Thank you for the support! It has been an interesting learning that the best teams don’t want a grant so much as users of their product. And what better way of getting legitimacy than telling users that Arbitrum DAO is their customer!
When we use this approach for ecosystem support, we most need to guard against the spray and pray approach prevalent in grant programs. It’s one thing to give a grant to a failed product that rugs users; entirely different to be one of those getting rugged!
I’m most curious to see how our committee performs its role of preventing any risky entries from even being eligible. I’m on the side of them being heavy handed to ensure delegates only vote among only 5-8 of the best providers, but we’ll have to see how it plays out in practice
One thing that I regret seeing in the proposal is that it seems centered mostly around USD yields, when for the sake of diversification it might make sense for the Arbitrum DAO to look into Euro or other non-USD RWA-centered yield sources.
I’m biased but with Angle we have developed a savings solution, already available natively on Arbitrum that aims at offering the risk free Euro yield to its participants in a transparent manner.
I get that many of the stakeholders here may prefer US dollar offerings (because this is what DeFi is all about), but strategically, I do think that for a treasury of this stage on a foundation which has ties basically everywhere in the world, with potential contributors everywhere, it’d be smart to broaden the perspectives and look for some allocation into non USD products.
This is not restricted to US tbills only but to assets that provide a comparable rate of return to US treasuries. So euro based stables would be eligible
I’ll let @GFXlabs comment more specifically as they are leading the charge for the RFP determining eligiblity but this is my understanding
Perhaps, in order to do this, it will be necessary to create a company in a European jurisdiction. This needs to be checked with a lawyers.
However, it’s a good idea for the second stage after approbation
This is a great idea! We featured the suggestion on the treasury WG end of season wrap up.
Ultimately we felt packing in utilization of interest earned or the underlying RWA asset in addition to diversification via ecosystem growth would be too much for one proposal.
So we decided interest earned simply goes back to our treasury as bridged USDC. Proposals for utilizing it, such as enhancing liquidity, use in CDPs, etc can follow the same process as any other proposal before the DAO
If our WG is renewed for a second season, we do plan to work on what we are calling the LAMP framework - Liquidation of ARB Mitigation Proposal. Would love to work with you on what it should look like.
I have voted “For” this proposal. Broadly speaking, I am for treasury diversification. I think crypto still proves itself very volatile and that is great for a lot of things… but covering fixed expenses is not one of them. In voting for, I hope to see this venture gives us a data point for future diversification discussions.
I will add I think having the group is a good idea - one person or entity in charge would be a lot of responsibility and trust placed in them for this type of thing.
Some forward-thinking items:
With diversification it’s important to strike a balance with protecting the value of the treasury and divesting from ARB to the point the DAO loses alignment with the token. This proposal is far from doing that, but I would note that in the future I think we should set a hard cap of how much ARB must be kept as a % of the total treasury. I’d imagine here 51% in the minimum, but I’d like to see this discussion had in the future.
I noted it above, but I also don’t want to see the treasury become a pool of funds for trading and/or ARB price protection. This proposal doesn’t seem to be doing that either, but I can see how as the size of non-ARB funds grows this will provide more and more opportunity for that.
Thank you @thedevanshmehta , the Working Group, and all community members who contributed their thoughtful feedback on the Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program proposal. We recognize the importance of exploring new strategies for treasury management, especially in such a dynamic and unpredictable market environment. The proactive approach to learning and adapting from this initiative is something we fully support.
Our backing of the proposal comes with a keen interest in understanding more about the operational details, particularly how the investment managers will be selected, their strategy for buying and selling assets, and the overall process that will guide these decisions.These details are crucial for ensuring the program’s transparency, efficiency, and alignment with the community’s expectations.
As we move forward, we are committed to supporting this proposal, however, our support is also contingent on the clarification and elaboration of the investment management process.
@juanbug and I have posted our perspective below on behalf of the Uniswap DAO’s Arbitrum governance team.
We believe that one predominant way by which DAOs mature and become sustainable organizations is by establishing a strong runway in the form of a diversified portfolio of assets. Selling off $ARB tokens for ensuring Arbitrum’s future success is an important financing lever. So far, most initiatives that we’ve seen in the past year have revolved around grants. These initiatives are important, but they should be balanced by making sure the protocol remains sustainable with a multi-year horizon. Issuing “new stock” from the Arb treasury is not a sustainable strategy.
