Camelot is a decentralized exchange designed to be a foundational piece of the Arbitrum ecosystem, offering a highly efficient, permissionless and native liquidity infrastructure. Since launching in 2022, Camelot has facilitated over $30 billion in trading volume and built strong partnerships with more than 75 projects, making it the leading native dex on Arbitrum.
As one of the most important parts of Arbitrum’s DeFi landscape, Camelot is committed to supporting the ecosystem’s expansion, including its growing network of aligned Orbit chains. Beyond just facilitating liquidity, Camelot will actively engage in governance through this thread to help shape the future of Arbitrum, ensuring that both the protocol and the broader ecosystem grow while contributing to Ethereum’s scaling.
We look forward to claiming back the fees accrued in Nova until August and also find a way to utilize them in a productive way for the ecosystem, in a way similar to the current GMC initiative. While we understand why the vote will be bundled in Tally for quorum reasons, we have strong opinions on Timeboost and so we would strongly be in favor of avoiding do so; in case of failure we will advocate for the unbundling of the two votes since they are not related one to each other.
Vote: For
Normally, we would not support a budget increase for a grant program, especially one that has yet to show meaningful results due to its timing. However, in this case, we are willing to make an exception because of how it has been structured.
Having OCL lead the selection of teams and projects to be subsidized ensures that their vision for this technology is embedded in the process. This leadership also allows them to identify and address key gaps. Stylus is a key technology, value add and differentiator of Arbitrum compared to other chains, and we should push it without being hindered by fixed budget allocation if this is the strong advice of the committee of and OCL.
We believe this approach has the potential to yield positive outcomes, and we welcome this change.
Camelot supports the proposed upgrade to ArbOS 40. This upgrade aligns Arbitrum One/Nova with the Pectra Ethereum update, and we think mechanisms such as EIP-7702 will be key to improve the UX of users interacting with the various dApps. In general, we think Arbitrum and the EVM ecosystem should do more in term of enhancements for user experience, and this upgrade goes in the right direction.
Camelot is voting AGAINST the OpCo proposal.
While we were supporters with several open questions during snapshot, the decision of Entropy, as the original proposer, to vote against their own proposal raises significant concerns about the possibility of success; this vote has candidly undermined confidence in the initiative.
We still think, as in the snapshot, that the proposed budget of 30M ARB represents a substantial commitment of DAO resources, potentially excessive for the highlighted scope. Given the uncertain effectiveness of OpCo compared to established entities like the Arbitrum Foundation, we think that the monetary allocation, but above all the mindshare allocation, of the initiative might be excessive at this stage of the DAO’s life, especially knowing there has been a commitment from the Arbitrum Foundation to be more active in governance life.
Without clear conviction from the proposal’s originator, combined with the significant impact and potential bloating of governance’s day-to-day operations, we don’t think it is currently wise to support OpCo in its current form, especially because we expect more engagement and a change of pace from the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL since this has been the general message provided in the last few weeks on public channels. We do remain positive about the fact that the DAO should be capable of having its own entity, with a precise scope such as owning infrastructure and ability to hire contributors for the long term. That said, if the vote passes as it currently seems likely to do, we will still act as stewards of the chain and of the DAO by ensuring to support the OpCo as well.
We believe the STEP 1.0 initiative is worth continuing and expanding upon. While its primary objective is to establish a more reliable set of treasury assets, we see an opportunity to create greater consistency in utilizing these assets for ecosystem growth. Specifically, we should focus on incentivizing the creation of liquidity pools on the Arbitrum chain. This approach would not only benefit the DAO but also strengthen the broader ecosystem, potentially unlocking a key advantage that RWAs currently lack: utility akin to that of non-yield-bearing stablecoins.
Additionally, we strongly align with other delegates who suggest that this initiative, along with the GMC and Arbitrum track, should be managed under a unified framework. Consolidating these efforts would streamline bookkeeping and reduce overhead costs.
