Thank you for proposing, AIP-1.1 - Lockup, Budget, Transparency, which gives us a better idea of how the Arbitrum Foundation allocation will be issued and used. However, I still have some questions.
(1) What does control mean here? Is there a wallet that collects the ETH made in fees? How does the DAO collect this revenue? Is it currently going to Offchain Labs?
(2) If this is the foundation’s yearly burn rate, and you’d like to secure a 4-year run rate from the DAO, assuming $ARB holds its price around $1.20, adjusting for the 50 million already spent, what is the need for the additional $796 million in $ARB? (50x1.2=60, 36x4=144, 1000-144-60=796).
Having experience in this realm with ENS DAO, I recognize the importance of this, but in no way see how $796 million over 4 years could be effectively allocated.
(3) What does this mean? The ask is for 750 million $ARB. Are you saying you intend to hold half and convert half to USD? $ARB might as well stay in the DAO treasury if you don’t intend to spend.
(4) What happens in the event of a budget overrun? Ask the DAO for more money again? 4 years is too long of a time horizon to fund for the DAO to assess whether or not the foundations interests align with the community and ecosystem.
The Arbitrum Foundation is the best team to handle, maintain, and enter new agreements with service providers to run infrastructure that’s critical for the ecosystem. The experience and knowledge on the team is extremely valuable. But this is the level of scrutiny needed to operate a DAO. I’ll vote against AIP 1.1 in its current form.
The criteria for me to change my vote would be to lower the dollar amount to that which the foundation has a plan ($36 million/year) to spend and make the proposal annual as opposed to once for 4 years. I would be in favor of keeping the timelock to align incentives as a bonus pool for employees and contractors, but, would like to lower this amount to a more reasonable level.