@pedrob raises good points around having a clear and informed roadmap for how the treasury will be deployed. It’s important for the working group and the DAO to continually think about how exactly these diversification efforts will play out. This particular proposal acts simply as a pilot program, so the diversification won’t happen immediately–it calls for using an insignificant amount of capital relative to the entire DAO treasury. The sourcing component of this proposal is therefore most compelling to us. We’d rather have the DAO be in a position to buy and sell assets effectively, and have the right partners to conduct these transactions through, even if the bulk of that diversification effort will occur later on.
Another aspect we’d like to mention is that RWAs are risk-off. When entering into a bull market, ideally the DAO holds onto native tokens and eventually sells into froth and buy pressure. A rotation into RWAs at this point is likely most beneficial since the DAO positions itself to limit downside and captures upside beta. Decisions like this require foresight and flexibility. It may very well be the case that such decisions will be made less actively. The best path may be to diversify and forget as opposed to making opportunistic decisions. We are not sure how the WG wants to handle these market dynamics.
Similarly, proper RWA portfolio allocation is another important factor. We don’t think letting the DAO decide allocations based on voting percentage is the right decision. It may be better to employ a more sophisticated allocation procedure.
For transparency, we’d like to have the DAO have a say in which providers are most desired, then give discretion of particulars to the WG. A middle ground here, for example, is if an entity like Karpatkey were to recommend certain allocations, stating the pros/cons to each, then let the DAO make a more informed decision.
This is such a great point, until now grant programs have been the only game in town for Arbitrum (and other L2s) to support their ecosystem and we really need to move beyond this meta.
My research over 3 months has led me to believe that ecosystem support should be the guiding star for our treasury’s diversification strategy & investment policy. The unfortunate truth is that grants attract grifters while customers are attracted to great products. So Arbitrum should diversify (and support) by being a customer of good products built on our chain.
If nothing else, there is some wisdom in dollar cost averaging ARB. So we think STEP isn’t a small or big amount of capital, but just right for the time we are in.
We also have wildly divergent views in the DAO for how much should be diversified in the first place. For eg @Frisson is concerned with too much diversification leading to us becoming unaligned with ARB.
@karpatkey on the other hand produced some great analysis on how diversifying upto 40% of our treasury with approximately 1.2-2.5% yield can help us meet all our expenses.
@Aera suggested keeping 85% in ARB and diversifying the rest into Eth, stables and RWAs.
So there’s quite a range of expressed opinions that’s hard to bridge and build consensus around!
If i am understanding correctly, you’re advocating for the DAO to appoint a manager to make allocations to providers. Such a manager would obviously need to be in step with our primary goal of ecosystem support guiding diversification, but i still have mixed feelings about this approach.
One thing I’ve observed as an outsider diving deep into treasury work is how interconnected & well-knit the industry is. So giving power to any one centralized group to provide huge business opportunities to the industry is a formula for corruption. It doesn’t even have to be obvious bribes or anything - people we appoint might switch jobs later in their careers to the people they give allocations to and there is already a pre-existing system of favors, relations, networks, biases, etc
Since stable RWAs are as close as we can get to a perfect competition market, we tried having the best of both worlds in ensuring a strong committee screens out those with undue risk, while still giving the actual allocation power to a decentralized base of ARB token holders. The job of the committee is narrowing the applicant pool to 6-8 providers, such that whoever we end up allocating to, our money will be safe.
A final point I’ll note is that value accrual for ARB as a token is through governance power. And having elections or appointments every now & then isn’t nearly as much fun as proposals that make each vote worth a certain amount of money to a provider
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting in favour of the proposal during temp-check as we believe investing into yield-bearing RWA’s to be a good first step towards a sustainable future for the DAO.
Having followed the discussion and the working group for some time now, we’re happy with how they’ve incorporated delegate feedback into their proposal through different iterations and how they’ve addressed the issues raised.
