Long Term Incentives Pilot Program

Where will these bounties to posted and how will it be managed?
I would suggest using platforms like DeWork budget is stated instead of asked to propose. This can simplify the task and increase the number of contributors working for Arbitrum DAO.

Also, I would love to see the dashboard creation open up partially or run parallelly to “Data Provider” on public platforms which can allow more members to contribute at their level.


This a huge problem. We need pathways for grantees to be successful. Grants aren’t one-off allocations, they should be pathways that fund ideas to become prototypes and prototypes to become legit projects. Then Incentive Programs can follow up by attracting users.

This focus on pathways will be one of the primary focus areas for our second milestone. Thanks for pointing this out. I’d love to connect with someone who was feeling hesitant about applying to better understand their perspective.

A project we are funding is tentatively called the “Grant Routing System”. This system does three things:

  • gives citizens one place to go to submit a form showing interest in grant applications.
  • automates and task manages the steps from grant approval through compliance and payout
  • Provides dashboards and view db (airtable) for anyone to see grants info across all programs (This has Questbook, Plurality Labs, and uniswap programs - still need foundation support)

This project’s next major milestone is Jan 15 with expected completion Jan 30th.

Also, thanks for the diligence behind the work you’ve done!


Great proposl, some areas also discussed that are missing might be resolved with adding 3 roles specfically in the areas of operations, checks and balances and keeping delegates up to date. I think to have it decided by the council might not be the best as the roles presented can act as implementers.

Project Scoping Squad
Role: The project scoping squad is responsible for defining the scope of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program and ensuring that all aspects of the program are well-defined.

What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal
Transparency: The project scoping squad can ensure that transparency mechanisms are well-defined in the program scope. They can specify that all decisions and discussions related to applications, council decisions, and program progress will be made publicly available, promoting transparency.

Council Assessment Administrators:
Role: The council assessment administrator is responsible for tracking the work of the council and communicating their actions to delegates and the community.

What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal

  • Decision-Making Authority: The council assessment administrator can monitor the council’s decisions and actions to ensure that they align with the defined criteria and rubrics. They can provide regular summaries of council decisions to delegates and the community, enhancing checks and balances.
  • Limited Community Involvement: The administrator can facilitate community feedback channels, allowing community members to express their opinions and concerns regarding council decisions. This involvement can enhance community participation in decision-making.
  • Emergency Actions: The administrator can help define clear criteria for triggering emergency actions, such as the removal of council members or program managers. This clarity reduces the potential for disputes and ensures that emergency actions are taken when necessary.

Content Designers
Role: Content designers are responsible for creating process flows, documentation, and communication materials to streamline program operations and ensure checks and balances.

Some areas also discussed that seem to be missing in the current proposal form and also something worth noting for future proposals or intitives as wel.

Here are some potential issues in the proposal to think about durng the implementation phase or even before slection process.

  • Lack of Transparency: The proposal lacks specific details on ensuring transparency, including making decisions and discussions publicly available.
  • Decision-Making Authority: The proposal’s 5-person council may concentrate power and limit checks and balances.
  • Limited Community Involvement: Community participation beyond veto power is unclear in the decision-making process.
  • Reporting Requirements: Specific reporting standards and update frequencies are not defined, affecting transparency.
  • Lack of Data on Effectiveness: The proposal lacks a clear plan for gathering and analyzing data on program effectiveness.
  • Role of Program Manager: Accountability and evaluation mechanisms for program managers are unclear.
  • Emergency Actions: Criteria for emergency actions like removing council members are undefined, leading to potential disputes.
  • Data Provider Selection: The selection process for data providers in the Pilot Program needs clarification.
    Budget Allocation: The proposal lacks a breakdown of fund allocation across program aspects, impacting transparency.

This is a great start to a LTIP for protocol-funded incentives and I definitely support StableLab’s offer to run a pilot program as a proof-of-concept prior to requesting a larger administrative budget. It’s great to see @Matt_StableLab independently drive forward a long-term program for protocol grants after great execution on STIP.

A few considerations prior to the publication of a snapshot might be:

Adding preliminary ideas of a rubric would instill confidence of the Council’s capability. Incentives are complicated, and the team should have clear goals/KPIs to work back from to establish their decision rubric.

The Application Advisors are a great addition, but I’d define specific a purpose (or even KPI’s) for the role to hammer home the expertise and quality required. In my mind, this role would serve two purposes:

  1. To ensure each applications alignment with Arbitrum network goals (which I think the proposal should prob define)
  2. To maximize ROI on a per ARB spent basis by working with applicants to optimize their incentive tactics.

