Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy

Proposals
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As stated in the AIP, the goal of Timeboost is to give chain owners a way to capture available MEV on their chain and reduce spam from FCFS arbitrage all while preserving best-in-class user experience with both fast block times and protection for users from harmful MEV (e.g. frontrunning/sandwich attacks). That being said, any MEV strategy comes with trade-offs though and it is important that the DAO works collaboratively together with the ecosystem to monitor and fine-tune Timeboost over time to strike the right balance of trade-offs.

Any proposed change, technical or otherwise, to Arbitrum One and Nova should prioritize ensuring the best user experience and optimal functioning of the chain ahead of other priorities. Timeboost explicitly embodies this principle in 3 ways through deliberate design decisions outlined below:

  1. Arbitrum One and Nova block times will continue to be industry leading at 250ms even after Timeboost What will change with Timeboost is that some transactions, specifically those not in the express lane, will be delayed to the next block. If there is an Express Lane controller for a given round, users will wait, at most, 450ms for their transactions to be sequenced (200ms proposed delay, plus 250ms block time). Furthermore, the time for a user’s transaction to be sequenced will fall back to 250ms(up to 100ms for Orbit chains who choose to lower blocktimes) if there is no express lane controller. All of these values for Arbitrum One and Nova, both the block time and the nominal delay for non-express lane transactions, are controlled by governance and are far shorter than the blocktimes seen on other L2 and even rival alternative L1s (like Solana’s 400ms block times).
  2. Timeboost is purely supplemental and optional to Arbitrum chains. The chain will fall back to the current FCFS ordering policy if (1) Timeboost is turned “off” (controlled by governance) or (2) if there is no express lane controller for the given round. Timeboost may be turned off in the event that its effects are harming UX for users of the chain.
  3. With Timeboost, the mempool for transactions will continue to be private, which means users will continue to be protected from harmful MEV like front-running and sandwich attacks. This ensures a great user experience.

Timeboost’s design is the culmination of over a year of research and development by the team at @offchainlabs , as well as discussions with teams that would be affected by Timeboost. While the on-chain implementation will be independently audited by Trail of Bits before the Tally vote, the long term performance of Timeboost can only truly be evaluated with real-world data - data that can help hone and fine-tune Timeboost’s design for the benefit of the ArbitrumDAO and all Arbitrum builders and users.

The proposed values in this Timeboost proposal were chosen as starting parameters that we believe would strike a fair balance/approach for both arbitrageurs and regular users of Arbitrum chains. All of these parameters, including the ability to disable Timeboost, are controlled by Governance, and can be adjusted (within limits) if experience with Timeboost suggests that is beneficial.

  • The 60 second period length was chosen to balance the desire to make prediction of MEV value by bidders easier (suggesting a shorter period) against the fact that there are costs and “friction” at the boundary between periods (suggesting a longer period).
  • Closing the auction 15 seconds before the period starts was chosen to balance the desire to minimize how far in the future bidders need to predict (suggesting a shorter interval) against the desire to leave time for the auction winner to restructure and/or resell their rights (suggesting a longer interval).
  • The 200 millisecond time advantage for the auction winner was chosen to balance the desire to minimize the delay for user transactions (suggesting a shorter interval) against the desire to give the auction winner enough time to run a service that aggregates submissions from multiple searchers and forwards them with some time advantage.

Other sectors of the chain will be impacted by the introduction of the proposed 200ms delay for non-express lane transactions. It remains to be seen what exactly that impact will entail as these sorts of behaviors are incredibly hard to predict ahead of time.

One fact that deserves emphasizing here is that even with Timeboost, Arbitrum One and Nova block times will continue to be industry leading at 250ms. What will change is that some transactions not in the express lane will be delayed to the next block. Preserving the property of fast block times contributes to the great user experience that Arbitrum chains have and continue to be known for. We believe that the property of fast block times, alongside protection against harmful MEV, will continue to attract and retain both users and the pioneering builders behind next-gen applications, including gaming and prediction markets - especially now with Stylus live on mainnet.

The decisions around what strategies to use and how to use them to generate revenue from available MEV on Arbitrum One and Nova are entirely in the hands of the DAO. Whether or not this revenue comes at the expense of DEX volume, and to what extent, remains to be seen. Without real-world data, it is difficult to accurately predict exactly what will happen.