While there are some additional points to be clarified, they can be by the time the proposal goes to on-chain vote. Specifically, before supporting the proposal during an on-chain vote, we’d like to see:
breakdown of the 200,000 ARB which is the cost associated with the implementation of the proposal, including the compensation for specific contributors for this proposal
more detailed description on scope of responsibilities of each contributor
more detailed schedule regarding what the process of implementing the proposal
Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council voted “For” this proposal.
We’ve been closely following this proposal and want to commend the Treasury and Sustainability Working Groups for their approach in engaging with the DAO and continuously seeking feedback to refine the proposal before it’s put forward to vote.
We believe this proposal presents a robust opportunity for the DAO to generate sustainable revenue for future operations.The RWA space is evolving rapidly and it is exciting to see Arbitrum take the lead engaging with high quality builders and providers in this field.
The allocation mechanism outlined in the proposal is elegantly designed, striking a balance between the need for detailed vetting of providers by high context individuals whilst still empowering the DAO to make informed decisions on fund allocation.
We agree with @krst request for further information that would be useful to see prior to the Tally vote. However, we do recognize and feel comfortable with some degree of flexibility on budget and responsibilities to accommodate unexpected developments within the program.
We express our gratitude to all who have contributed to and shaped the development of this proposal. The collaborative approach taken here should serve as a guide that future Working Groups and initiatives can draw inspiration from.
Michigan Blockchain is voting for this proposal. We believe that diversifying Arbitrum Treasury’s portfolio (which is currently mostly ARB), would be in the best interest of the DAO, in order to provide a more stable source of revenue and stabilize the DAO’s funds. Since 35M Arb is ~1%, putting 35M into stable RWAs is a sufficient amount to test the ecosystem, but not enough to damage the DAO if something happens to the funds. Would also like to note that, in the future, it’s imperative for the DAO to keep most of their treasury funds in ARB in order to continue to be aligned with the ARB token, as @Frisson pointed out.
Our team voted FOR this proposal,
We are glad that the authors took into account many comments from the community in this proposal.
And it is a good idea to make money work for DAO.
Hey all, I voted in favor of this proposal.
I think there is value in the DAO holding RWAs. Here are some further considerations:
I believe we can take our goal of treasury diversification as an opportunity to boost the ecosystem; we can be a credible reference as a customer for projects that benefit Arbitrum.
Yes, there are added risks with onchain holding, and I think we should take them especially in this experimental phase.
I am super excited about the DAO experimenting with investments beyond pure grants.
I second this, and I feel everyone is aligned that the DAO should remain ARB-Centric.
Some indicative parameters have already been suggested, I’d like to see them written in stone in our constitution in the future.
I would have voted in favour of this proposal, however I received my VP right after the snapshot was taken.
This is a great step forward for the DAO to use 35M arb for RWAs in a pilot program. A lot of comments have been addressed, and I recommend other delegates to read through this entire thread to gain a good overview of the proposal and some great questions that have been answered thoroughly.
In principle, we believe it is valuable to introduce Arbitrum to the diversification of its treasury through investment in Real World Assets (RWA) while leveraging this goal to also incentivize the deployment of protocols on the network.
However, there are some points that we believe should be improved before moving forward with the proposal:
More clarity towards the goals of approving this budget. Is it to diversify the treasury? That seems too limited. Is it to experiment with RWA? Is it to incorporate as many providers as possible into Arbitrum?
More clarity towards the expected timeline. How much time should we expect until the screening committee publishes the RPF? How much time will they review applications? Once investments are done, how much time do you consider must be waited until STEP it’s considered successful? Or what milestone must be achieved to consider it concluded?
More clarity towards RFP and how to evaluate the committee’s work. If it’s not possible to have the definitive version of the RFP before the tally vote, it would be great to have some guidance points on how it will look like and what we can expect of their work.
A detailed breakdown of the budget. I expect to have a full breakdown on how the 200K ARB are going to be used for the implementation of the proposal.
Also, as @pedrob stated, it is necessary for us as a DAO to define short-medium-long term objectives, to have a consensus on what to spend on, and to make a framework for investments that aligns with the sentiment of the DAO itself.
We hope that through STEP 1 we can learn about how we want to manage treasury more broadly, so that we can implement a strategy for both spending and investing, considering the impact, cost/benefit, and sustainability of each decision.
Conclusion
We believe that, although the proposal is headed in the right direction, it still lacks clarity on some issues that we consider essential for approval.
