Thanks for putting this up, @Arbitrum.
There’s already been plenty of discussion around why banning LobbyFi isn’t the optimal path forward, so we won’t rehash those arguments. Instead, we want to zero in on the actual risk vector: the effectiveness of LobbyFi’s strategy during elections — especially in weighted elections with shutters, as JoJo rightfully mentioned here:
We initially had some ideas on the path forward. Like:
- Pre-lockups before elections (tied to ARB staking)
- Automatic negative vote structure ( in Lobby’s case, that would be - 19.3M to be cast against whoever they vote for)
However, these ideas introduce significant operational overhead and can be easily gamed.
Introducing: A Vote Cap Per Candidate
We are suggesting the introduction of a vote cap per candidate mechanism. We believe a vote cap per candidate is a far more practical, adaptable, and enforceable approach.
Let’s use the recent election results as a case study. Of the 12 candidates, 3 were to be selected.
Looking at the outcome:
- The ~20M VP allocated to cupojoseph wasn’t enough to secure a top-three spot.
- However, it pushed him into the top five.
This might not seem alarming in a 3/12 setup, but in a 5/12 scenario, this kind of influence could be decisive. That opens the door for vote-buying to effectively place candidates, even those misaligned with the community.
How the Cap Would Work
- The DAO sets a maximum amount of VP that can be allocated to any single candidate per election.
- Any votes exceeding that cap would be reallocated to the voter’s remaining choices, thus treating it as a soft abstain.
- This limits the power of concentrated voting blocs while maintaining freedom of participation.
For example, having a 10M cap for the OAT elections in a 5/12 scenario would have forced LobbyFi to split the rest of their VP to the other candidates. Cupojoseph, in this case, would have still made it to the top five, but we are sure only Lobby’s vote wouldn’t have pushed him through.
Making it Dynamic
We recognize this cap can’t be static. It should adjust based on election parameters — number of candidates, seats, total VP, etc. That said, it’s possible to derive a simple formula to keep this process seamless and predictable.
As a final note, while ideating on next steps around this, we tried as much as possible to look at things from a wider spectrum (considering others who might want to implement something similar to what LobbyFI is already doing). Also, we tried not to get so hung up on ARB staking playing a major part in fixing this, because although it would be of great help, making 5 ETH per DAO election looks appetizing enough for individuals to both stake and participate in lobbying.
This cap vote mechanism offers a flexible safeguard that targets the actual vector of abuse — excessive concentration in a single candidate — without introducing undue complexity. We believe it is worth further discussion and modeling as we explore how to preserve the legitimacy of the DAO’s elections.