Collection and monitoring of key metrics will be crucial to evaluating Timeboost’s performance and downstream impacts, over time. The insights gained from such analyses can also be used to inform how the DAO fine-tunes the various parameters of Timeboost, including the nominal delay for non-express lane transactions (200ms) and the auction duration (1 minute). To support this effort, the AIP states that the following data sources will be saved and made available after Timeboost goes live on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, if this proposal passes:

  • Historical bid data for auction participants, outside of the two highest bids (that are otherwise posted on-chain)
  • A way to label/identify which transactions were sequenced in the express lane (i.e. Timeboosted transactions)

Also mentioned in the AIP is the fact that the long term performance of Timeboost can only truly be evaluated with real-world data - data that can help hone and fine-tune Timeboost’s design for the benefit of the DAO.

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Timeboost is purely additive to an Arbitrum chain’s infrastructure, and does not pose a risk to “break” the Arbitrum chains. A Timeboost-enabled Arbitrum chain will fall back to the current FCFS ordering policy if (1) Timeboost is turned “off” (controlled by governance) or (2) if there is no express lane controller for the given round. As for your comment about reducing performance or user experience, Arbitrum One and Nova block times will continue to be industry leading with Timeboost.

Furthermore, this AIP proposes granting the current sequencer operator a few rights to make adjustments from time to time for a period of two (2) years in circumstances where doing so would enhance Timeboost’s long-term stability, preserve or improve the user experience for those using Timeboost-enabled Arbitrum chains, increase the security posture, resiliency, or stability of the chain, and/or otherwise help increase revenue for the ArbitrumDAO.

Modifications to other Timeboost parameters, including to values outside the specified ranges and to those not already listed above, but which are otherwise listed in the design specification, will require a constitutional governance vote, in accordance with the ArbitrumDAO Constitution.

Additionally, it is important to emphasize that for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, the DAO-elected Arbitrum Security Council can, at any time, perform either Emergency Actions or Non-Emergency Actions to execute software upgrades, perform routine maintenance, and other parameter adjustments to Timeboost, in each case in accordance with its existing powers. These actions can include, but are not limited solely to, exercising the rights proposed above for the current sequencer operator. More information about the Arbitrum Security Council and their scope of powers can be found in the ArbitrumDAO Constitution.

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Sharing Chaos Labs’ perspectives on some points raised in this discussion.

It could be argued that a reduction in spam transactions will lower gas prices, lowering transaction costs. The fixed upfront cost of the express lane, with no marginal costs for the controller, would also motivate them to maximize arbitrage trading and profits to most effectively monetize.

We acknowledge that in cases where access to the express lane is sold on secondary markets, that there is a potential for usage based access and a marginal cost for arbitrageurs “renting” access should these markets develop in this way. It is unclear that this would result in lower volumes however.

Arbitrageurs are not performing arbitrages as a public good, but because they can make money from price mismatches between exchanges. It is also unclear whether Timeboost will affect the frequency of price mismatches between exchanges.

Loss versus rebalancing is the value leaked by the AMM pool to arbitrageurs. Quoting from Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing, the paper proposing LVR: “LVR captures costs incurred by AMM LPs due to stale prices that are picked off by better informed arbitrageurs.” In short LVR, the measure of cost for LPs, is unaffected by latency or block times, but the ability to monetize these opportunities could be affected by block times, affecting LP fees. Since LP economics are fees less costs, this deserves further unpacking.

Recent research into the impact of block times on potential arbitrage fee revenues for LPs found that this theoretically increases in the order of the square root of block times. This empirical follow up found that the actual results were about half as much as theoretically predicted.

As clarified by @BlockworksResearch above, block times are not increasing under Timeboost, there is simply a latency added for non-express lane users. It is unclear why the express lane owner would choose to ignore profitable arbitrage, rather than monetize them themselves or provide access for others to do so. We do not conclude that DEX volumes should be affected in either direction by a change in arbitrage behavior under Timeboost. It is extremely likely that the express lane will be used for arbitrage predominantly, as this is the major cause of spam MEV transactions currently.

Chaos Labs agrees with the conclusion of @BlockworksResearch here that arbitrage activity could increase under Timeboost, increasing DEX LP fees. Taken together, we do not expect LP fees to reduce as a result of Timeboost ordering.

In summary, we find no reason that arbitrage DEX volumes or costs (LVR) will be negatively affected by Timeboost, and LP fees could potentially increase.

As mentioned in our original post, there are multiple ways the microstructure of MEV could evolve under this upgrade and we strongly recommend close monitoring to ensure that the auction process remains competitive, and user experience is not harmed.

