DAO Discussion: Vote Buying Services

[Tane]

We appreciate the thorough discussion around vote-buying and platforms such as LobbyFi. Ultimately, we do not support the regulatory approach aimed specifically at platforms like LobbyFi.

The primary issue we should focus on isn’t vote-buying (the transfer of voting power) itself, but rather the fact that such practices may enable malicious actors to distort DAO decision-making at relatively low costs. In other words, the central risk lies in the cost-effectiveness of governance attacks rather than in the mechanics of vote buying per se.

We strongly agree with the following sentiment shared by @jameskbh:

@jameskbh

IMO, a good governance process is robust enough to work DESPITE attempts to break it, ensuring fairness in decision-making.

Thus, the core of our defensive measures should aim at significantly raising the capital costs required for any malicious attack, thereby effectively deterring such behavior.

One effective method for increasing attack resistance would be mobilizing more ARB tokens into decentralized voting. We’ve reviewed the proposed measures and offer our evaluation:

1. Strategic delegation of DAO Treasury ARB to active delegates aligned with DAO values:

• Evaluation: Strengthens resilience against governance attacks by diversifying voting power.
• Concerns: Complexity in objectively and fairly choosing delegates.

2. ARB Staking:

• Evaluation: Positive, as it can enhance participation and thus DAO resilience.
• Concerns: Staking incentives alone cannot eliminate “bribery” (especially off-chain or through undetectable methods). Incentives for greater capital efficiency will persist, potentially leading to alternate forms of vote buying such as airdrops or off-chain promises. Therefore, while useful, staking should not be viewed as an all-encompassing solution.

3. Token lock-up requirements (Pre-voting holding periods):

• Evaluation: Potentially effective in preventing short-term manipulation just before voting.

4. Direct interventions on platforms like LobbyFi (dialogue, control, or bans):

• Evaluation: Might temporarily mitigate immediate risks from specific malicious behaviors.
• Concerns: Such measures don’t fundamentally solve the issue, as @Vertex_Protocol noted clearly:

@Vertex_Protocol

LobbyFi might be willing to negotiate things like this, but the next project that gets set up would have no obligation to and it’s a competitive disadvantage if your pricing and development goals are set by the DAO while others have the freedom to do what they want. If LobbyFi wants to work with the DAO that would be great, but we think it’d also be fair for them to refuse to alter their development priorities, protocol architecture, or business model to fit with our preferences.

Additionally, banning such platforms could push activities into opaque environments, requiring restrictive measures like voter KYC, contradicting our commitment to a permissionless system. We align with @olimpio’s perspective:

@olimpio

In open, permissionless systems, whoever can create an incentive or have an edge will do it, and it should not be censored.

Lastly, we propose exploring mechanisms that explicitly increase the capital cost for short-term governance manipulation. For example, implementing multipliers on voting power tied to longer lock-up periods or staking durations could be beneficial. This approach has precedents and could effectively raise the threshold required for malicious interventions.

Reference: NEAR House of Stake Governance Proposal - Gauntlet

We believe combining these strategies, especially strategic delegation, staking incentives, and lock-up-based voting multipliers, would significantly reinforce the robustness and fairness of our governance processes.