Ideally, I’d expect the quality of this role to be in the vein of a quant/analyst from a Gauntlet, OpenBlock, SixDegrees, etc.

A key issue with STIP was that both the program’s size and streaming design limited the ability for milestone-based applications.

For example, multiple proposals (I think Vertex/Radiant/GMX?) had offered to do iterative/performance based incentives, where funding for consecutive disbursements increased or decreased (10%, 15%, etc.) depending on performance. With stronger admin powers, it’d be great to accommodate these structures.

This might increase the multisig workload, but considering this is a trial program, additional compensation for extra admin would be justified.

There’s a subtle difference in scope for a data provider vs. data analysis. To realize the vision for the research bounties (which I love), the DAO requires open data for analysts to work with. The way the Data Provider is articulated here doesn’t quite make that clear, and it seems to be asking more for a provider build everything turnkey (data pipeline, collection, and analysis) but potentially gatekeep the data itself as IP/private data pipelines.

I’m not sure if I’m articulating this as I’m not a data science guru, but it’d be better to build open-source data here. We should fund a pipeline for public data availability via Dune spells, or an open-data repo. Maybe have Carl Cervone or the Open Data folks brainstorm how to build a pipeline on each incentive program that’s available/query-able the full community?

If delegates want a final say an optimistic funding route might lower the pain for delegates, while ensuring oversight. I think each app going to a vote will be burdensome and prob adds unnecessary pain.

Might look something like:
Program Proposal —> Multisig —> Council Approves Grants —> Multisig Approves Transactions —> One-Week Grace Period where delegates can veto a grant w/ XX Voting Power —> Grants are streamed.

Does that make sense?


Hi all! Thank you so much for your feedback on the Pilot Program - we are currently incorporating it into the proposal.

Taking a break for the holidays but in the next week, we will continue responding to forum comments and editing the proposal to make positions and workflows clearer. We will post an update next week explaining all the changes and how we have addressed the forum feedback.

After feedback regarding concerns over how the council and advisors would be chosen, we have decided to include an election process for these positions.

Anyone interested in these positions can apply by responding to the Pilot Program Position Application Thread

Additionally, we will be hosting our next open proposal discussion meeting next Friday, January 5th at 11 am EST



This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.


Testing Incentives Mechanisms For a Long-Term Framework

The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen in STIP V1. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.

The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Application Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.

Why Protocols Need a Round 2

STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 as was permissible in the original rules.

This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline or intentionally waited for Round 2. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives. Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.


There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.

We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.

This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Application Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.

This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework.


Problem / Solutions:

The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.

Problem #1: Too large a burden placed on delegates

In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.

Solution #1

To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.

Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals

A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.

Solution #2

The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.

Problem #3: Strict Limitations on Incentives Mechanisms

STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.

Solution #3

The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.

Flow of V2

Application Period (2 week)

Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Application Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted.

Feedback Period (2 weeks)

During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.

StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.

Screening Period (1 week)

During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.

The rubric will be created by the Council and Application Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.

The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB

EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB

50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each → Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget → 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council’s decisions → 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes → 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO

Voting Period (1 Week)

Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, the respective protocol will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution pending the protocol successfully passing KYC.

Incentives Period (12 weeks)

Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template. Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available.

During this period Application Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update.

Roles & Responsibilities

The Council

The council will comprise 5 DAO members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders or delegates with experience in incentive programs, grants councils, or growing a protocol.

The council will decide which protocols will progress to a snapshot vote to be awarded the ARB incentives. The council does not need to spend the entire incentives budget should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.

The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Application Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Application Advisors to ensure the Application Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will progress to Snapshot votes to allow the DAO to determine if they should receive ARB. The council will be responsible for publishing the graded rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.

The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped. Streams can also be halted via a DAO snapshot vote should the DAO disagree with the council’s judgment.

Additionally, the council will select who completes each research bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties. This selection will be made via a simple majority by council members and will require them to provide their reasoning for all choices made. The council does not need to spend the full amount should they receive lower budget requests or do not find an appropriate party to fill a bounty.

Council Election

The 5 council members will be selected by DAO vote. The 5 Council Applicants with the most votes will be elected to serve on the council for the Pilot Program.

Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here. Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be a council member will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select who will sit on the council.

Those who serve on the Pilot Program Council are not guaranteed to be included on a council in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select council members when it comes time for the full long-term program.

Council Workload:

The exact amount of hours the Council position will require is difficult to estimate given this is the first time the DAO will use a council for incentives. However, the following is an estimated breakdown.

