[PROPOSAL] Event Horizon Community Governed, Public-Access Governance Delegation

Event Horizon Community Governed, Public-Access Governance Delegation



With the aim of further decentralizing Arbitrum governance, this proposal suggests we delegate, not grant, 1.82m ARB to the public access voter block Event Horizon, revocable at any time. Delegating to a community of governance-interested individuals helps decentralize the Arbitrum governance process, increase participation and broaden our pool of thought capital.

To support this initiative, rather than request funding, the Event Horizon team has offered a $3,000 ETH grant to reimburse the gas cost Arbitrum community members spend to mint voter access passes


In light of the recent contentious BanklessDAO proposal which involved asking the Arbitrum community for 1.82m ARB, now is a good time to contrast for-profit proposal offers with no-cost, community-first modes of bolstering the health of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Compare BanklessDAO’s expensive proposal with the approach Uniswap has recently taken. Uniswap governance passed a proposal that delegates to small, but active, delegates. 7 delegates received a delegation of 10m UNI to continue their work as active, but under-weight delegates. A similar measure can be taken to decentralize Arbitrum governance by delegating to the Event Horizon community.

Event Horizon is the world’s first community driven public access voter block. The protocol operates on a novel governance model Implicit Delegation.

Implicit Delegation is a model by which the full public governance block mobilizes in favor of the consensus of those who do vote, thereby implicitly delegating the authority of those who don’t vote. Ideologically, implicit delegation represents an effort to shift the paradigm around means of influence from entirely capital-centric to, at least in part, participation-centric.

Where Direct Governance allocates influence along the lines of capital, and Explicit Delegation allocates influence along the lines of popularity (which often reflect capital), Implicit Delegation places emphasis on active participation agnostic of monetary access.

Anyone can mint a free Voter Pass which allows them to mobilize those DAO tokens to vote on supported DAO Snapshots such as Uniswap, and Aave. Since all the DAO tokens are mobilized every time, those who do show up to vote via Event Horizon have historically received up to 1300x vote multiples on their Voter Pass cost to mint.

Through these means, the system rewards participation, not capital. And, while we recognize a full shift toward implicit delegation would represent a sizeable change to Arbitrum’s current delegation structure which maintains a spectrum of its own benefits and assurances, we believe that a small allocation toward public access governance would serve to benefit the community greatly, with no compromise to the current structure. Consider the Event Horizon public-access block another delegate amongst the many talented delegates currently building the protocol.

Benefits of a public access, implicit delegation block:

  • Increased Participation: One of the greatest barriers to participation is lack of voice as a result of lack of capital. When voice is a direct facet of capital, the vast majority of community members simply lack the means to have an impactful say under any conditions. If one has $500 of arbitrum today, their vote is effectively meaningless. Through implicit delegation, capital is only one variable which can then be multiplied by your greater willingness to participate relative to the broader community. If general turnout is low, implicit delegation would afford a very sizable multiple to a voter previously relegated to $500 in authority. This is a direct result of their initiative.

  • Zero-Cost Voting Participation Incentives: Contrary to most other modes of encouraging participation, Implicit Delegation operates with balances to promote turnout without requiring airdrops or monetary incentives. rewards participation most when existing turnout is lowest, the multiple afforded to those who show up increases. Voters are empowered with the ability to mobilize a larger slice of the pool.

  • Added Thought Capital: in line with the notion above, there are likely hundreds, or thousands, of community members who fit the character type above, each holding both strong ideas and valuable contributions for the ecosystem, but simply lack enough voice to justify participation. Through Implicit Delegation, a community member with hundreds of dollars of ARB could mobilize (tens of) thousands of dollars of authority have their ideas presented and shared. Through this, the total accessible pool of talent, ideation, and evolution expands greatly.


This proposal reflects several of Arbitrum’s core mission values:

  • Socially Inclusive: By constructing a dedicated block of governance authority with lower capital barriers, our community greatly expands the net of governance inclusion.

  • Neutral and Open: By making the thoughts and ideas of this broader swath of individuals heard, we further broaden the spectrum of possibilities for the evolution of our ecosystem.


The Event Horizon Community has already processed >20 meta-governance proposals for both Uniswap and AAVE. The process is as follows:

  1. Duplication: Event Horizon Automatically copies proposals published on the Snapshot of included DAOs, in this case Arbitrum, into its meta-governance dashboard: EventHorizon.vote/vote

  1. Meta-Governance: The Event Horizon voter pass holders conduct a meta-layer vote to assess the community’s desired base-layer proposal outcome. NOTE: voter passes are free to mint and the Event Horizon will subsidize the gas cost for Arbitrum community members. EventHorizon.vote/mint

  1. Base-Layer Voting: The Event Horizon community wallet votes in favor of the desired outcome determined by the pass holders.

Historical Outcomes:

  • Number of Meta-Proposals Passed: 25
    Our community members have participated in and passed 25 meta-governance proposals, each corresponding to Uniswap or AAVE base layer proposals.

  • Voter Participation: >30%
    Over thirty percent of our community members have participated in our meta-governance proposals. Some participants have voted as many as 12 times in under 2 months. Check out the latest info on our leaderboard: EventHorizon.vote/leaderboard

  • Average Authority Mobilized per Participating Passholder: $17,124 (and counting)
    Each participating pass holder has represented an average of just over $17,000 in Uniswap and AAVE authority governance authority across all meta-governance proposals passed.

  • Average Authority Mobilized Multiple: 5,708x
    The average pass holder minted their voter pass for ~$3 in gas. When compared to the $17,124 in average authority mobilized, each member has mobilized over 5,708x their gas cost of admission in blue-chip governance authority.

