Our team has been closely monitoring Arbitrum quorum, and we thank the @Arbitrum foundation again for putting forward this well-researched proposal. We are in strong agreement with the core direction and would like to offer our analysis and specific recommendations on the proposed parameters.
1. Support for Shifting Quorum from Votable token to DVP
We strongly support the proposal to shift the quorum calculation from the total votable token to Delegated Voting Power (DVP).
Quorum should be tied to the cohort of token holders who are actively participating in governance, not a theoretical maximum supply. The current mechanism, where quorum continuously rises due to vesting unlocks while DVP remains relatively flat, poses a significant liveness risk to the DAO. We have previously highlighted in this discussion thread that this would become an increasingly urgent problem that requires longer-term solution that aligns quorum with actual participation.
In contrast, the DVP has been relatively stable, with monthly fluctuations as we have documented in our reports:
Tying quorum to DVP correctly aligns the metric with the actual pool of engaged voters and resolves this fundamental issue.
2. Recommended Percentage of Quorum
To validate the proposed numbers suggested by the Foundation:
We backtested historical voting data against various DVP-based quorum thresholds. Our goal was to find a range that aligns with the historical average participation margin of 20-40% on different time periods (2023–2024, 2024–2025, 2025, and overall). We believed this margin to be a healthy balance, providing a meaningful hurdle for proposals without making them excessively difficult to pass.
Our analysis, which can be viewed in detail in this spreadsheet, yielded the following recommendations, using the 2025 data as our primary benchmark for its relevance to the current state of the DAO:
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For Non-Constitutional Proposals: A quorum between 42–50% of DVP maintains the target 20-40% participation rate against quorum margin.
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For Constitutional Proposals: We believed the ideal range is 48–56% of DVP. We believe the threshold should not exceed 60%, as it would begin to severely restrict the DAO’s ability to pass crucial upgrades.
Based on this data, the Foundation’s proposed range is effective, and we would advocate for values at the lower end for non-constitutional and the higher end for constitutional proposals.
3. Concerns Regarding the Fixed Lower Bound
We understand the rationale for a fixed minimum quorum is to act as a safeguard against governance capture if DVP were to fall dramatically. That said, a static floor, while well-intentioned, introduces its own form of liveness risk. We raised this point during the DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Open Discussion community call and wish to elaborate on it here for the broader community.
In a scenario where DVP drops significantly, the fixed lower bound could make it mathematically impossible to reach quorum, effectively freezing the DAO. The table below illustrates this using a 100M ARB lower bound for non-constitutional proposals:
| DVP (in millions) | Quorum (40% of DVP) | Effective Quorum (with Lower Bound) | Passable? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 300 | 120 M | 120 M | Yes |
| 250 | 100 M | 100 M | Yes |
| 249 | 99.6 M | 100 M | No |
| 80 | 32 M | 100 M | No |
While unlikely, this scenario would force the DAO into a difficult position, potentially requiring repeated governance actions to adjust the floor.
We suggest considering alternatives to a static minimum:
- Remove the fixed lower bound and rely on the percentage-based quorum alone.
- Implement a dynamic lower bound that adjusts relative to a trailing average of DVP, preventing sudden freezes.
In an extreme edge case where DVP collapses, the Security Council could serve as the ultimate backstop to ensure the DAO remains functional.
Summary
In conclusion, we strongly endorse the move to a DVP-based quorum. Our analysis supports the proposed percentage ranges, and we offer refined suggestions based on historical data. Our primary concern lies with the rigidity of the fixed lower bound.
Parallel to this, the long-term health of the DAO depends on increasing voter participation. We reiterate our support for initiatives that bring idle ARB into the governance system, such as:
- Treasury delegation to active delegates (as we have mentioned previously), with clear safeguards.
- Incentive programs that encourage token holders to delegate their ARB rather than keeping it idle.
- Awareness and onboarding efforts to reduce friction for new delegates and improve voter turnout.
Strengthening participation alongside quorum adjustments will help ensure ArbitrumDAO remains resilient, active, and secure over the long run.