Designing Rubric and Application Template: 20 hours

Grading Protocols and providing Reasoning: 4 hours per protocol.

Determining if a stream should be halted: 5 hours per week

Selecting Research Bounties: 4 hours per applicant

Council Responsibilities:

  • Design a rubric with the help of Application Advisors to grade applications
  • Grade all protocols against the rubric to determine who will progress to snapshot vote
  • Provide public reasoning for all funding decisions made
  • Decide whether a protocol’s funding should be halted if they violate the rules or fail to distribute ARB
  • Read over all Research Bounty applications and select who completes each research bounty based on the budget requested and level of expertise in that field of research.

Council Members

Council members will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify the council. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.

  • TBA 1
  • TBA 2
  • TBA 3
  • TBA 4
  • TBA 5

Removing Council Members

Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote.

Anyone will sufficient voting power can initiate a Snapshot poll to remove council member(s). Should the poll receive a majority “remove” votes the council member(s) will be immediately removed.

Should this occur there will then be a week-long application process where replacement council members can apply via the forum. This will be followed by a Snapshot vote to elect replacement member(s).

Application Advisors


Three Application Advisors will help protocols design, implement, and update their incentive plans. Application Advisors are integral to the proposal process, serving as impartial entities with DeFi expertise. Their primary function is to provide detailed, unbiased feedback on applications, aiding protocols in refining and improving their submissions.

The Application Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.

As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.


Collaboration with Council and Program Manager: Work jointly to design the application template, KPIs, and a grading rubric, ensuring alignment with council expectations and clarity in the evaluation process.

Feedback and Recommendations: Offer detailed feedback on each eligible application assigned to your team during the review period.

Communication with Applicants: Engage actively with applicants to streamline the application process, aiding in proposal improvements and clarifications.

Hosting Office Hours: Schedule and conduct public office hours 3 times per week while the program is running for protocols to seek advice. This will focus on transparency and accessibility. All interactions during these sessions will be recorded and summarized for everyone. Order of speaking during office hours will be on a first come first serve basis.


Impartiality: Advisors must remain unbiased, especially as they do not have the final say in proposal acceptance. While application advisors will work closely with the council members to create the Rubric, advisors should not interfere with the votes from the council nor guarantee any outcome to projects they speak with.

Continuous Engagement: Post-application feedback is crucial, as is ongoing involvement in the later stages of the process, subject to discussion and agreement with relevant parties. There may also be later involvement in the process when the program is running or over.

Timeline and Process

Pre-Application Phase: Advisors are required to hold open office hours, focusing on guiding applicants in preparing their proposals.

Application Review Phase: Each proposal receives at least one detailed feedback report addressing key criteria established by the DAO.

Post-Application Feedback: After the submission of proposals, advisors provide insights on the process and suggest improvements for future cycles.

Selection and Ratification

Application Advisors will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.

Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be an Application Advisor will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select the Advisors.

Those who serve as a Pilot Program Advisor are not guaranteed to be included onboarded in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select Advisors when it comes time for the full long-term program.

The application to be an advisor is currently open here: LTI Pilot Program Position Application Thread

  • TBA 1
  • TBA 2
  • TBA 3

The Multisig

The same STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal will continue for The Pilot Program. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.

The STIP-ARB multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:

  1. Clawback capability so the DAO can retrieve funds if the multisig violates the agreement.
  2. Streaming of funds to grantees every second week for the grant’s duration using Hedgey. This allows for the halting of funds if misuse is discovered to stop bad actors, not punish bad designs.

Program Manager

The Program Manager will be responsible for coordinating between all parties involved to ensure the Pilot Program runs smoothly. They will be available to answer any questions the DAO has regarding the Pilot Program and will publish bi-weekly reports so the community understands the status of the program. The Project Manager will be available to the community at least 40 hours a week. This role is designed to add efficiency and clarity to all aspects of the Pilot Program. The Program Manager will have no input into which protocols receive funds. However, they will be responsible for handling any operational tasks that arise throughout the Pilot Program.

Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Application Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.

StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.

Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.

In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.

Program Manager Responsibilities

  • Provide feedback on all applications regarding their eligibility. They will not provide any thoughts on the merits of the applications.
  • Answer any questions regarding incentives from the community, protocols, council, Application Advisors, foundation, and multisig
  • Handle forum communication regarding the program.
  • Provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of the program.
  • Organize the Council and Advisor Elections
  • Help the council coordinate the review and selection process. They will have no say in the council’s decisions.
  • Help the data provider coordinate with protocols.
  • Coordinate KYC progress with foundation and multisig.
  • Coordinate streams between multisig and protocols.
  • Continue designing the Long Term Framework, ensuring it has DAO approval and will be ready to begin in Q2 2024.
  • Publish a detailed research report breaking down the operational effectiveness of the Pilot Program compared to STIP V1 in terms of DAO costs and effort.