1 Like
89

The primary use of Timeboost will be for executing arbitrage operations. However, with the current auction mechanism, Timeboost is highly likely to turn into a game dominated by a single whale (or multiple whales colluding together), leaving smaller arbitrageurs with no opportunity, forcing them to leave the Arbitrum chain. This monopolistic game would undermine the competitive ecosystem of Arbitrum and could also lead to a reduction in auction revenue.

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Having read the proposal, reports, and comments, I voted in favour to this proposal (bids in ETH). Adopting Timeboost does not impact users in regards to value extracted, and it presents another revenue stream for the DAO by capturing some of the available MEV.

ETH can later on be utilized to do any buybacks and burns if needed.

Keeping tabs on discussions and points risen by Camelot and leyiang for Tally.

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To further the conversation on the impact Timeboost may have on DAO revenue as well as LPs, we want to point everyone in the direction of an ARDC deliverable we just published.

This was not an explicit ask for Blockworks Research to do, but we felt with the recent discourse/concern around Timeboost, it was important for us to put this out there.

TL:DR - We estimate that Timeboost could have led to an additional $19m to $95m increase in annual DAO revenue, implying 33-162% growth over the previous twelve months. We believe Timeboost is a net-positive for Arbitrum DAO value capture and that Arbitrum One LPs should still outperform LPs on competing chains. Additionally, we believe the DAO may want to consider a Timeboost Committee to closely monitor Timeboost activity and onchain market conditions, so that it can make informed decisions on adjustments to Timeboost’s parameters in the future.

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I voted to collect bids in ARB. Blockworks and Chaos Labs reasoning and research provided a strong case for the adoption of this feature.

1 Like
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As stated in the AIP, the mentioned rights will “only be exercised in circumstances where doing so would enhance Timeboost’s long-term stability, preserve or improve the user experience for those using Timeboost-enabled Arbitrum chains, increase the security posture, resiliency, or stability of the chain, and/or otherwise help increase revenue for the Arbitrum DAO”. To determine these circumstances, both (1) holistic and data-based analyses and (2) careful incorporation of valuable feedback and insights from the community will be used to understand how Timeboost is being used and how Timeboost impacts the user experience and the broader Arbitrum One and Nova ecosystem. No “A/B test” system is planned to try different parameters.

As with any MEV strategy or implementation, there are trade-offs and no such thing as a “completely perfect” solution. The trade-off space includes various stakeholders and aspects, such as Arbitrum DAO revenue from bid proceeds, robust security and stability of the chain, preserving an excellent user experience, and downstream effects on the DeFi ecosystem.

It is important that the Arbitrum DAO works collaboratively together with the ecosystem to help monitor and ultimately fine-tune Timeboost over time to strike the right balance of trade-offs, alongside Offchain Labs. We further hope that members of the community, including the Arbitrum Research & Development Committee (ARDC) and other teams, will conduct thorough research and analyses on Timeboost’s performance over time to support and review proposals to change the Timeboost parameters (if at all).

It is important to emphasize again that:

  1. Modifications to other Timeboost parameters, including to values outside the specified ranges and to those not already listed in the AIP, but which are otherwise listed in the design specification, will require a constitutional governance vote, in accordance with the Arbitrum DAO Constitution.
  2. For Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, the DAO-elected Arbitrum Security Council can, at any time, perform either Emergency Actions or Non-Emergency Actions to execute software upgrades, perform routine maintenance, and other parameter adjustments to Timeboost, in each case in accordance with its existing powers. These actions can include, but are not limited solely to, exercising the rights proposed for the current sequencer operator. More information about the Arbitrum Security Council and their scope of powers can be found in the Arbitrum DAO Constitution.
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There is currently no data to suggest that this will happen. However, if this behavior is positively identified and the whale(s) is bidding unfairly low, the reservePrice can be increased by the DAO (or the Security Council in cases where doing so is permitted in accordance to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution) to financially disincentivize and deter this behavior. Determining the right value of the reservePrice in this situation, however, will not be straightforward. Therefore, it is important that the Arbitrum DAO works collaboratively together with the ecosystem of users, builders, and the ARDC to help monitor and, if necessary, fine-tune Timeboost over time to strike the right balance of trade-offs.

