The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’d like to thank the Arbitrum Foundation for starting the conversation, as the Security Council is of critical importance to Arbitrum, and any changes that will materially improve its election process should be brought forward.
While the proposed changes are welcome, and we are generally supportive of them, we believe that there is much more room for improvement. This proposal is a great opportunity to discuss other aspects of the election process and of the Security Council itself, and hopefully introduce some additional changes. If we are to go through a constitutional vote, it seems prudent to have a proper retrospective and debate in the DAO so as not to have to go through the process again for additional things in the future — things that could have been included already.
Such a debate began after the OpenZeppelin’s ARDC report on Arbitrum Security Council Recommendations, but hasn’t been picked up by the Foundation or any other AAEs. The report outlined many recommendations for improving the election process. We don’t see this work referenced anywhere in this proposal. During both open and private discussions following the report, many other ideas were surfaced that deserve at least thoughtful consideration.
For example, some of the things that are, in our opinion, unaddressed are:
Election Process
- What do we consider the ‘right candidate’?
The Arbitrum Foundation created a forum post explaining their view on the attributes of good Security Council candidates. However, this document has not been updated in two years. Some questions that could be answered include whether we prefer entities or individuals, what kind of entities we prefer (if we do), and how they should be represented. There are also technical questions like should we allow for multisigs, or do we require EOAs, and why?
- What do we expect from candidates in the election process?
How much effort should candidates put into their application to the Security Council? What kind of info should they share with the DAO? How can we make them more visible to delegates, enabling them to assess and decide more effectively? Should we rely on their pitching skills or should we provide some kind of independent assessment of the applications?
- Should we proactively search for fitting SC members?
Do we solely expect promising candidates to apply on their own initiative, or should the DAO perform some sort of outreach to potentially promising candidates and facilitate their application? How should this be handled?
Security Council Operations
Aside from the election process itself, we could also take the opportunity to address some of the aspects of the SC’s operations.
- How do we handle SC’s funding going forward?
Right now, the Security Council is being funded through the Arbitrum Foundation. Do we want to continue in this way, or should we consider alternatives? Should there be a budget for things besides compensation for the SC to use if needed (for example, to be able to fund additional tooling needed for Security Council)?
- Should the SC rely on the Arbitrum Foundation for operations?
As an extension to the above, should the SC continue to rely on AF for operations, or should it potentially handle that independently?
- What is the relationship between the SC and the DAO?
Apart from the elections themselves, should the Security Council have a more active role in the DAO? If yes, what should that role be, and how would it work?
- Should there be an internal structure?
Instead of having 12 members with a horizontal structure, does it make sense to introduce a hierarchy and perhaps have a Security Council lead?
- Do we still need the ‘small Security Council’?
IIrc, we have only used it once, and right now there doesn’t seem to be any clear use case for it.
- Should we change the language of the Constitution around SC’s scope?
For example, the Constitution states:
The Security Council may also approve and implement routine software upgrades, routine maintenance and other parameter adjustments in a non-emergency setting…
But in practice, even routine and non-controversial upgrades go through the full governance process. Should we change the scope of the Security Council, or should the SC start executing on that mandate more?
- Should we introduce some kind of a transparency report / retrospective for the Security Council to better understand its past actions and the performance of particular members?
Right now, there is no feedback loop between the DAO and Security Council, we have no tools to assess whether the past member was a good choice or not.
Overall, we think it’s pretty clear that there are many things to discuss and decide on relevant to the Security Council that extend beyond the changes proposed by the Arbitrum Foundation in the proposal above.
We believe that before the proposal moves to a vote, a Constitutional one nonetheless, we should have a proper open discussion on all of the above and more, especially if we are to have a Constitutional vote. We already have good precedent for such debates, as seen in the ones facilitated by us - the debate on incentive programs, consolidation of treasury management initiatives, and the SOSs.
We will not be supportive of the proposal in its current form if it moves to a vote without such a proper discussion.