Data Provider


As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a service provider for data monitoring and reporting.


Making Data Publically Available: The Data provider will be responsible for publically displaying data from all funded protocols. This will serve two purposes. First, it will allow the entire community to see the success of the program. Second, it will ensure those completing the Research Bounties have access to this information so they can provide proper analysis of this data. This will allow for the Bounty completers to provide better reports and data visualizations for the community. This provides the DAO with a decentralized method for analyzing and understanding how effective this program is as well as better setting up the DAO for the Long Term Framework.

Data required to report:

  • TVL
  • Transactions
  • Users
  • Fees Generated
  • Volume
  • Protocol Type
  • Contracts Incentivized
  • Impact per ARB

Communication with Protocols: Engage actively with funded protocols to collect all data necessary.

Monitor For Misuse of Funds: The data provider will monitor data from all funded protocols to detect any misuse of funds. Should they find suspicious activity the data Provider will be responsible for sharing this with the Council.

Create a Recap Report: The Data provider will be responsible for creating a recap report that tells the story of the Pilot Program and breaks down the successes and failures of the different incentive strategies.


Impartiality: The Data Provider must remain unbiased. While the Data providers will not have the power to halt streams themselves, they must be impartial when it comes to reporting the data and examining for any misuse of funds. Any suspicious behavior they find must be communicated to the council for further review.

Continuous Monitoring: The Data Provider must continually update the data to reflect the latest updates. This will ensure the bounty researchers and community have access to the correct information. They also must continually monitor for misuse of funds to allow the council to act quickly should any issues arise

Timeline and Process

Post-Selection Phase: The Data Provider will communicate with all funded protocols to ensure they can collect all necessary data and understand which contracts are being incentivized.

Incentives Phase: The Data Provider will continually update the data and monitor for any violations.

Selection and Ratification

This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1. Potential data providers are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify.

Research Bounties

The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.

When this proposal goes live to Tally, it will include many questions the DAO wants answered. Some examples Include:

  • Which protocol incentive designs were most effective at attracting sticky users/liquidity?
  • What is an appropriate budget for a Long Term Incentives Incentive Program?
  • What was more effective the council or delegates voting?
  • What category of protocol received the most funding? Were any categories left out?

Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget. The council will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty. This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.

Retroactive Community Funding

In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.

Arbitrum Delegates

This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities are replaced by the Council and Application Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.

Delegates will retain the following powers:

  • Elect Council Members and Application Advisors
  • Ratify all additional roles included in this proposal
  • Remove any position holder via a snapshot vote should the delegates feel they are not fulfilling their responsibilities
  • Veto any funding decision made by the council
  • propose the final research bounty questions

Eligibility Requirements

The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.

Additional eligibility requirements

  • Grantees must be live on Arbitrum at the time of application
  • Grantees must refrain from farming their own incentive programs.
  • Grantees must outline a spending plan, provide a pro forma, and state the grant’s objective.
  • Grantees must commit to providing data on distributions, all ARB spending transactions, and key metrics like daily TVL, transactions, volumes, unique addresses, and transaction fees. This data should cover 30 days before, during, and after the Incentivization period, and be presented preferably in a Dune Spell/dashboard.
  • Grantees must agree to share all contract addresses being used to distribute incentive rewards.
  • Grantees must disclose the contracts being incentivized and denote any external contracts being incentivized as part of the program.
  • Grantees can only incentive contracts on the Arbitrum Network.
  • Grants are not to be used in DAO governance.
  • Grantees are expected to not encourage or partake Sybil attacks against the forum to sway community opinion.
  • Grantees must agree to KYC with the Arbitrum Foundation to receive funds.
  • Grantees must apply using the approved program application template

By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:

  • Any use of funds not explicitly described in the grantee’s application.
  • Failure to comply with data reporting standards.
    • Grantee recipients will be required to provide Dune dashboards uploaded and posted to the forum
      • Dashboard requirements are: Daily TVL, transactions, volumes, unique addresses, and transaction fees for incentivized protocols. This data should cover 30 days before, during, and after the Incentivization period. If a metric does not apply, or this is not achievable, it should be noted in the application.
      • More granular dashboards (including pool-level and user analysis) will be noted by the community for future programs.
    • If dashboards are not posted by this date, the multisig will be empowered to halt incentive funding streams for protocols at their discretion.