It is important to state again that if you are in control of the express lane, it does not guarantee that you can and will capture 100% of the MEV opportunities. If you win the Timeboost auction, you win a time advantage for transaction inclusion. You do not win the right to: re-order transactions, see other people’s transactions, or be the first transaction in every block. Therefore, opportunities not already captured by the express lane controller can be captured by other arbitrageurs since the ordering policy will remain FCFS (but with a 200ms delay for non-express lane transactions). In the case where a single express lane controller is able to capture a large majority (or all) of available MEV on the chain, then this would be fine so long as they are bidding fairly in the auction, which may be competitive, leading to sustained and higher DAO revenue.

Lastly, competition between searchers to bid for express lane control is an improvement over the current FCFS environment where searchers invest wastefully in hardware and infra to win latency races with spam. This spam contributes to network congestion with no value being captured by the Arbitrum DAO. Timeboost aims to address this spam and value capture gap.

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To help address some of the common misunderstandings we’ve seen around Timeboost, Offchain Labs has published a blog by Ed Felten entitled “Debunking Common Misconceptions About Timeboost”.

The original blog can be found at:

To more easily facilitate discussion of the topics in the blog with the Arbitrum community, Offchain Labs is also cross-posting the blog content here in its entirety.

We look forward to your feedback and answering any additional questions.

===[begin]===

Debunking Common Misconceptions About Timeboost

By: Ed Felten

As the DAO discusses Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy for Arbitrum chains, there has been some confusion around what Timeboost actually does. As with anything new, we understand there are bound to be misunderstandings, so we wanted to clarify some of the most common misconceptions.

Misconception #1:

Arbitrum uses the same model for transaction ordering and block building as Ethereum L1, so L1 MEV issues automatically apply to Arbitrum.

The reality:

Arbitrum’s sequencing method is substantially different from Ethereum L1’s. Arbitrum uses a First-Come, First-Served (FCFS) model to determine transaction ordering, meaning that transactions are sequenced in the order in which they arrive. Arbitrum sequencing is also done continuously, rather than building each block all at once. This misunderstanding of Arbitrum transaction ordering leads to other misunderstandings of how Timeboost works.

Misconception #2:

Timeboost Creates New Types of MEV Extraction.

The reality:

Timeboost does not create new types of Maximum Extractable Value (MEV). Instead, it introduces slight adjustments to when and how existing forms of MEV operate. Timeboost is designed to strike a balance between capturing MEV value for the chain without introducing additional externalities.

For example, Timeboost does not enable transaction reordering in a way that facilitates sandwich attacks. The protocol does allow users to try to get their transactions processed earlier by gaining control of the express lane, but it doesn’t allow them to manipulate the order in which trades occur relative to others in the same block. This means the fast lane controller [at any given time] cannot be certain of how their transactions are ordered relative to others’ transactions.

Misconception #3:

Timeboost gives the auction winner an unfair amount of power around transaction ordering.

The reality:

Winning a Timeboost auction gives you a time advantage — specifically, a proposed 200ms “head start” — but it does not ensure your transaction will always be the first in every block. The perceived value of the express lane is pre-determined by its holder and how much they chose to bid to win control of it: it’s a use it or lose it privilege. Let’s be clear on what Timeboost does not do:

  • It does not give anyone the right to reorder transactions. It does not let you see others’ transactions before they are sequenced (because the mempool will remain private).
  • It does not ensure your transaction will always be the first in every block.
  • It does not mean your tx will have absolutely zero total time delay. Winning the bid means you won’t experience the 200ms artificial delay others face, but natural delays — such as processing time or network distance — still apply.

Misconception #4:

Timeboost will definitely be monopolized by powerful, centralized entities that ultimately harm the Arbitrum ecosystem.

The reality:

Timeboost is designed as an auction-based system that encourages open competition. Although the idea of a monopoly can be scary, the auction process is still competitive. If one player dominates, they will be required to continuously outbid other users, which prevents complete static control. Additionally, the express lane only gives a 200ms time advantage**.** The system is designed to incentivize rational actors to participate when they believe there is an advantage to controlling the express lane and only bid up to the value they are willing to pay for that advantage (since it is a sealed-bid auction).

Finally, we want to stress that Timeboost is entirely optional, meaning that Arbitrum chains can still function normally without it. Should Timeboost need to be disabled, the network would smoothly revert to FCFS transaction ordering, maintaining its current security and efficiency. Every chain can make its own decision about whether to enable Timeboost–your chain, your rules.

Misconception #5:

The goal of Timeboost is to capture all MEV value and completely eliminate spam.