Steps to Implement

The only step to implementation would be the delegation of 1.82m ARB to EventHorizonCommunity.eth ( 0xc0DdBAAeed6fC3E2f4f4Efa5778383B0E356621E ). Again, simply consider the Event Horizon public-access block another delegate amongst the many talented delegates currently building the protocol.


  • Start: Effective immediately
  • Revocation: Delegation revocable at will upon community revocation proposal

Overall Cost

$0 (-$3,000). The Event Horizon community is requesting no grant funding for this initiative and is instead offering $3,000 in gas reimbursements for those who would like to participate.

Additional Information


Do your DAO thing dear DAO; delegate some tokens to them


Event Horizon will save the bear market


I am very excited that EventHorizon is expanding its model on the Arbitrum ecosystem. This will be a major milestone not only for EventHorizon but also for Arbitrum voters. Together, we will upgrade Dao to a new level, overcoming the limitations of the conventional Dao mechanism.


This is great. I am quite in support of this proposal.


I’m in favor of this proposal. Event Horizon is innovating in the DAO voting realm and most likely has a bright future ahead.


To start, 404 DAO believes governance is most effective when it is equitable and representative.

The current state of most DAO governance, including Arbitrum’s, is top-heavy to major players. In an ideal state, governance is comprised of different parties who represent constituents of the ecosystem. With greater distribution of voting power, governance is more capture resistant and invites robust conversation among delegates.

This is an interesting attempt at rectifying some of these pain points for everyday users and small token holders.

However, the litmus test for any meta-governance proposal should be inherently stronger than a typical proposal (IE: something like a STIP or other growth oriented proposals) because it is seeking ongoing authority rather than just incremental resources. STIPs can be experiments of scaled risk and measured consequence, but setting precedent around granting governance authority is closer to pandora’s box. Therefore, we believe any system or body pursuing individually granted authority (rather than earning or acquiring that authority naturally) should be expected to meet a few base level expectations at the root of the proposal. In its current state the proposal lacks some of these, specifically:

1. Earned Reliability

The applicant should be willing to demonstrate a track record in their decision-making capabilities and should be willing to earn the trust and goodwill of the network over multiple decisions. We would like to see a vesting schedule proposed by Event Horizon that demonstrates a timeline or milestone structure where delegated ARB can be earned, rather than granted completely up front.

2. Verifiable Capability

Any specific team applying should be capable of demonstrating their unique capability to build this system, and specifically their ability to overcome broadly understood risks and obstacles. An immediate example is how Sybil attacks will be prevented, which we do not see in the proposal or defined in the product specs on the website. There is potential for more. We would like to see more focus in this proposal on these fundamental risks.

3. Responsible Stewardship

Any applicant, especially when lacking a history in Arbitrum governance, should be expected to demonstrate a net positive impact from its decision-making coordination, to the welfare and benefit of the broader network generally, and demonstrate a ‚Äėno conflict of interest‚Äô in their decisions and process. While we realize this is not entirely possible preemptively, we would like to see as a part of this proposal, a plan for how to effectively measure this overtime and repercussions if performance either falls short or measurements are not made.

With these few principles in mind, it is not difficult to imagine adjustments that would address these considerations without abandoning the core concept of the proposal.

We think such revisions and discussions would be the appropriate next step for this concept.


1. To show our expectation of reliable and consistent positive impact within the Arbitrum Ecosystem…

the first proposal draft noted unconditional revocability. The intent is to ensure that delegation is only afforded so much as it is considered valuable by the broader community.

With further consideration in mind, we are willing to include a vesting schedule over and above the revocation clause. However, we would highlight that any tiered delegation model does add additional administrative friction and consideration which we would want to confirm is within the foundation’s abilities and willingness.

We will amend the proposal to include the following criteria:

  • Total Delegation: Cumulative ARB delegated to EventHorizonCommunity.eth
  • Earliest Date: Earliest date of ARB delegation
  • Passholder Count: Cumulative number of HVAX Voter Pass Holders
  • Proposal Participation: The percentage of proposals the community voter block participated in over the delegation period
  • Average Pass Participation: The average number of pass holders participating in each proposal. This has been set at 10%, over 3x higher than Arbitrum‚Äôs current wallet participation rate
  • Total Participation: The percent of total passes which have voted on at least one proposal

The earliest date and three of the four benchmark thresholds would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment.

2. Regarding Sybil considerations…

we would highlight that the allocated sum of delegated ARB is intentionally a minority voter amount by a significant margin. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.

That being said, we would be willing to heighten anti-sybil measures with Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum meta-governance. Gitcoin Passports allow for the customization and weighting of proof-of-humanity criteria including:

We would recommend a slight customization of standard weighting as to emphasize non-ETH-balance pertaining benchmarks such as linked social media accounts, wallet age, gas used, civic uniqueness, and ENS. We are very open to community discussion on this approach vs standard Gitcoin Passport weighting.

3. Regarding responsible stewardship…

we believe this is a particularly difficult concept to quantify objectively. There are certain assurances the team can provide at the protocol and base mechanics level, such as being fully doxxed, legally incorporated, and well-known by various individuals within the community.

However, it is important to highlight that the public authority block is not a delegation to the Event Horizon team members. In fact, the team will not be voting with voter passes and will remain as neutral an impact as possible.

Rather, this proposal seeks to delegate ARB to a group of retail voters (Voter Pass holders). So it is very difficult to objectively determine if the decisions of a large swath of previously disenfranchised individuals are ‚Äėresponsible‚Äô or not. We also see risk in becoming a gatekeeper for who can and cannot participate in this open public good voter block. We don‚Äôt want the power to deem a voter worthy of this public good, as that opens up potential avenues for abuse and proposal attack. Instead, we stand by the notion that unconditional revocation is a greater catchall to halting irresponsible action in a more democratic fashion.

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