In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.

Steps to Implement

  • Protocols can begin applying for incentives after a snapshot vote passes.
  • At the same time, it is recommended applicants begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding.
  • Once protocols begin applying, the Application Advisors and the council will begin providing feedback on proposals on a first come first serve basis.
  • Once this proposal passes the on-chain vote, the total amount of ARB will be sent to the multisig.
  • Protocols will work with Application Advisors to improve their applications.
  • The Council will design a rubric and grade each application using this rubric to select which applications are funded.
  • All protocols that will be receiving funding will have to pass KYC and sign grant agreements.
  • Once the foundation notifies the program manager and multisig that protocols are ready for funding, the program manager will coordinate with the protocols, and the multisig will initiate the streams.
  • Research Bounties will be selected and completed throughout the process.

Overall Cost

Total Cost: 25,815,000 - 45,815,000 ARB

  • Incentives: 25,000,000 - 45,000,000 ARB. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO through a Snapshot vote. The entire budget does not need to be spent by the council. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO
  • Council Members: 125,000 ARB - 25,000 ARB each
  • Application Advisors: 105,000 ARB - 35,000 ARB each
  • Research Bounties: 200,000 ARB Total - the exact amount and sizes of specific bounties will be selected by the Council and can be vetoed by delegates.
  • Data and Analytics Provider: 150,000 ARB for data monitoring and reporting
  • Program Manager: 100,000 ARB for program design, organization, management, research report, and continuing development of the Long Term Incentives Framework. See the full list of responsibilities above.
    Proposal Creation Assistance: 15,000 ARB - 10,000 ARB for Alex Lumley and 5,000 ARB for Bobby Bola for their time spent assisting with proposal design, hosting proposal office hour calls, and communicating with delegates to gather feedback.
  • Retroactive Community Funding: 100,000 ARB
  • Multisig Signers: 20,000 ARB - 2,500 ARB each

Voting Options

  1. Fund Pilot Program with 45,815,000 ARB
  2. Fund Pilot Program with 35,815,000 ARB
  3. Fund Pilot Program with 25,815,000 ARB
  4. Don’t Fund Pilot Program

After receiving amazing feedbackin the forum, speaking with many delegates, and sharing the proposal in multiple community calls we have improved the proposal in the following ways:

  1. To avoid too much centralization of power with the council the delegates will now get the chance to vote to confirm all of the council’s choices. The council will screen all applications and select only the best applicant to move to Snapshot votes for the delegates to vote on.

EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB

50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each → Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget → 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council’s decisions → 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes → 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO

  1. Additionally the DAO will now have the ability to choose the size of the Pilot Program with voting options of 25M, 35M, and 45M in incentives budgets. This will be voted on during the proposal Snapshot

  2. The Application Advisors and Council members will now be elected via Snapshot to allow the DAO to choose who they want to fill these positions.

  3. Added role responsibilities, goals, and selection criteria to provide more clarity to the community and assure accountability for these positions.

  4. There are now 3 Application Advisors to accomadate the expected application demand and ensure each applicant is able to recieve sufficient attention from advisors. Additionally, Application Advisors will now help protocols throughout the entire incentive period to help protocols manage, evaluate, and tweak their incentive plans.

  5. Clarified how this Incentives program relates to eligibility for other DAO grant programs

“The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.”

  1. Retroactive Community Funding has been added to encourage community members to provide valuable contributions throughout the program.

Thanks again to everyone who has provided feedback on this program! Please read the entire updated proposal here.

Additionally, anyone interested in being an Application Advisor or Council Member is encouraged to apply here


We completely agree with your sentiment and have done our best to take a first cut at what we believe could be a way for grant programs to be tracked and compared on an even playing field. More info here: Serious People: Proposed KPIs for Arbitrum Grant Programs


Really appreciate Matt and the team being so receptive to feedback. I am now in a position to support the LTIPP!

This is a great move because in their negotiations with applicants, the council has the ability to say “we don’t have all the power so make XYZ change else the delegates might not vote for approval.” Creating this check on the councils power will lead to a better outcome.

Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?

This might have intentionally been left vague (DAO will have the final say?) Its not necessary for this stage of the proposal, but I would like some details on who gets to allocate the 100k ARB. Would it be via Gitcoin matching funds to Arbitrum citizens? A JokeRace/snapshot weighted voting for anyone with delegated ARB to vote on those competing?

In my view we should not overcomplicate this by involving the entire DAO and just let the council members/application advisors give it to community members that have helped reduce their workload. But curious to know yours and others thoughts on this.