Camelot voted “for” the new season of Arbitrum D.A.O. grants. While we believe there is significant room for improvement—particularly in light of the Entropy report and, more broadly, the DAO’s spending approach—we think supporting this new iteration is worthwhile.
Not only does it serve as an entry-level program for the ecosystem, but it also relieves the DAO from having to directly evaluate a large number of smaller proposals. While many of these proposals may have merit, assessing them individually would likely require too much time and attention from delegates.
Lastly, we welcome the approval of the new Orbit domain. We understand that this is an experiment and has been underfunded for this reason, but we believe the DAO has not yet done enough to promote Orbit—a technology we see as crucial to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Vote: Only deploy stables, Deploy nothing, Abstain, Deploy both, Deploy only ARB
We are going to trust the choice of the committee about not deploying ARB. At the same time, we would be
Vote: For, Deploy Capital
While we are not neutral for this vote since we are one of the selected protocols, we do believe the approach is sensitive in term of risk management. In term of selection of protocols, we still believe there should be a more diverse selection of native Arbitrum protocols to foster growth as explained in a previous feedback hereby reported for clarity.
Vote: Abstain
While we don’t want to hinder the vote, we will vote “Abstain” on the on-chain vote to adopt Timeboost. We still think all our concern from the snapshot discussion have not been addressed, and we are looking forward to read more precise data studies on the effect of this new policy not only for the DAO but also for protocols operating in Arbitrum.
Vote: Against
Consistently with the snapshot vote, we are voting against. We appreciate the effort of the proposer, but we think the initiative is not structured on strong fundamentals. Specifically, the idea that builders and founders will come to the DAO to seek for advice is a bit naive since the DAO doesn’t have the strongest history ever of supporting builders, nor most of the people involved in it are necessarily founders or operators of protocols.
Vote: Abstain
We thank the proposer for the work done so far on this initiative. We think incentive programs are an important part of growth strategies for our chain, and we have not had any for several months now.
That said, we want to abstain from this vote because we think, in the current form, it only partially address the gaps we have seen in previous iterations such as STIP and LTIPP. We support the data monitoring, but haven’t seen solution for the shortfalls that can happen in such programs, specifically for certain categories of protocols and above all from protocols operating exclusively in Arbitrum versus protocols operating multi chains that can indeed subsidise growth here through incentives while recouping any loss outside of our ecosystem.
Vote: 33.33% for A.J. Warner (ajwarner90), 33.33% for Frisson (Frisson), 33.33% for Patrick McCorry (stonecoldpat)
We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo.
Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way.
We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well.
Since several concerns from our previous notes were addressed by the Foundation such as the participation of already deployed protocol in the program, we are voting in favour of the initiative compared to the previous abstain in the off-chain vote.
Vote: For
We think STEP has been a rather successful initiative, and we think a second round build on the same premise of the first is positive for the ecosystem.
Vote: Yes for both
While we think there is the need to address the long term need of the DAO on how to tackle conversion of funds, in this case we think is sensitive to use already allocated funds, that should be given back to the DAO, for initiative experiencing a shortfall. On top of that, it makes sense to utilise the stables in excess for yield bearing programs such as the TMC one.
Vote: For
As previously noted, we think incentive programs are a structural part of growth in our ecosystem, but have to happen in the proper way. We are willing to move forward only mechanisms that are able to address previous shortfall, and while not all details are planned, we think Entropy is currently the only entity potentially able to tackle these problems and also to gather consensus around the goals.
We are looking forward to know the first set of potential goals of the program before the on-chain vote, as well as the technological partner of choice to execute it.
Vote: For
We vote in support of this proposal since we are well aware of the quorum problems the DAO is facing more and more over time. We are also looking forward to proper long term fixes, since this initiative will buy us only 4 months of time according to the Foundation’s calculations.
We are obviously in favour of cutting any excessive cost on Nova, especially now that we are seeing the Orbit stack becoming more and more predominant in the ecosystem. It would be interesting to understand if there is any specific strategic plan for this product; at the same time, the proposal is sounding and logic for the current time being.