The reality:

As stated in the AIP, Timeboost’s goal is to provide a way for chain owners to capture a significant share of the MEV on their chain and reduce spam from FCFS arbitrage, all while preserving a best-in-class user experience with fast block times and protection against harmful MEV.

===[end]===

5 Likes
96

Thank you for this clarification. The majority of concerns I have heard have been from the misunderstanding #1 & #3.

I feel that Timeboost is “safe to try” reading this well-articulated reasoning along with the great work by @BlockworksResearch and @chaoslabs to come to an understanding around the rebalancing effect on LPs.

1 Like
97

Vote: Collect bids in ETH to treasury

Type and Proposal Link: Snapshot –> Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy

Voting Rationale Link: Alex Lumley (Savvy DAO) Delegate Communication Thread - #21 by AlexLumley

=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===

We support the adoption of Timeboost as it introduces significant benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Timeboost mitigates front-running attacks, improves transaction fairness by reducing reliance on gas fees, and provides a new revenue stream for the DAO through MEV auctions. Collecting bids in ETH for the treasury ensures future flexibility for the DAO, allowing ETH to be used in multiple ways, including buybacks, burns, or treasury diversification. We appreciate the detailed technical analysis, and while concerns about auction monopolization and user experience persist, these can be mitigated with post-implementation monitoring.

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Voted: Collect bids in ETH to treasury, however based on the discussions from highly technical folks breaking down the potential issues, there is clear reason to deep dive into this more to ensure that we are benefiting the ecosystem more than we are harming it.

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The ITU Blockchain Delegation supports the Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost with the Collect bids in ETH to treasury option.

Firstly, collecting bids in ETH will reduce the DAO’s dependence on ARB. Secondly, it can provide a stable revenue stream, which can be crucial for funding future initiatives such as staking mechanisms. Finally Timeboost aims to decrease the negative effects of MEV with an auction based express lane. Despite concerns about potential system manipulation and legal risks tied to MEV, we believe the proposal’s benefits, outweigh these risks.

1 Like
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Thank you for taking the time to provide such a detailed explanation. I’d like to continue sharing my thoughts.

  1. The point you raised about “a single express lane controller capture a large majority of MEV, while bidding fairly in the auction” is impossible. This is because capital has a time cost, and other arbitrage competitors will leave, leading to a monopoly. Before the monopoly, whales will raise prices, but after the monopoly, bids will be as low as possible. On-chain monitoring for monopolistic behavior maybe also impossible because they can always use multiple accounts to take turns controlling the express lane (or do we have a better way to monitor this?).

  2. As an active liquidity provider, I believe that the 200ms delay introduced by Timeboost is a huge challenge and will likely cause my liquidity operations to lag significantly behind those express lane controllers. Compared to all other chains, Arbitrum’s FIFO and 250ms transaction responsiveness are my favorite features, as they allow me to avoid gas wars with arbitrageurs. However, this advantage will disappear with Timeboost, and increased slippage is almost inevitable.

  3. Timeboost aims to address spams, but I personally haven’t felt the severe impact of spams. Does the spam frequently cause congestion on Arbitrum?

I believe Arbitrum’s current performance is excellent, offering a relatively fair competitive environment. It ranks among the top public chains in terms of transaction volume. Although I hope that the Timeboost can help the DAO accumulate value, given such a significant mechanism change, perhaps impact on all participants of current ecosystem should be more carefully considered.

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UPDATE: OCT 7, 2024 (MONDAY)

Based on feedback and additional engineering work, the following updates have been made to the Timeboost implementation adjustments section that covers the temporary rights that are requested to be granted to the current sequencer operator:

  • Removed the right to impose a minimum balance/deposit for Timeboost auction participants, as this right is no longer considered to be necessary to help mitigate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Alternative, more robust mechanisms have been developed and will be put in place instead.

  • Added the right to pause the acceptance and verification of bids. This is to allow the current sequencer operator to provide reliable, consistent UX and maximize infrastructure stability.

The above changes will continue to be temporary and granting of these rights (to the current sequencer operator) are ultimately subject to the ArbitrumDAO’s approval.

Modifications to any Timeboost parameter by anyone else will continue to require a constitutional governance vote. The DAO-elected security council will continue to possess the right to perform either Emergency Actions or Non-Emergency Actions to execute software upgrades, perform routine maintenance, and other parameter adjustments to Timeboost, in each case in accordance with its existing powers. These actions can include, but are not limited solely to, exercising the rights proposed herein for the current sequencer operator. More information about the Arbitrum Security Council and their scope of powers can be found in the ArbitrumDAO Constitution.