Proposal Edit Note: We have added a small funding amount to compensate @AlexLumley and @Bobbay for the many hours they spent helping design the proposal and advancing it to the voting stage. This was done to reward DAO members for their hard work on the proposal and to avoid relying on other programs such as Plurality Labs to reward valuable contributions

Proposal Creation Assistance: 15,000 ARB - 10,000 ARB for Alex Lumley and 5,000 ARB for Bobby Bola for their time spent assisting with proposal design, hosting proposal office hour calls, and communicating with delegates to gather feedback.


Hey @thedevanshmehta thank you for your support and valuable feedback!

Yes, this would be the maximum amount spent. The funds from any applications the delegates reject will be returned to the DAO.

This is very valuable feedback and we are still finalizing the exact mechanism. This will be figured out and clearly defined by the Tally vote!


Simplified Version of the Updated Proposal:

The proposal aims to address past incentive program issues and test new mechanisms through the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program, distributing 35M ARB to protocols from January 2024 to April 2024.


  • Advantages:

    • Positive outcomes from STIP V1 with increased metrics.
    • Recognition of structural flaws in STIP V1.
  • Feedback:

    • Brief overview of lessons learned from STIP V1 and Backfund.
    • Emphasis on how the pilot program contributes to cost and time savings.

Why Protocols Need a Round 2:

  • Advantages:

    • Acknowledgment of unexpected popularity.
    • Focus on protocols missing the first round, balancing the competitive landscape.
  • Feedback:

    • Specific metrics on the impact of the first round.
    • Emphasis on dual benefits for individual protocols and the Arbitrum ecosystem.


  • Advantages:

    • Recognition of the need for a 2024 long-term plan.
    • Desire for evidence-based decision-making.
  • Feedback:

    • Brief summary of findings from STIP V1 and Backfund research.
    • Emphasis on how the pilot program aids in cost and time savings.

Specifications - Problem/Solutions:

  • Advantages:

    • Clear identification of the three main issues from STIP Round 1.
    • Introduction of specific solutions.
  • Feedback:

    • Simplification of problem and solution statements.
    • Ensuring solutions directly relate to the lessons from STIP V1.

V2 Flow:

  • Advantages:

    • Defined application, feedback, selection, and reward phases.
    • Inclusion of StableLab for program management.
  • Feedback:

    • Further streamlining the application process.
    • Emphasis on how StableLab’s experience benefits the program.

Roles and Responsibilities:

  • Advantages:

    • Clear delineation of responsibilities for the council, application advisors, multisig, program manager, and data provider.
  • Feedback:

    • Brief profiles of potential council members and application advisors.
    • Emphasis on the expertise and neutrality of advisors and the program manager.

Research Bounties:

  • Advantages:

    • Allocation of ARB for key questions.
    • Emphasis on the importance of meaningful conclusions.
  • Feedback:

    • Simplification of language for clearer expression.
    • Ensuring bounty questions align with DAO’s strategic goals.

Arbitrum Delegates:

  • Advantages:

    • Acknowledgment of delegate power and responsibility.
    • Inclusion of veto power in funding decisions.
  • Feedback:

    • Emphasis on the importance of collaborative decision-making.
    • Highlighting the involvement of delegates.

Eligibility Requirements:

  • Advantages:

    • Clear qualification standards for grantees.
  • Feedback:

    • Further simplification and clarification of language for easy understanding.
    • Emphasis on the importance of KYC for accountability.

Steps to Implement:

  • Advantages:

    • Sequential breakdown of implementation steps.
    • Clear involvement of stakeholders.
  • Feedback:

    • Further simplification of language for easy understanding.
    • Emphasis on collaboration among stakeholders.

Overall Cost:

  • Advantages:

    • Clear breakdown of ARB allocation.
    • Transparent presentation of costs.
  • Feedback:

    • Brief justifications for allocation amounts.
    • Emphasis on how each allocation contributes to program success.

The proposed Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program shows promise in addressing past issues and preparing for a comprehensive long-term framework. Improving communication effectiveness and simplifying language could further enhance clarity and implementation efficiency.


This proposal is now live for vote! Please cast your vote on Snapshot


Hello, @Matt_StableLab!
Thanks for the proposal, it’s great.
A small note, we think that 2500 ARB for a multisig is atoo much. In all other proposals on the platform it was 1000 (taking into account the fact that the cost of the ARB increased to $2)


@TreasureDAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) will vote FOR this proposal on Snapshot to fund the program with 45,815,000 (ranked in descending order of ARB amount).