We will again support the proposal on tally if these issues are clarified and included in the proposal.
Thanks to all for their patience while we worked on incorporating feedback received after the snapshot, on the forum and IRL during EthDenver
This is a meaty post with all the details required for moving to the onchain tally vote; we will keep this up for a period of 2 weeks for any comments.
There are 2 changes to the text that was posted on snaposhot;
Committee members will now recommend an allocation to providers based on a policy we come up with, and the DAO simply votes on its approval. Large delegates told us they do not want to vote for individual service providers and wish for our committee to perform the task of selection, as many still have PTSD from the STIP days
We will not mandatorily require our own external audit of selected service providers, but exercise the right to do so in case we do not trust their auditor or have another reason to do so
Let’s now get into the additional details requested!
Budget
Committee Members : 60k-80k ARB
External counsel fees ( requested by @cliffton.eth ) : 50k ARB, possibly more
Program Manager : Received one quotation of $100k per year plus $15k for every selected service provider
Budget Narrative
Committee members are paid 500 ARB per application per member. Assuming 20 eligible applications, that amounts to 10k ARB per member and we have 6 in total which is 60k ARB.
We require external legal counsel for signing agreements with committee members and also the agreements with service providers. 50k ARB is a conservative estimate; it is likely to be more. This amount was requested for by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Assuming around 5 service providers are selected at current ARB prices, we estimate 80-90k ARB per year will go to the program manager overseeing service providers. We do not recommend being stingy with this budget; they play an important role in making sure we don’t lose any of our principal and the interest earned from the program will be ~3 million per year, of which program management costs are only 3-5%
As shared above, committee members are responsible for recommending an allocation to eligible service providers, which the DAO finally approves via yes/no vote.
Below is the scope of responsibilities for the program manager, written with help from the excellent @adamlawrence who is planning to apply with his company RWA.XYZ for being a program manager to STEP. Candidates for the role will be selected by a vote of the procurement committee, valid for a period of one year after which they need to ask the DAO for additional funds to continue in their role.
In the pre-allocation phase, we received a quotation of $1000 per application processed. The duties include;
Receiving applications from service providers
Conduct a first pass on applications received; filter out incomplete applications or those not fitting the RFP
After the committee reviews valid applications and shortlists eligible providers, prepare an assessment report on each provider that allows for easy comparison between them
In the post allocation phase, we received a quotation of $100,000 per year plus $15k for every selected provider (even if they recommend withdrawal of assets from a provider, they will still be paid the same amount to prevent unaligned incentives). The duties include;
1. Cashflow & Accrual Monitoring: Enable the Arbitrum Foundation to easily ensure that the Arbitrum Treasury receives timely payments or accruals. If payments are delayed or incongruent with stated rates, Arbitrum can take appropriate action (e.g. inquiry, divestment, etc). Specific functionality includes:
Initial capital contribution and redemption tracking
Track and notify interest accrual or payment amounts for each investment
Ensure expected interest accrual or payment frequencies match service providers’ documentation
2. Underlying Asset Monitoring: Validate that service providers are investing in expected underlying assets and risk exposures. If nonstandard assets are being included in a provider’s portfolio, Arbitrum will be informed and can take appropriate action.
Report on service providers’ underlying assets and reserves
Provide portfolio statistics and risk analytics
Report % of product AUM that pertains to Arbitrum’s investment
3. Operations & Counterparty Monitoring: Aggregates nonquantitative information to regularly inform Arbitrum of key structural information and material document changes and administer redemption tests.
Collate service provider financial and audit reports
Track underlying service provider changes (e.g. custodian or broker changes, change in 3rd party auditors)
Track material changes in provider terms
Administer Redemption Tests (i.e. “Fire Drills”) to test for provider redemption timeliness.
Communication with the DAO on the governance forum for questions pertaining to the program
Any other duties that may arise which are necessary for success
March 15th : Upload to Tally for onchain vote
April 1st: Open for applications from service providers (1 month submission window)
May 1st: Review applications (1 month)
June 1st: Snapshot approval vote for recommended allocations
After one year, the program manager needs to return to the DAO for a vote on paying their retainer fees. In case they do not get approval and there is no program manager overseeing our investments, the arbitrum foundation will liquidate and return assets to the treasury.
