We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
We previously supported the proposal during temp-check and we voted in favor of version 1.5 as it introduced some additional qualitative criteria that we think is the right approach. The questions and points we raised with our comment when we voted during temp-check have been addressed, and we are now comfortable voting in favor of the proposal onchain.
We’d like to stress once more that we’ll rely on SEEDGov to monitor the program and communicate its progress, especially with the addition of the qualitative criteria. We expect them to attend all the monthly oversight calls to provide updates and, most importantly, highlight anything that might not work as expected or intended.
With SEEDGov having more control and discretion over the program, they also have more responsibility. We expect that they will communicate with delegates proactively and we’ll be holding them accountable for the proper administration of the program. Specifically, and as noted in our previous comment, we’d like to know whether it makes sense continuing with v1.5, or if it’s more sensible to fallback to the previous version.
4 Likes
DAOplomats is voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
We voted in favor of v1.5 during the temp check, and we are maintaining our stance during this onchain vote.
Voting has ended!
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[[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2433597000864761163)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 166.75M of 119.31M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 148.93M (89.2%) |
| **Against** | | 179.74k (0.1%) |
| **Abstain** | | 17.82M (10.7%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact support@tally.xyz
The results are in for the [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats:
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “ABSTAIN” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
Rationale
Considering that we are the proposers and have economic interests involved, we believe it is ethically correct to abstain from this vote.
We also want to thank all the Arbitrum DAO delegates for their overwhelming support of the proposal!
Throughout this process, we have received an immense amount of valuable feedback that has allowed us to build a more robust proposal, reaffirming the critical role of delegates in fostering pluralistic and intelligent governance.
The Tally vote was approved with 89.21% of the votes and the Delegate Incentive Program v1.5 will start in November as planned.
4 Likes
For Tally: I am supportive of such a proposal to attract and keep talent (this can already be seen in the Incentive Program Delegate Application forum post) and for the same reasons stated below. Voted Abstain.
Voted FOR: Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program
See Commenting Rationale for Snapshot:
=== COMMENTARY RATIONALE ===
- I stand by my previous comments but I do expect the team to communicate to the DAO on the new changes for the Delegate Incentive program and how it all works as it may take a while for people to change their systems.
2 Likes
Suggested Optimization:
- Total Participation (TP): Consideration can be given to adding a flexible mechanism, for example, 1-2 consecutive times of low participation rate but high historical activity on behalf of the community will not directly affect the rating. It is good to adjust the body to focus more on actual participation and community communication, but the quality of the reasons for voting should not be completely ignored.
- While raising the percentage to 65%, is there any plan to provide room for improvement for representatives below 65%, for example, can they participate in more incentives to encourage improvement?
1 Like
HI, I have a suggestion: the ARB token threshold should be increased to 100K for delegates to receive rewards. As the value of ARB tokens declines, the rules should be revised—for example, requiring delegates to hold more than $50,000USD worth of ARB tokens. Otherwise, delegates may simply sell off their rewards immediately or create new accounts under their spouse’s or family members’ names to rejoin the incentive program.
Some of the top delegates have millions of delegated tokens, but are not holders themselves.
It seems to me that the program’s goal is not to encourage the purchase of tokens (there is no goal to increase the value of ARB), but on the contrary, only to increase delegations.
1 Like
Many of today’s good and active delegates who take part in the program have less than 100,000 tokens. They actively take part every day in voting and criticizing proposals. These delegates have proven their integrity and usefulness through continued participation in the DAO. Increasing the threshold to 100k ARB would mean that it would be impossible for active participants of the DAO to further participate, which would lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of the DAO.
So I don’t think it’s a good idea
On the other hand, @newze you mention above, that a drop in the price of a token can lead to the emergence of dishonest schemes, which can also harm the DAO. In this case, it would be nice to make a threshold of 100k ARB or 50k $ only for new participants in the DIP 1.5 to prevent abuses as described above.
Over time, delegates with less than 100K should be advocating in the community or elsewhere to gain more ARB delegation. However, they have made no progress. I believe they must be eliminated as they are gradually becoming parasites.