Arbitrum DAO's Delegate Engagement Apathy Determent program (Arb DAO DEAD Program) - Pilot

Governance
1

On the heels of the ARB Staking Working group’s recent recommendations I want to propose a new program, made possible by ARB staking which would further push the same goals.

TL;DR
Using the new ARB governance staking system the DAO can maintain 100% ownership over ARB tokens in the treasury while delegating them to different contributing members of the DAO. We should pilot a program that rewards our top 25 most active contributors who have small delegations with responsibility and 200k ARB delegation each.

Number of active ARB voters is going down consistently
Number of active ARB voters is going down consistently882×700 50.5 KB

Problems:

  1. Active participants in Arbitrum governance continues to goes down. (ARB staking intends to address this, and I won’t discuss why this is bad here since its been expanded on in the linked thread^)
  2. It’s basically impossible for new delegates to rise naturally, without massive subsidy from major institutions like wintermute, no matter their individual contributions.

We need both delegate engagement RETENTION (1) but also GROWTH (2).

An anecdote

As a personal example, I’ve made several public posts about Arbitrum governance that have gotten well over 100k views each, I’ve been cited about arbitrum governance debates in dozens of news articles over a few years. In each post I ask folks who agree with me to delegate their ARB. Not a single person ever has. I’ve personally DM’d over 200 ARB holders with personal messages, after writing scrips that pull all ARB balances and cross reference with twitter/ENS/telegram, to those who have not delegated their ARB holdings. I’ve never been able to convince anyone to care enough to spend a moment to delegate this way. I have participated in IRL Arbitrum events… no dice. Maybe it’s me, but I have heard the same complaints from 6 other contributors whom I asked while working on this proposal. Or maybe there’s just no upside to ever doing it (for now) and holders don’t care enough.

Solutions

Part of the solution should be rewards for active delegates and the people delegating to them, as the ARB Staking project is working hard towards. But that’s only part of it.

We also need to bring up contributors and give more voting power to active participants who deserve it. The graph above (stolen from @dennison) not only shows voting participation falling, but power concentrating in the hands of a few. Bad news for the future security and vitality of the DAO. So the other part of the solution is to use the new staking features to build up and boost our top contributors and give more power to more good actors who want to see Arbitrum flourish.

Proposal

  1. While keeping this ARB in the treasury control, delegate 200,000 ARB each to the top 25 contributors of Arbitrum who currently have less than 100k total delegation, as the existing delegates see fit. (5M ARB total).
  2. This 5M delegation will be updated every 6 months, via new onchain votes, based on who continues to contribute in good faith according to the other existing delegates (ie no council should decide this).

This gives us the chance to show off some new features the are available to ARB holders, and also give more temporary power to top contributors who are doing a lot. With a foot in the door I suspect it will be easier to convince more ARB holders to decentralize and diffuse their delegations.

A certain expiration date for the delegation is trivial to setup technically. Example:

    // Function to remove delegation after 6 months
    function removeDelegation() external {
        require(
            block.timestamp >= delegation.timestamp + 180 days,
            "Delegation cannot be removed before 6 months"
        );

        // Clear delegation
       ARBStaking.withdraw(...);
       ARBToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this), DAOTreasury, ARBtoken.balanceOf(address(this)));

        emit DelegationRemoved();
    }

Target recipients shared here for inspiration.

Here’s some of the top contributors to Arbitrum DAO in recent months who have extremely little governance power despite doing significant work for the DAO.

Feedback

Looking for initial feedback on:

  • Size of delegations and total
  • Number of contributors
  • Length of time the delegation should be active for
  • technical implementation for how to automatically remove delegation after 6 months

One other note: the redelegation campaign earlier this summer was a fantastic idea, but I don’t think it had the high impact I had hoped for it. And this idea has been discussed several times before, however, governance staking was not part of the equation. Now that it is, we should reassess because new mechanisms are possible.

Thanks for reading and your feedback!