Treasure has been involved in the pre-forum socialization process for the Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and believes it addresses many of the challenges identified through STIP Round 1, further builds upon it, and will set the foundation to establish a long-term, sustainable incentives/grants program that will support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

  • Tests a program structure that could be greatly scaled up across sectors with a lens towards plurality: In the long run, we believe that sector/cluster-based programs with DAO-elected councils comprising subject matter experts and Arbitrum-aligned builders will win out as the optimal set up to award incentives. LTIPP will serve as the first stab at this, applied against all categories within Arbitrum DAO which will be an informative exercise while unlocking necessary funds for ecosystem protocols and builders.
  • Broadens scope of incentives to enable greater flexibility: Coming from the gaming angle, we’re delighted to see the acknowledgement of this problem (#3) as it was a pain point that was universally shared across games both in and outside of the Treasure DAO ecosystem. Notably, the strict limitation on incentive mechanisms forced DeFi distributions of grants which needed to be expressly complied with which we do not believe to be aligned to the needs of games.
  • Reduces the burden on delegates while maintaining veto power: As an active delegate who reviewed and voted on all STIP Round 1 applicants, the burden placed on protocol delegates was great as we felt the weight of responsibility and expectation to strive to participate in the STIP engagement, review, and voting process, while also delivering against the needs of Treasure DAO’s own priorities.

With our support of this proposal, we also urge the DAO to consider the following:

  • Electing a diverse council: We believe the council approach paired with the application advisors are both a step in the right direction. Beyond this, what will be of paramount importance are two things: (1) ensuring both groups comprise balanced, knowledgeable and thoughtful members who can represent Arbitrum’s diverse ecosystem of projects across sectors; and (2) ensuring the council designs a universal rubric that can be applied across all types of projects – whether they be DeFi, RWAs, gaming, infrastructure, and so on.
  • Getting this program in front of as many Arbitrum builders as possible: For those of us who have been deeply engaged in Arbitrum governance, this has been a major topic of discussion for some time. For those outside of it though, it’s easy to not be aware of this potential funding and support path for all who would be able to benefit from this. The Arbitrum DAO community and Arbitrum Foundation needs to amplify and promote this program as much as possible to get this in front of the protocols and builders helping grow the Arbitrum network.

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I’m not sure if this is the best way.

First of all, I feel like relying so heavily on a council could end up centralizing Arbitrum’s governance a bit too much, especially if it’s related to protocol incentives since they are essential for the development of the ecosystem. Because, even though I understand that it was a burden for most delegates, I think that we could just give them more time to review proposals (with longer review windows and feedback periods). This, coupled with compensations for delegates, could alleviate the burden.

Replacing delegates with a council might be more efficient in a way, but it also takes away value from governance - if I’m not wrong, many protocols started engaging with the DAOs governance thanks to STIP.

Second, I think some expenses are a bit too high and might not be necessary. I understand that the DAO has a massive treasury but it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be a bit more careful with it ~ excluding the incentives, there’s an additional 815,000 ARB requested for various purposes, this amounts to roughly $1.7M. For example, I think that the program shouldn’t include the role of the advisor since, ideally, with a longer timeframe, feedback should come from the delegates + it would encourage protocols to learn the DAO governance process. As a side note, I noticed that @SEEDGov applied to this role, but I just wanted to state that our delegation decides independently from the organization.


Eventhough I like the direction towards this proposal is going, I think we have to develop a program that seeks more involvement from the delegates and relies less on centralized committees.


gm all, nice to see the hard work of the last few months coming to fruition.

I am supportive of this intiative and voted FOR the pilot program of the LTIP.


I think the 3 key problems identified are tackling the right frictions that currently exist for such a program to be lean, effective, yet fair and open.

The council and advisors are tasked with supporting applications and ensuring a minimum agreed-upon quality, while still preserving the ultimate decision-making power of the delegates.

Still, I want to echo @cp0x and @cattin : the proposed compensation for some positions are not aligned with the current market.
While people involved in the different roles take the downside risk of the market if the ARB tokens go down, I would encourage to review the different compensation packages before submitting the final proposal on Tally.


Good day, @cattin
I like your rationale for rejecting the offer.
In addition to payment, in order to avoid centralization of grant decisions, perhaps if @att_StableLab adds the following changes to his work, we may consider the proposal again:

  1. att_StableLab makes a selection of rejected grant recipients according to their parameters.
  2. att_StableLab makes one general proposal with a vote to exclude funding for the above grant recipients. With detailed information on each project, with explanations of why you should not allocate ARB to this project.
  3. This way, we will reduce the number of votes and the community will be able to influence who exactly gets the grant, even if this project was excluded from funding.

