After reading the proposal once again, new questions come to my mind along with concerns as well as conclusions.
FACTS:
- GRAIL token performance is getting worse by the day. It can easily be checked on any chart. With the xGRAIL unlocking pressure added up along the way, the future expectations don’t look better.
- TVL keeps decreasing every day.
- In this proposal Camelot is the most benefited protocol within the ecosystem: position of power, TVL attraction, no competition. All these without having to increase their own emissions.
HYPOTHESIS (Not facts):
I don’t want to get misconstrued but, “coincidentally”, the use of given $ARB as a farm token would be a perfect solution to those issues. The fact that Camelot is the most directly benefited protocol if the proposal takes place, that makes me wonder whether the main reason and intentions behind this step is to save and accelerate their own platform.
This is something so hard to figure out, not to say impossible, since isn’t the only beneficiary. The doubt is there though.
SUSPICIONS (Not facts):
One of the suspicious points on their grants distribution design is the choice of a farming method to be carried out. Why does that work better than, for example, sending the allocations straight to each ecosystem’s protocols? Why everything must go through the Camelot’s funnel? Isn’t that centralization?
I’m still trying to figure out how does a farm incentives method helps to the other protocols other than providing to their tokens a deeper liquidity. I mean yes, that could be seen as a benefit (wait! NOT ALWAYS), but in this case the subjects are the grants which are a very different form of benefit. So, to me, the Camelot’s proposal is something very apart from the Arbitrum’s grants program. In this proposal we’re not talking about grants but just about farming incentives.
PROBLEMS:
Besides all the design flaws, I miss some warnings/disclaimers to the voter, I mean to talk not only about the upsides but also about the downsides/side effects of turning Arbitrum into a farming party, like:
- Attraction of mercenary capital from other chains, which is short term activity/fees increase (only or mostly for Camelot) and liquidity increase that turns into mid/long term liquidity extraction.
- Weaken of $ARB tokenomics = Less holders = Weaker governance.
ALTERNATIVE:
Distributing $ARB liquidity via direct grants not only really delivers financial help to each protocol but also appears to be more fair, decentralized and flexible.
Also avoids the ecosystem’s liquidity extraction issue. This doesn’t mean this method is free of downsides, the major one is the ease to misuse and waste the funds. Although I’ve read some very interesting proposals above pointing to a tranches system and KPIs assessment which, in my opinion, solves that problem or at least diminishes it by a lot.
Seeing the pros and cons of each distribution method (the apparent pros of farming are in Camelot’s proposal), the very first thing we should agree is:
MAIN QUESTION:
Should Arbitrum distribute $ARB token via farming or via grants? Or both?
To me, I think is clear that I advocate for the grants system but only if they come with the anti misuse measures. The use of $ARB for farming should be rejected, it’s a nonsense.