2 Likes
2

Hey @cupojoseph thanks for putt this prop up.

There have been a couple of discussions around this topic in the past, all of which still boils down to the reality that a delegate requires at least 7-10M voting power to move the needle in governance. Your request to delegate 200k to these top contributors (5M total) doesn’t do much at the end of the day.

About this:

A good idea could be establishing a redelegation campaign strictly for active contributors that have little vp.

Also, about this:

I believe DIP by SEEDLatam does a good job of compensating delegates with >= 50k vp thus keeping them engaged; so target could be lower than this threshold if at all this happens.

3

There are many things to unpack here, but at a high level i am opposed to giving governance power without ownership

I think it creates the wrong incentives and deepens principal agent problems. i had said the same for a similar proposal that was floated way back

The other aspect is that DAOs function with 3 groups:

  • Projects or apps who are mostly loyal to Arbitrum
  • Delegates who are usually influential across many ecosystems
  • Contributors who make proposals at one or many DAOs

I see this proposal as an effort to make contributors into delegates, which again i’m not sure is needed or a good idea. It is alright if some people remain contributors and get paid directly for that, rather than trying to make them big delegates and force them to try making money off their increased importance in the DAO.

4

Hi!

Leaving my 2 cents here as I was tagged :wink::

There is a need for a really robust criteria to start the conversation about this. A few questions to consider:

  • Is there a need for this? As mentioned in the post where this chart was shared, this is a number of votes, not total VP being cast. With more delegation, the number of voters decreases.
  • What is the objective of this delegation? What do we want to achieve as a DAO?
  • Who is eligible, and how are these defined? Which set of rules/points are we going to apply (top-contributor is not enough, IMO)

Maybe if we can answer these, the path is clearer.

1 Like
5

Hi @cupojoseph, thanks for bringing this proposal forward. We really appreciate the effort to address this topic of governance participation, However, We have some concerns and suggestions:

First, regarding your statement:

While this might bring visibility to some active contributors, the impact on governance seems limited. As well mentioned earlier:

so delegating 200k ARB would not create a significant change in the broader landscape.
In this sense, it might be worth exploring a tiered incentive program that not only involves delegations but also other forms of recognition, such as milestone-based bonuses or rewards for specific contributions. This approach could better align with the DAO’s goals of decentralization and sustainable growth.

Also, we agree with the point raised in this comment:

Delegating without ownership can create risks, as delegates may lack a direct interest in the long-term success of the ecosystem. You might consider a hybrid approach: a mix of small direct rewards and temporary delegations, accompanied by clear performance metrics.

We think it’s crucial to better define what “retention” and “growth” mean in this context. Is the main goal to increase participation in votes? To foster new ideas? Or both? Establishing specific criteria, As mentioned by @jameskbh in their comment would help clarify the purpose of the proposal.

Finally, We find the idea of updating delegations every 6 months through on-chain voting cool to discuss, but it would be helpful to define what specific parameters or metrics would be used to evaluate contributors. These could include indicators such as their level of participation in discussions, the number of proposals submitted, or votes cast.

That would be all for now. Thanks again for sharing this!

6

Yes it does, because then together they have as much power as a decently large delegate. And also there is a cold start problem you’re not getting: its very hard to start with 0 and convince anyone to delegate to you/stay motivated. I think 200k is enough that people will be able to use that to start attracting more, especially with the liquid staking boosts. The math works out that you need at least a few hundred thousand to make a dent in the APY if you pass rewards on to your delegatees.

The previous discussions around this basic idea that you mentioned do not take into account the new features and possibilities created from the liquid staking

2 Likes
7

I’ve talked about milestone bonuses before with some other delegates, but i think it seems like too much administrative work and a distraction from the core mission. If you think 200k delegation is not enough to incentives or reward good actors, is there a larger number that you think would? 500k? 1M? I choose 200k because I feel its enough to get over the cold start problem, but no too much that it becomes a governance risk to give out that much power.