Additionally, a new privilege has been added to the proposal text that proposes that the ArbitrumDAO be granted the right to pause or disable Timeboost, for any reason, using the outcome of a vote on Snapshot, rather than a full Constitutional Vote. This special provision allows the ArbitrumDAO to react to market conditions quicker than what a Tally, on-chain vote would allow (~14 days as opposed to ~30 days).

2 Likes
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Please find below the responses to the points you’ve raised:

  1. We acknowledge that, over time, a single actor could begin to bid accurately/fairly before deciding to lower their bids. However, we don’t believe that this behavior will allow the single actor to maintain control of the Express Lane over the long term for two reasons. First, the bids submitted to the autonomous auctioneer are private, meaning that the single actor would need to make bids without knowing what other people are bidding and always bid more than the other, unknown parties. This scenario is a game of incomplete information or a Bayesian game where the optimal strategy for the single actor is to bid to maximize their expected profit given the information they have. In other words, a rational, profit-seeking actor would only bid what they are willing to pay and up to the amount that they believe the Express Lane time advantage is worth to them. All participants in this game have incomplete information (what other participants have bid) and so it is not in the best interest of participants to lower their bids or else they risk losing the auction. Secondly, if a single actor was bidding low (relative to the value they were able to extract while in control of the Express Lane) and were still winning the auction, then the Arbitrum DAO or the current sequencer operator can act to raise the minimum bid to compensate for this behavior. An additional point to be made here is that the on-chain monitoring will not be for monopolistic behavior, but for the bid amounts compared to the available MEV on an Arbitrum chain. We believe that so long as the bid amounts are close to the available MEV of the chain, then it does not materially make a difference if there is 1 auction participant or 1000 participants or if there is monopolistic behavior occurring.

  2. This is valuable feedback, thank you! In the current proposal that is subject to the DAO’s approval, either the current sequencer operator, the Arbitrum DAO, or the Security Council could intervene to pause Timeboost or decrease the nominal delay on non-Express Lane transactions if there is conclusive evidence that chain’s UX has been negatively impacted or has been materially degraded because of Timeboost. As a result, close monitoring of user behavior and UX impacts from Timeboost (if Timeboost is approved) will be critical and a top priority for Offchain Labs. We hope that other members of the ecosystem will contribute to this type of analysis and subsequent discussions as well! The results of these analyses will be instrumental in determining how best to adjust or fine-tune Timeboost’s parameters in the long run.

  3. One of Timeboost’s goals is to reduce spam. The expectation is that, for searchers, using the Express Lane will be both cheaper and yield better returns than investing in off-chain hardware and strategies to win latency races. As a result of this, searchers are incentivized to participate in Timeboost auctions instead of resorting to spamming. One thing to point out is that Timeboost is not meant or expected to eliminate spam. Spam, and all transactions generally, all contribute to network congestion. This congestion manifests itself as higher L2 gas prices once the network has reached the speed target of 7 MGas/s (the default for Arbitrum chains). In other words, each time the L2 base fee rises, some form or amount of spam is contributing to that rise - regardless of who the spam is coming from. A reduction in the spam happening on the network should ultimately result in less congestion, allowing for more transactions to be executed at lower gas prices (because congestion pricing kicks in later).

2 Likes
103

It sounds like a trial-and-error process with a lot of uncertainties.

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When Timeboost goes live?

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Pros:

  1. Increases DAO revenue.

  2. Reduces spam.

Cons:

  1. Increased slippage, as previously stated.

  2. Nearly doubles transaction response time. With the growing competition among public chains, fast response time is Arbitrum’s greatest advantage and brings great UX. Artificially diminishing this advantage significantly reduces Arbitrum’s competitiveness(eg. compared to solana) and limits the potential improvements driven by hardware advancements.

  3. Potential monopoly. The design of the Timeboost mechanism grants a leading advantage for all transactions in the following minute through a single bid, which is highly likely to result in monopolization. The consequence of such monopolization is that a single team could dominate all arbitrage transactions, forcing other teams out and ultimately rendering the auction mechanism ineffective.

Additionally, considering arbitrage transactions between CEX and DEX, I believe it is very challenging to estimate “the available MEV on an Arbitrum chain.”