We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
We previously supported the proposal during temp-check and we voted in favor of version 1.5 as it introduced some additional qualitative criteria that we think is the right approach. The questions and points we raised with our comment when we voted during temp-check have been addressed, and we are now comfortable voting in favor of the proposal onchain.
We’d like to stress once more that we’ll rely on SEEDGov to monitor the program and communicate its progress, especially with the addition of the qualitative criteria. We expect them to attend all the monthly oversight calls to provide updates and, most importantly, highlight anything that might not work as expected or intended.
With SEEDGov having more control and discretion over the program, they also have more responsibility. We expect that they will communicate with delegates proactively and we’ll be holding them accountable for the proper administration of the program. Specifically, and as noted in our previous comment, we’d like to know whether it makes sense continuing with v1.5, or if it’s more sensible to fallback to the previous version.
4 Likes
DAOplomats is voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
We voted in favor of v1.5 during the temp check, and we are maintaining our stance during this onchain vote.
Voting has ended!
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[[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2433597000864761163)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 166.75M of 119.31M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 148.93M (89.2%) |
| **Against** | | 179.74k (0.1%) |
| **Abstain** | | 17.82M (10.7%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact support@tally.xyz
The results are in for the [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats:
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “ABSTAIN” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
Rationale
Considering that we are the proposers and have economic interests involved, we believe it is ethically correct to abstain from this vote.
We also want to thank all the Arbitrum DAO delegates for their overwhelming support of the proposal!
Throughout this process, we have received an immense amount of valuable feedback that has allowed us to build a more robust proposal, reaffirming the critical role of delegates in fostering pluralistic and intelligent governance.
The Tally vote was approved with 89.21% of the votes and the Delegate Incentive Program v1.5 will start in November as planned.
4 Likes
For Tally: I am supportive of such a proposal to attract and keep talent (this can already be seen in the Incentive Program Delegate Application forum post) and for the same reasons stated below. Voted Abstain.
Voted FOR: Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program
See Commenting Rationale for Snapshot:
=== COMMENTARY RATIONALE ===
- I stand by my previous comments but I do expect the team to communicate to the DAO on the new changes for the Delegate Incentive program and how it all works as it may take a while for people to change their systems.
2 Likes
Suggested Optimization:
- Total Participation (TP): Consideration can be given to adding a flexible mechanism, for example, 1-2 consecutive times of low participation rate but high historical activity on behalf of the community will not directly affect the rating. It is good to adjust the body to focus more on actual participation and community communication, but the quality of the reasons for voting should not be completely ignored.
- While raising the percentage to 65%, is there any plan to provide room for improvement for representatives below 65%, for example, can they participate in more incentives to encourage improvement?
1 Like
HI, I have a suggestion: the ARB token threshold should be increased to 100K for delegates to receive rewards. As the value of ARB tokens declines, the rules should be revised—for example, requiring delegates to hold more than $50,000USD worth of ARB tokens. Otherwise, delegates may simply sell off their rewards immediately or create new accounts under their spouse’s or family members’ names to rejoin the incentive program.
Some of the top delegates have millions of delegated tokens, but are not holders themselves.
It seems to me that the program’s goal is not to encourage the purchase of tokens (there is no goal to increase the value of ARB), but on the contrary, only to increase delegations.
1 Like
Many of today’s good and active delegates who take part in the program have less than 100,000 tokens. They actively take part every day in voting and criticizing proposals. These delegates have proven their integrity and usefulness through continued participation in the DAO. Increasing the threshold to 100k ARB would mean that it would be impossible for active participants of the DAO to further participate, which would lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of the DAO.
So I don’t think it’s a good idea
On the other hand, @newze you mention above, that a drop in the price of a token can lead to the emergence of dishonest schemes, which can also harm the DAO. In this case, it would be nice to make a threshold of 100k ARB or 50k $ only for new participants in the DIP 1.5 to prevent abuses as described above.
Over time, delegates with less than 100K should be advocating in the community or elsewhere to gain more ARB delegation. However, they have made no progress. I believe they must be eliminated as they are gradually becoming parasites.
I fully recognize that running a program like this is a complex and important effort. Naturally, there are growing pains and unexpected challenges, especially in the early stages. Some degree of flexibility is understandable.
However, enough time has passed to reflect on the overall progress and evaluate how well the goals outlined in the original proposal are being met.
While I understand there’s a dedicated thread for feedback, I’d like to briefly share some key observations here, as they speak directly to the alignment (or misalignment) between stated goals and actual outcomes:
- Goal: “Achieve that 50 delegates receive incentives”
This target appears to remain unmet. The number of delegates receiving rewards has declined substantially since January — from 50+ to just 26 last month. Of those, only 9 were lower-voting-power delegates, down from 33 in January. This trend seems to move in the opposite direction of the goal and intention of the program. - Goal: “Engage 100 delegates in the program”
While new delegates continue to register, engagement remains limited. Many are not active in discussions, likely due to the lack of clarity and predictability regarding incentives. The total number of active participants has grown from 63 to only 64 since January — a negligible change. - Goal: “Achieve an average Total Participation (TP) of 80% within six months”
Unfortunately, the data shows movement away from this target. The average TP was 72.41% in January, but dropped to 59.78% last month following program changes. This suggests the revisions may not have had the intended positive impact. - Goal: “Introduce improvements to the program after six months”
While this has been formally fulfilled, the effectiveness of those changes is debatable based on the trends above.
