
Since arb went live. We have been looking forward to the ARB pledge to bring more opportunities to the ecology, not only just capture the value, but also really let the holder, the pledgee to see the ARB ecology in all aspects of leading the industry at the same time, can be more confident to hold. However, how to strike a balance between pledging and voting rights, and at the same time, the proxy can continue to get the right to vote by proxy, and at the same time, attract more people to participate. I hope frisson can bring more different things, thank you for your proposal!
I fully support the ARB staking proposal, which represents a significant milestone in enhancing ARBās utility. Itās encouraging to see that we are finally making concrete progress on this front.
Initially, I had concerns about some aspects of the proposal, particularly regarding the delegate incentives and Karma Score system, as well as the funding sources for stakeholder rewards. Specifically, the discussions highlighted potential issues with the Karma Score system, such as the risk of gamification and the concentration of power among larger delegates, which could undermine the fairness of the governance process. Additionally, there were valid concerns about the sustainability of relying solely on sequencer fees for staking rewards.
However, the thoughtful revisions from @Frisson and the establishment of dedicated working groups to further refine these details have alleviated these concerns.
After all, liqudity matters. Currently there is not significant liquidty for ARB on ETH mainnet. With $stARB adoption, we expect better liquidity for ARB token in DeFi and be more accessible for on chain users.
I look forward to the continued discussions and the forthcoming proposals from these working groups.
Iām voting āFORā anything that will bring utility to the token. Price appreciation might not be impacted in the short term, but this is a first step towards building a self-sustainable protocol. However, Iām concerned about the legal risks this could pose to the Arb Foundation and the DAO.
I believe the delegation working group should also focus on creating the right incentive program to prevent delegating more power to whales, which could result in a plutocracy, and instead create incentives for smaller delegates to gain more influence.
Weāre voting FOR this proposal. The staking setup cleverly tackles the āDeFi or governā dilemma by letting folks use their ARB in DeFi without tanking governance participation. Iām particularly impressed by how it handles unused voting power - itās a smart way to keep things decentralized even as ARB gets wrapped up in various protocols. Plus, the Karma score integration isnāt just a set-and-forget deal. The DAO can tweak or override it, which keeps us flexible as we figure out what āactive governanceā really looks like in practice over the next years.
We voted For this proposal in both the snapshot and onchain phases.
Our team has been monitoring the continual iterations of this proposal by intaking delegatesā feedback, and it has been great to see the progress towards a more conclusive structure.
After the introduction of the unistaker concept, itās exciting to see the possibilities that can be implemented for introducing some degree of value behind āmere governance tokensā. The initial idea to distribute surplus sequencer fees to stakers is of course difficult since the operating revenue for the DAO is currently limited, and it is an important revenue management decision to consider where and how this capital should be used. We are interested in seeing the new working groupsā research regarding how capital should be directed to stakers. It seems unlikely that the DAO will be able to sustain decent enough yield to stakers from sequencer fees alone. The recent proposal by Karpatkey and Aera regarding ādiversifyingā the treasury into stables and yield bearing assets would be an interesting way to potentially divert some of this non-operating revenue to stakers. Again, this is a revenue management decision. It could be the case that incorporating this staking setup is good enough for nowāand we can in the future turn on this, so to speak, fee switch and begin issuing dividends.
It could also be the case that the yield is turned on for a period of time, like issuing a dividend during a period where we have excess revenue. However, this is difficult since whenever a company issues dividends, investors expect an indefinite dividend. Turning on fees to stakers could also be something thatās implemented during times where we need the price of ARB to perhaps increase to a particular threshold in order to preserve the severity of the treasury. As mentioned, the likelihood and incentive towards conducting a governance attack only increases as the treasury balance sheet is full of more and more non-native tokens.
Deciding who will be eligible for the yield is also a very difficult problem due to the subjectivity surrounding assessment results from groups like Karma. We look forward to seeing the research surrounding this as well.
Overall, this staked governance token setup is very promising in increasing the attractiveness of holding these tokens. Iām sure many large DAOs have seen this and are now contemplating similar practices.
Voted FOR, this is an interesting experiment, and we should explore options to increase usage of ARB if it makes sense and aligns with long term vision / strategy (we need this too).
The following reflects the views of L2BEATās governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and itās based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
As we mentioned back when we voted in favor of this proposal during Snapshot, we have discussed this proposal extensively with Frisson and the Tally team both in person and online. Our views havenāt changed since our last comment, and we remain committed to participating in any working groups that are spun up to define the source of staking rewards and the definition of an active delegate.
We also want to take the opportunity to link a relative content piece that Delphi Digital, as a member of the ARDC, published two weeks ago.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
Weāre voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
What stands out to us is the transparency and level of detail in the proposal. The potential impact of ARB staking appears to fully justify the requested funding. The introduction of ARB staking and stARB provides a valuable way to strengthen governance while allowing token holders to capture value. The data provided highlights the need for stronger governance and DeFi support, and we believe that improving governance participation in this way is a step in the right direction.
Governance tokens still face utility challenges, and recent months have shown that without proper incentives or tokenomics, itās difficult to demonstrate long-term value for those currently involved.
I appreciate this effort and am very interested to see how this change plays out. Not only could it have a positive impact on Arbitrum, but it might also serve as a future example for the entire ecosystem.
The FranklinDAO / Penn Blockchain Team voted FOR this proposal on Tally. Weāre excited to see increased participation and delegation in governance and unlocking utility and yield for the Arbitrum token.
There are still many questions to be answered, and we are interested in being apart of the groups to help provide answers these critical questions:
Which parties will be in charge of leading and doing BD for DeFi integrations for stARB?
How will this affect existing delegations - would it drastically shake up the voting power for delegates?
Where exactly will this yield come from, and how can we make it sustainable? What are the tradeoffs of each source (sequencer, MEV, validator, inflation etc)? What is an acceptable minimum rate?
We maintain the support made during Snapshot and are excited to see how a governance token can evolve with the staking mechanism and staked tokens. We are also in support of any working groups that further the utility and sustainable use of the protocol.
Considering the significant price fluctuations, the goal of fostering governance, the risks of governance attacks, providing utility to ARB, and the experience gained from other DAOs, I believe the proposal makes sense.
I appreciated the DAOās active participation and the valuable feedback it provided, including the working groups. I think itās a bet worth making.