[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO's Operations

We’re glad to see great discussion already underway! Thank you to all for contributing to this important topic. Below are responses to some of the questions and points brought up by delegates.

Additional Rationale

Several delegates mentioned Optimism DAO and its code of conduct / resolution processes, so we’d first like to provide some additional rationale for how the code was written and why the Arbitrum Foundation was chosen as the mediator in conflicts between delegates. Of all the DAOs reviewed, Optimism DAO has experimented the most with enforcement mechanisms for their code of conduct and rules of engagement (their term for community guidelines). After its creation, the code was initially enforced by the Optimism Foundation. In an effort to decentralize moderation, the process was shifted so that violations were brought forward and voted on by delegates directly. After just two instances this was determined to be a sub-optimal approach. It was concluded that delegates did not want to be responsible for voting on conduct cases. From this a dedicated code of conduct committee was established, but over the last year its powers have been rescoped twice. Now it only handles severe instances of conduct breaches and upholds the rules of engagement, while all unenforceable policies in the original code of conduct were transformed into guiding principles now known as the “Optimist Expectations”.

We encourage all delegates to read through the materials linked above. In many ways they have come full circle, but their experimentation has provided valuable insights for DAOs of a similar size.

The Arbitrum Delegate Code of Conduct and its enforcement mechanism were written in a manner specifically taking those learnings into account. Most importantly, we believe that many conflicts can be handled first in private and only in serious instances need to be raised to a 3rd-party mediator. The Arbitrum Foundation is already responsible for enforcing the community guidelines, so while a committee was mentioned first by @PGov and other delegates, our team believes the tradeoffs involved with introducing additional bureaucracy & overhead to monitor/resolve conflict issues outweighs the benefits.

Enforcement Mechanisms

Most clauses in the code of conduct are written as guiding principles that delegates should seek to embody. The responsibility falls on all delegates to hold each other accountable. It takes the entire community to create and maintain a professional culture. Similar to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution’s community values, with these principles actually written out, the code of conduct provides contributors a basis for behavior that should be promoted.

The only violations that result in direct punishment are the behaviors prohibited by the community guidelines - ex. harassment, doxxing, inappropriate language. Mediation and conflict resolution will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation, but any Arbitrum DAO contributor can use this google form to report instances.

This is just one scenario that makes conduct enforcement in DAOs so difficult. Any individual can spin up a new wallet, transfer ARB, and begin voting. Holding anon delegates accountable is close to impossible. However, while Arbitrum DAO is open to anyone that wishes to participate, it does not mean the DAO is required to pay everyone. When it comes to the Delegate Incentive Program, participants are required to KYC to receive rewards and those applying for committee/council positions normally have to maintain a level of social credibility/reputation to be elected. These mechanisms prevent an individual from at least immediately transferring ARB to another wallet and reapplying to the DIP or an elected-position. Overall, this scenario and reasoning contributed to the code of conduct being written as a set of guiding principles that delegates should aspire to embody, rather than a strict set of rules that can be “violated”.

Clarification of DAO-Elected Removal Process and Quorum Requirements

This is a great call out; the proposal has been updated to clarify that elected representative removal votes must adhere to the other agreed upon proposal guidelines.

This is also a good addition, a quorum requirement of at least 3% of circulating supply has been added for the DIP removal appeal process.

Defining an Emergency Proposal

Several delegates have asked for clarification on what constitutes an emergency proposal. We are hesitant to create exact criteria, but generally speaking, emergency proposals should be limited to security related protocol upgrades. Another example of an emergency could include a heinous unethical activity such as stealing funds, that requires immediate removal from a committee. Non-constitutional proposals that are to spin up new initiatives, grants, or any other funding requests are not considered an emergency, and should therefore wait until after the Holiday Period. There were recently two proposals that went to Tally a day late, and while justification was given, in our opinion they did not really qualify as an emergency. We recognize that there is a tricky tradeoff in strictly adhering to procedures and perhaps slowing down operations unnecessarily. The community has thus far adapted well to the voting schedule, and we trust that delegates will be able to discern when an emergency is actually required.

Delegate availability during the holiday season is an appropriate concern. When created, the main purpose of the holiday was to at least give delegates some time off from voting on proposals. We expect that conversations and comments will still occur both on the forums and other adjacent DAO-related chats. The break just creates a time where the expectation of delegates is reduced compared to a normal week. Additionally, with the Holiday Break being shorter (18 days) than the time required to move a proposal through an onchain vote (~20 days), we view the likelihood of a governance attack or emergency situation going unnoticed as low.

Conflict Resolution Form

The proposal has been updated to include a link to the conflict resolution reporting google form. Responses will be sent to the Arbitrum Foundation team.

Prioritizing controversy without an attempt at private mediation

We appreciate delegates calling out this line, as upon reflection, we agree that it needs clarification and did not accurately communicate the intent behind the statement.

@stonecoldpat correctly summarized our motivation behind this statement and code of conduct as a whole. This document intends to be something that delegates can point to in order to help filter out those playing status or short-term games. A professional and civil culture can be brought down by just one or two individuals who purposefully introduce toxicity. Drawing hard lines on what is acceptable speech is a fool’s errand, but the DAO needs to acquire the ability to defend itself from bad actors that seek to subvert its operations.

The phrase “private mediation” was added after recent instances of individuals taking critiques public to social media without engaging in a minimal level of due diligence. As @JoJo stated, mistakes happen and we in no way are suggesting that the recent instances were malicious in nature, but taking conversations to social media can have unintended consequences. It is our view that delegates should take caution in unnecessarily tarnishing the Arbitrum brand and painting the DAO in a negative light. Constructive feedback starts with seeking a deep understanding on a topic from those most familiar and prioritizes a polite demeanor in practice.

We propose removing this line from prohibited behavior and replacing it with an additional guiding principle under the Civility and Professionalism section:

Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.

Before updating the proposal, we welcome additional feedback on the topic and proposed changes.

Other Edits

Lastly, thank you to @jameskbh and @Argonaut for calling out some minor mistakes. They have now been fixed.

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