Vote: For
We are in support of this proposal. We think the current status of AGV is such that going for a re-election now would be disruptive for the operations. At the same time, we are generally not thrilled by the fact that this situation was forced by basically a 6 months delay in the roadmap of the fund.
That said, we hope that this extension will help the council work in peace and allow the initiative to take off. The goal has always been to create a new line of business for the DAO and we hope that this will come to fruition in the future.
Vote: Don’t Extend
As others, we think the internalisation of research functions in the AAEs plus the ability for OpCo to engage directly with service providers after the previous vote makes the extension of ARDC not viable. We think the researches were of good quality; that said, the structure falls short in term of actionability post-research. We do see a risk of the gap in not having a research department in the DAO, but our hope is that this gap will be filled by OpCo ability to move more freely.
Vote: For
We support upgrading the contracts in a way that is more efficient to call for specific updates, to reduce complexity and potentially also human errors.
Vote: For
We do support every builder that wants to come in Arbitrum so the vote is straightforward. As other delegates, we hope that there will be in future ways to avoid governance votes for this kind of operations which should be easier to execute.
Vote: For
All the updates make sense, and we do realise that while some things like responsible voting would have been net positive are impossible to enforce and so will get exploited at some point.
Vote: For
We do think this is a sensitive and logical approach for idle funding. Our expectation is that, beside generating yield, the allocations will be used in a risk adjust way in Arbitrum native protocols, to achieve the double goal of financial independence for the DAO and growth of the ecosystem
Vote: For: Upgrade to v1.7
Camelot is voting in favour.
We do agree that there has been a general reduction of activity in governance which deems a reduction of payout for delegates. We are unsure if the current cut will push away some important key delegates from the DAO and look forward to hear results in a few months on this choice.
We also agree on the passive Tier X as a way to have a predictable payout from passive delegates, albeit small.
Vote: For
We are voting in favour to support the renewal of Entropy and supporting the on-chain vote as well as we did in Snapshot. We think that OAT, especially through AJ Warner, is the best positioned team to negotiate KPI with Entropy going forward and we welcome this change.
Vote: For
We support trying to speed up the development on Arbitrum’s side ahead of the Lusaka upgrade. We are also looking forward for the audit from Trailbits.
Vote: Keep the current 1.7 DIP, Abstain, Revert to 1.5, Sunset the DIP
We are voting AGAINST any change to the DIP program in any form through a voting that favours preserving the current version or abstaining. We don’t think it’s wise to vote for changing this program ahead of the upgrade of the program to the 1.7 just voted and two months before its natural expiration. We want to instead understand how this newer version will perform, as well as look into a new proposal for the next iteration of the program.
We think the DAO and the ecosystem are mature enough for an evolution of the Security council, that favours both a longer tenure and more independence from the single council members. Especially the ability of rotating keys independently is important to preserve security and allow for swift action; the 1 year tenure will also allow the DAO to have less burden in these votes.
Vote: 2.36M Immunefi, 2.36M Cyfrin
We decided to support in the nominee phase two strong candidates in the form of security audit firms, both very reputable and well known. We think they should run for the council alongside the others selected by the DAO.
We consciously decided to not allocate all of our voting power: most of the candidates that we wanted to support were already qualified through the votes of other candidates, which pleases us. That said, we did see a danger in just allocating the rest of the votes to candidates that we would not necessarily feel comfortable sitting in our Security Council.
Confirming all the previous snapshot votes. We don’t think is a good habit to bundle all of this proposal together for what is worth.
Vote: For
We do think the compensation raise is not material compared to the theoretical role of the AGV council: supervise a 200M Arbitrum fund for a very difficult vertical, gaming. We do understand the compensation end number is the result of both research of similar roles and also internal DAO benchmark like the OpCo OAT; there could be a merit in discussing if that number toward we are all gravitating, around 8,000 in council position, is right or wrong. While it could be a bit inflated, we are more focused on having the right people in these position to foster growth of DAO initiatives. For these reasons, we are voting in favour.