Our goal is diversifying our treasury via ecosystem support. This is a test run for an insight we had that many of the best projects in Arbitrum don’t want grants so much as the legitimacy of Arbitrum DAO being a customer of their product and earning money from it.
In their allocations, the committee will prefer projects that have either launched their stable, liquid and yield-earning product on Arbitrum or have a timeline for doing so. In case a provider commits to launching in say 6 months, they will get an allocation but it will be withdrawn if they do not meet this timeline.
The formatting isn’t breaking too badly so posting the RFP here;
Request For Proposals: Arbitrum Treasury Diversification (STEP 1)
Table of contents
Summary and Arbitrum info
· Introduction
· Requester background
Description
· Asset information
· Oversight
· Scope of service/Criteria
RFP process overview
· RFP timeline
· Participants
Questionnaire
· Applicant information
· Primary contact
· Key information
· Background information
· Plan design
· Performance reporting
· Pricing
· Smart contract/architecture
Supplementary
Summary and Arbitrum info
Introduction
Arbitrum governance is seeking proposals from qualified applicants for the purposes of diversifying the governance treasury and supporting ecosystem growth.
The purpose of the RFP is to identify products that provide trading volume and depth (i.e., liquidity), are stable in value, produce income for governance independent of crypto market volatility, offer transparency, and can potentially see use in developing a nascent “real-world assets” sector on Arbitrum chains.
Applicants whose products meet certain quality thresholds will be presented to ARB holders and their delegates for possible asset allocation. All final asset allocation decisions rest with ARB holders and their representatives. This RFP is intended to both collect relevant information for the committee and also to recommend allocations for tokenholders to vote upon.
Requester background
Arbitrum governance maintains and upgrades the Arbitrum technology stack, upon which are built multiple blockchains, including the largest Layer 2 on Ethereum, with more than $2.8b in assets onchain.
Description
Asset information
This program is intended to convert 35,000,000 ARB into stable, liquid and yield earning assets. The dollar notional amount of this investment is subject to market volatility, but at the time of February 9, 2024, is valued at approximately $66,000,000. These assets do not have a specific futured obligation or liability they are matched against. The Arbitrum Foundation, a Cayman Islands legal entity, will be the transacting counterparty.
Oversight
The committee is comprised of 6 members including GFX Labs, Steakhouse Financial, Karpatkey, Nethermind, and North Lakes Legal. The Arbitrum Treasury & Sustainability Working Group also serves as a non-voting member of the committee, except in the case of ties.
All members are required to recuse themselves for any application in which they have a monetary interest, direct or indirect.
The Arbitrum Treasury & Sustainability Working Group leads this process, and answers to stakeholders within Arbitrum governance.
Scope of service/criteria
Please include the following as part of your proposal:
Sample or template investment contract and the governing instrument (credit agreement, partnership agreement, etc.).
Investment selection, monitoring, and reporting plan.
Compliance requirements. Be specific about requirements you anticipate from Arbitrum governance.
RFP process overview
RFP Timeline
RFP published : March 15
Submissions open : April 1
Submissions deadline : May 1
Finalists announced : June 1
ARB holders vote on propposed allocation : June 15
Participants
This RFP will be open to all applicants with a stable, liquid and yield earning product. The screening committee will review all submissions and announce allocation between finalists for ARB tokenholders to vote upon.
After receiving applications, the committee will prepare an allocation policy for distribution to applicants and recommend a split between them. The DAO will then vote on whether to approve the split or not.
Questionnaire
Applicant information
Name
Address (Headquarters)
City, State, Postal Code
Country
Website
Primary contact
Name
Title
Country
Email, Telegram, Forum, & other methods of contact
Key Information
Expected Yield
Expected Maturity
Underlying asset
Minimum/Maximum transaction size
Current AUM for product
Current AUM for issuer
Volume of transactions LTM
Source of first-loss capital
Basics and background
How will this investment improve Arbitrum’s RWA ecosystem?
Identify key management personnel and individual experience. Also include third parties utilized for managing assets and their qualifications.
Describe any previous work by the entity or its officers/key contributors similar to that requested. References are encouraged.