Voting order

  1. Fund Program with 25,815,000
  2. Don’t Fund Pilot Program
  3. Fund Program with 35,815,000
  4. Fund Program with 45,815,000

If the option to Abstain was available this would have been availed but it was not possible on this snapshot vote, so voting and providing feedback.

Highly supportive of the idea of running a V2 to the original STIP with those protocols having weighted months, while the backfund worked through voting, funding and now disbursment before their proposal finally came to vote. Voting in support instead of to not Fund the Piliot Program is to ensure the V2 opportunity does exist, despite misgivings on the proposed size of this Pilot program at between $52.5 and $105 million + overheads.

Voting on Tally in support will be contingent on seeing progress on the below concerns.

Size of the Pilot program

  • Presented as a Pilot program, given this is the first time the DAO is delegating the vetting and evaluation process of an Incentive grant program to a council / committee, as STIP involved direct voting on 100+ proposals and backfund was an omnibus funding. The proposers state a need for caution before spending significant amounts under a long term program yet the smallest funding option provided is 25 million ARB (52.5 million USD on the average value over the last 7 days) that means this PILOT program even at the LOWEST level will be the second biggest disbursement of total ARB ever by the DAO and the largest ever disbursement by the DAO in USD.
  • When a V2 was being evaluated the most common number floated was 25 million ARB which would have grown made STIP + V2 to the same 75 million ARB that the incentive committee originally floated. Since that time, an additional 20+ million ARB was added via the backfund (those protocols would have been in a V2) and the underlying value of the ARB token has increased by over 100%. Yes to those asking, the value of the ARB token going up is relevant because the network that we are growing isn’t denominated in ARB but in gas consumption in ETH and TVL and other metrics that are $/ETH based, the ARB token is simply the mechanism by which this growth is being funded in this context. Meaning both the ARB, USD and ETH value should be considered when determining sizing.
  • Concerns were raised on the size in community calls but the proposers didn’t seek to give delegates the option of looking at more modest budgets for the pilot, I’m sure they will share their reasons.
  • Appreciate that the council could choose to award or recommend less than the entire amount, but it is reasonable for the council to assume they have a mandate to spend the amount and choosing to spend materially less then the total funds committed might not align with the DAOs intentions. In the end they can say they are only providing recommendations, the DAO can decide which proposals to support. Difficult acts of self restraint may be needed by the council or DAO, or we may end up with less effective funding.


  • “The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding.”
  • If someone read the entire test of the snapshot and gave up after reading 80% of a 5000+ words from an additionally provided link, they might miss the above line that indicates that this vote for funding between $52.5-105.0 million in incentives from the DAO is intended only towards protocols that did not succeed in securing funding in STIP + backfund.
  • This choice of presentation needlessly creates confusion, especially when proposing a grants program as large or larger than STIP it seems eligibility should have been front and centre.
  • It would also be ideal to have clarity (via a snapshot vote?) if the words ‘intended’ means prioritization of projects outside of STIP+backfund or complete exclusion, including a silly edge case of protocols who received funding via say the foundation claiming that the exclusion does not apply to them since the language says recipients of those grants ARE eligible.

Additional Budgets

  • In addition to grant budgets of 25 -45 million ARB ($52.5 - 105.0 million) there is an additional budget of 815,000 ARB ($1.7 million) towards a range of administrative, support, retrofunding and research
  • The research grants are explicitly indicated as being subject to further DAO votes which would make it safe to assume the remaining amounts are not although presumably can be stopped by the multi-sig only for improper activity.
  • Not arguing against the merits or need to potentially fund these various activities, but I do think that it would be appropriate for the DAO to be able to weigh in individually on some of these expenditures especially since many are commenting that they are supporting inspite of these expenditures and not in support of some of these expenditure
  • A caveat that the project manager compensation is implicitly linked to the proposal itself and probably should not be touched since the project manager is named but for positions and expenditures not yet committed to a specific party as the vote to determine who will receive them hasn’t happened or for retro amounts these amounts can be amended if the DAO weights in.
  • Propose that while the full amount be voted on Tally, in parallel snapshot votes are done on these additional budgets effectively allowing the DAO a line item veto for them.

No doubt the role of the council we elect will be very important, and it would be prudent for everyone to understand the philosophy of candidates including with regards to their view on how the budget reflects a mandate to spend.


@AbdullahUmar and I have shared our thoughts on this vote here. Overall, we’re in favor and are excited to see this get going. One thing to note and consider we think is reevaluating some of the compensations, for example the Multi-sig signer.