1 Like
8

I think anyone who is contributing should be eligible, if you’re under a certain threshhold of delegation, say 100k or so. and the decision on who to give it to lies entirely with the existing delegates. Anyone can run, anyone can get it, and it gives us a completely open opportunity to lift up and recognize our top contributors who dont really have any individual power.

9

We desperately need MORE of these.

One of the reason arbitrum has bled against optimism, is because projects going there get big OP bribes and now they are bought into the future of it and can participate in governance. If you’re a new founder considering where to build an app theres less of a reason to do it on Arbitrum where breaking into governance and having any say over the future of the network you’re building on is extremely difficult.

The proposal isnt about giving power to people with no skin in the game. Its about lifting up the people who have proven they do have skin in the game but are left out of the decision making process.

Theres a reason you give equity to early employees at a startup. You dont say “sorry only investors and corporate governance nerds are able to participate.”

2 Likes
10

Yes i am fully in favor of giving projects or apps driving txn volume or TVL on arbitrum more voting power, preferably via token swaps so we get some bidirectional alignment & upside from it.

The question here is, should contributors who write proposals to ARB DAO get voting power? Personally speaking, greater or more predictable pay for our contributions is more valuable.

As a project building on arbitrum though i would certainly want more influence on the chain i am building on. So an interesting fork of this proposal might be to look at the top dapps on arbitrum, identify those with low voting power, and seek to engage them more closely in our governance.

11

This is a cool proposal, thanks @cupojoseph

I would suggest that we look at solutions like Rari Chains Delegate Launch pad program. In this program the foundation delegates out a pot of their on tokens to a group of new delegates who are chosen every few months. The delegation decays over time, the purpose of it is to “boot strap” their participation and give them a meaningful voice and opportunity to participate in a way that can shape the DAO.

During this time they have the opportunity to earn more delegations from a higher profile, with the goal that they are able to replace their delegations as they decay with new organic delegations.

It’s been a success in Rari it might be an interesting program to run here. I don’t think we need to couple it with staking though, as that already has a ton of moving pieces.

1 Like
12

Sorry, but I don’t find this helpful

so it turns out that those who collected more than 100,000 votes will theoretically have fewer votes than those who collected 20,000 (+200,000 = 220,000)? Is this fair in your opinion?

There is already a similar project that has been allocated 7,000,000 ARB (Event Horizon). Use it if you want more votes. Considering the number of people who want to participate, you will have more than 200,000 votes

13

I’m always in favor of initiatives that drive more decentralization and encourage diverse participation in the DAO. At first, I think this proposal is a solid step in that direction.

In detail, I would like to share a few thoughts:

  1. Number of participants: Instead of fixing the number at 25 for the entire 6 months, it might be better to allow others to join if they meet certain criteria and clear KPIs are set. If someone doesn’t meet expectations, they can be replaced.
  2. Duration: Consider a trial period with defined expectations for the selected delegates. If the impact is positive, we can extend the program—potentially up to 12 months—with higher delegations to ensure it truly makes an impact.
  3. Size of delegations: As @WinVerse mentioned, it takes 7–10M in voting power to really move the needle. Perhaps consider increasing the delegation size and extending the duration to reach that voting power.

Happy to hear more thoughts!

1 Like
14

Overall, we think this idea is really interesting and could definitely help many new active participants onboard into the ecosystem. Some questions:

  • The proposal could maybe clarify its objectives more. Is the focus on increasing voter turnout, elevating new voices, or rewarding active contributors?
  • While 200k ARB helps address the “cold start problem,” it may not sufficiently influence governance.Maybe a tiered approach, with higher delegations for impactful contributors, over time, could be helpful?
  • Maybe a hybrid model, combining temporary delegation with performance-based incentives like staking rewards once that’s live could tie delegate success to ecosystem health.
  • Maybe extend the program duration to 12 months with periodic evaluations like other DAO’s could be a good move.
1 Like