I’ve been looking into this a bit more, and a perspective I think we should take into account is one of using the Nakamoto Coefficient to determine the hardness of each type of quorum.
Right now, as of September 21st, 2025:
- the non-constitutional (3%) quorum threshold is 140,542,046 ARB, and it takes the 12 Biggest Delegates voting For or Abstain, to achieve it.
- the just recently decreased constitutional (4.5%) quorum threshold is 210,813,069 ARB, and it takes the 22 Biggest Delegates voting For or Abstain, to achieve it.
- the previous constitutional (5%) quorum threshold is 234,236,743 ARB, and it takes the 28 Biggest Delegates voting For or Abstain, to achieve it.
With this new DVP-Quorum proposed here:
- the non-constitutional quorum threshold would be 100,000,000 ARB, and it would take the 7 Biggest Delegates voting For or Abstain, to achieve it, instead of the current 12 Biggest Delegates. this makes it almost half as difficult to spend money from our treasury
- the constitutional quorum threshold would be 150,000,000 ARB, and it would take the 13 Biggest Delegates voting For or Abstain, to achieve it, instead of the current 22 Biggest Delegates. this makes it almost half as difficult to change our network parameters
This is a huge reduction in the Nakamoto Coefficient for Arbitrum DAO, making it way easier to pass both type of proposals, and even worse, making it almost as easy to pass constitutional proposals in the future, as it is currently to pass non-constitutional proposals. this would have a very serious impact on the security of our network that secures our TVL, bridge, etc.
I highly recommend that these proposed values are revised, to keep the nakamoto coefficient closer to what it is today.
quorum calculations and comparisons available in this spreadsheet