Vote: Against
We are against this proposal. The program seems like it was designed to tap into mostly into a specific set of delegates, the ones that are active in the forum, allocating to them 60% of monthly rewards. This mechanism will push likely for “discussions for the sake of discussing” more than meaningful contributions, and won’t help too much tackling the hard problems we have in the DAO, but just the perception of tackling them. Finally, we don’t understand why this proposal did frontrun on snapshot the one from the Foundation: is not that the latter is necessarily better than the former, but they are competing proposals on the same topic and running both at the same time voting wise could have been a bit more beneficial.
Vote: Against
We are not supporting the new DIP proposed by the Foundation. While we do see the effort of improving several things that have been perceived as a problem in the last year, we think it introduces too much complexity in the operations, especially through the peer review assembly, without any predictability on voting.
The program should be aimed to sustain delegates in allocating time for voting, which is a fundamental and necessary duty of our ecosystem. Arbitrum DAO governance wise is hard, with several proposals, calls and initiatives, sometimes very different between each other. While the activity has seen a slow down and simplification through the AAEs, there is still a merit in considering governance in Arbitrum still a very important and heavy task.
The DIP has so far allowed big delegates, and especially protocols, to allocate an FTE (partially or totally) to this duties; this new iteration, with no proper example of payouts, budget in ARB and not in stables and a mix of contributor and delegate program will likely neither solve delegates’ needs nor contributors’ needs. We are honestly puzzled by the choices made so far in designing the proposed program, because it feels like is very distant from the overarching goals it had in the beginning.
We would like to see something closer to previous iteration, with a centralised program manager able to evaluate ad-hoc cases and issues, with more predictability for payout, and a separation between contributors and delegates program.
Similar to the previous vote for future council members, we are in favour of this proposal. Again, the main point is that we do think the compensation raise is not material compared to the theoretical role of the AGV council: supervise a 200M Arbitrum fund for a very difficult vertical, gaming. All other points also stand, such as comparison with the OpCo OAT. We also do believe that standing up AGV has likely been a demanding task with a very initial steep curve, and for this reason we do think this retroactive change is not only consistent with the one made for future council, but also necessary in relation to the work done so far.
In the same way we supported the raise of previous council members, we are here to confirm both Tim and John as valuable members of AGV.
There is in our opinion still a lot to fix in this initiatives; we do recognise the improvements over time, and we want to trust the current committee that states that John and Tim are strategic for the fund.
Is quite easy to understand the why for Tim due to his experience in VC. For John, we have started to know him better in the last few calls held in the DAO, and our advice for him is to show himself more and allow us to learn what he does.
We think David, Coinflip and Jojo are the best suited for the next iteration of AGV.
David is not only in OCL but also part of the gaming branch, as well as the consumer part. His position is key in the initiative.
Coinflip has been not only a widely recognise DAO member, but also one of the core contributor of one of the most important protocol of Arbitrum, GMX. We think he has the right balance between institutional presence and understanding of relationship in the ecosystem.
Finally, we want to support Jojo. His role in the DAO has been prominent in managing several initiatives, and we think he can introduce a better degree of communication in AGV, both internal and external.
We also want to highlight that Jojo advices us on governance matters; that said, our vote has and will always been independent and based on what we think is the best outcome for Camelot, for protocols in the ecosystem and for Arbitrum as a whole
Vote: For
We think the current program strikes the right balance between involvement of delegates and compensation for the voting activity.
Voting and governance can be challenging for people who have an interest in arbitrum, but main responsibility outside the pure governance sphere, so a monetary incentive to stay up to date is most likely useful, especially for big delegates that, in the end, are influential in the votes are key for protocols’ upgrades.
We look forward to have also information about a contributor program which we also deem important, especially for important figures in our DAO that don’t have necessarily an equivalent amount of votes.