A few words on operational execution:
“Payments to delegates are expected to be processed in ARB from the MSS between the 15th and 16th of each month”
Unfortunately, this timeline hasn’t been consistently met:
- November: Paid on Jan 4
- December: Jan 21
- January: March 4
- February: March 26
- March: April 25
- April: May 22
- May: As of July 1, no report or payment has been published
“The DIP administrator will address the issue promptly, with a resolution expected within 4 days.”
This expectation has also been difficult to uphold:
- May: Dispute started June 17, reply June 23, no follow-up (6+ days)
- April: May 15 → May 20 (5 days)
- March: Final delegate message was never answered
- February: Several messages were left unaddressed
- January: Jan 20 → Jan 25 (5 days)
Given that addressing disputes is a core function of the role, I believe it’s worth revisiting how communication and responsiveness could be improved moving forward.
Again, I share all of this in the spirit of transparency and constructive feedback — not as criticism for its own sake, but to help the program succeed in the long term. Thank you to everyone involved for the ongoing work
4 Likes
If someone wants to delegate me 100k arb I would join DIP, I also know a handful of others who would be interested but don’t know how to get delegation - more importantly don’t know how to campaign/network with folks who might be interested in pushing governance.
I would love to do it but don’t have the arb to do so.
What are thoughts around some of the larger delegates distributing their vote to smaller more interested delegates and DIP would be a way for them to get paid for the services instead of using internal/company funds if it’s only for a short term basis
Delegate apathy exists and I don’t see a solution other than staking.
Only financial incentive will force holders to delegate their tokens, without this only the most active ones do it
Hey @cp0x !
Thanks for your thoughtful message and for taking the time to walk through each of the stated goals. Let us address each of the points raised, one by one.
When this proposal was approved, it was under the assumption that the DAO would continue growing in both delegates’ participation and responsibilities. The target of “50 delegates” was meant in the context of having 100+ contributors competing for those spots.
With the DAO’s shifting priorities and reduced operational burden for delegates, we believe this original goal may no longer be fully aligned with the current context. It’s important to note that this proposal was approved nearly 9 months ago, and naturally, in a fast-moving environment like crypto, some expectations become outdated.
Also, SEEDGov does not control delegate activity nor the overall level of engagement in the DAO. Therefore, in months with less activity, a smaller number of incentivized delegates is not only expected — it’s also reasonable. Otherwise, we’d be distributing funds just for the sake of it.
Regarding the numbers: as shown in the May report, 78 delegates applied to the program — up from 61 in October. That’s a 27.86% increase in registered participants over the first 7 months of the program.
While not all delegates are actively contributing, engagement — measured by participation in the program — has indeed increased. Many delegates may be passive or less active due to uncertainty in rewards, which is something we’re actively addressing. But in terms of total applicants, the program is growing.
This might be a misunderstanding: the Average TP Rate is calculated only among rewarded delegates, not all applicants. Including all applicants would be misleading, especially since many towards the bottom of the ranking are no longer active in the Arbitrum DAO.
Between November and May, the average TP rate among rewarded delegates was 79.23%, with 19,411.62 points awarded across 245 rewards. So this KPI can be reasonably considered met.
That said, we agree the DIP needs new KPIs that better reflect the DAO’s evolving context, and we plan to introduce updated metrics in future iterations.
This has been formally met. And based on the rationale provided and the data in our midterm report, we believe the changes achieved their intended goals. Naturally, we welcome feedback to continue refining them.
On Operational Execution
Let us provide context on some of the delays:
- November: All delegates had to go through compliance, which delayed payments.
- January: Limited team availability due to holidays pushed results and payments.
- May: Payments were executed on June 26, though the public thread hasn’t yet been updated — we apologize for the oversight.
A few additional considerations:
- When we originally set that timeline, it was admittedly optimistic. This was the first time we would fully assess contributions (beyond mere comment-counting), and we weren’t sure how long it would take.
- Even after adding individual reports — a major additional workload — we’ve maintained similar delivery times.
- There’s a 4-day dispute period, and SEEDGov no longer controls payments directly — the AF now manages execution, which adds 1–2 days of buffer.
- The phrasing used was “expected” rather than “guaranteed”, acknowledging some flexibility in timelines. We believe it’s more important to ensure accurate and fair assessments than to optimize purely for speed.
We aim to address all disputes within four days, collectively. Most of the examples cited fall within that range or are slightly beyond it.
As for follow-ups, we often choose not to engage in extended back-and-forth after providing a final decision, especially when the dispute involves subjective parameters. Once a judgment has been made and communicated clearly, the conversation has, by definition, concluded.
We truly appreciate the feedback and the spirit in which it was delivered. We also welcome any additional questions or clarifications in private — especially related to metrics — as we believe it’s important to avoid the spread of inaccurate data.
Thanks again for the engagement and commitment to improving the program.
Warm regards,
SEEDGov
1 Like
I believe that such an attitude toward delegates is unacceptable — specifically, the disregard for their comments on your work and on how you evaluate their performance
The very fact that you’re referring to subjective criteria shows that there’s a problem that no one is addressing. I find it inappropriate to treat delegates in a way where your opinion is presented as final and unquestionable. In this program, you act as legislator, executor, and judge all at once — meaning that no matter what others say, you can proceed however you want.
This undermines trust in the system, where a delegate has no real way to defend their position, simply because you think differently and have framed everything around subjective parameters that you defined yourself.
That’s why it’s necessary to move toward objective delegate evaluations
3 Likes