We appreciate the motivation behind this proposal, but at present, we find it difficult to support. Lowering quorum thresholds directly reduces the difficulty of governance capture, and while there are various benchmarks that can be used to guide the discussion, we believe it is not possible to define a strict line at which risks become acceptable. For this reason, we consider quorum reduction an approach that should be avoided if other options are available.
In that context, it would be helpful to understand what other mechanisms have been considered. For instance, the past discussions around treasury delegation point toward alternative ways of improving governance resilience while ensuring quorum achievement. A system that introduces voting power caps, combined with the selection of trusted delegates, could reduce concentration among a few large delegates and strengthen security. Where delegate selection by performance metrics may be difficult, other approaches could also be explored, such as distributing delegation linearly or sub-linearly up to a threshold based on the amount received, or assigning delegation through community voting.
Looking more specifically at the proposal, we view the situation for non-constitutional proposals differently from constitutional ones. For non-constitutional proposals, the variable quorum adjustment does not appear materially problematic. With delegated voting power relatively stable, the change from the current ~$139M to ~$130M is not significant. So long as the system can withstand temporary spikes in delegated voting power and the associated risk of capture, this adjustment may even prove beneficial.
That said, we do not agree with lowering the minimum threshold to $100M, which is roughly $40M below today’s effective level. Simply halting the continual upward drift of quorum would already provide relief, and a $130M minimum threshold would in our view be sufficient.
For constitutional proposals, however, a reduction of nearly $50M is far more concerning. Here too, preventing quorum from mechanically increasing in line with votable supply is already an important safeguard, but going beyond that to make passage substantially easier seems unnecessary. While we would not oppose a modest reduction to account for the current imbalance between constitutional and non-constitutional quorums, we cannot support a change of the magnitude presented in this proposal.