Has your entity or its officers/key contributors been subject to an enforcement action, criminal action, or defaulted on legal or financial obligations? Please describe the circumstances if so.
Describe any conflicts of interest for your entity and key personnel.
Insurance coverages, guarantees, and backstops
Name of insurer or guarantor
Per incident coverage
Aggregate coverage
Historical tracking error in your proposed product, or similar to that being proposed
Product
2024 YTD
2023
2022
2021
Brief reason for above tracking error
Please describe any experience your firm has in working with decentralized organizational structures
What is your entity’s current assets under management, assets held in trust, total value locked, or equivalent metric for your legal structuring?
How many of these assets held are present on Arbitrum One, if any?
Plan design
Please describe your proposed product, including a description of the underlying assets and, if more than one asset, the proposed allocation among assets and general investment guidelines. Where appropriate, include targeted maturity mix and credit quality. Attach supplementary documents as appropriate.
Do investors have any shareholder, investor, creditor or similar rights?
Describe the legal and contractual structuring for your product including regulatory bodies overseeing your business and the product and identifying all legal jurisdictions interacting with your product. Attach supplementary documents as appropriate.
Would Arbitrum’s assets be bankruptcy remote from your own entity and its officers/key contributors? If so, please explain the legal and contractual basis. On a confidential, non-reliance basis, provide any third party legal opinions to support the conclusions.
How are Arbitrum’s assets protected vis-a-vis the bankruptcy of the brokerage or applicable financial institution (e.g., bank deposit insurance, securities insurance, etc.)?
Does the Issuer issue more than one asset? If so, what is the priority relationship between different asset classes?
Provide a detailed cash flow diagram that shows the flow of funds from ARB/Fiat conversion, investment in underlying asset, payment of expenses, sale of underlying asset, and repayment (Fiat/ARB conversion), including the counterparties and legal jurisdictions involved.
Describe anticipated tax consequences (if any) in transacting on the underlying and/or receipt of yield.
Describe the process and expected timeline for liquidation of assets, if given instructions to do so by Arbitrum governance.
What amount of first-loss equity will Sponsor provide to ensure over-collateralization, how is the first-loss equity denominated, and what is the source of capital?
Describe the liquidity and stability of the proposed underlying assets, including anticipated settlement times from the sale of the underlying to the repayment of ARB.
If relying on the blockchain for any of the transactional flows, please describe any blockchain derived risks and mitigations.
Does the product rely on any derivative product (swaps,OTC agreements?
List all the third party counterparties linked to your assets including and not restricted to prime broker if any, custodian, reporting agent, banks for derivatives or loans and provide primary contact details for the third party counterparties
Can you explain how is risk management (inv and operational) being done? Can you provide a copy of your risk management policy?
Performance reporting
What are your proposed performance benchmarks? If this is substantially different from the underlying assets, please explain why.
Describe the content, format, preparation process, and cadence of performance reports. This should include proof of reserves, if appropriate. Please include a sample report.
Who provides the performance reports in respect of the underlying assets?
Describe any formal audit process and timing of such audits.
Pricing
Provide a copy of your standard contract, or one similar to what is being proposed here.
Fee summary: Inclusive of the full scope of services requested.
Product
Fee schedule
If asset based
Fee calculation for our plan if asset based
Annual fee if flat fee
Any other fees (including redemption or minting fees)
Describe frequency of fee payment and its position vis-a-vis payment priority compared with other expenses (i.e., cash waterfall)
Smart Contract/Architecture
How many audits have you had and name of auditors?
Please provide a copy of reports.
Is the project permissioned? If so how are you managing user identities? Any blacklisting/whitelisting features?
Is the product present on several chains? Are there any cross chain interactions?
Are the RWA tokens being used in any other protocols? Please describe the various components of the ecosystem
How are trusted roles/admins managed in the system? Which aspects of the solution require trust from users?
Is there any custom logic required for your RWA token? If so please give any details.
Supplementary
Please attach any further information or documents you feel would help the screening committee or ARB tokenholders make an informed decision.
I welcome any feedback before the vote goes live later next week on March 15.
One other change from the snapshot is increasing the remuneration to committee members to flat 25k arb, given their increased workload in recommending allocations between service providers and to be commensurate with pay received by LTIPP council members
