After consideration Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) would like to share the following feedback on the proposal
We will be voting FOR an Extend Delegate Incentives.
We believe the Delegate Incentive program has significantly influenced delegate behavior, encouraging more active and engaged participation within the DAO. While the system isn’t without its imperfections, it has proven to be robust. We also want to commend SEED LATAM for their exceptional execution and administration of this program
I voted FOR on this proposal. It makes sense to take the time we need to come up with a better iteration of the next version of this program and not a rushed one, and this extension gives SEED LATAM the tranquillity to deliver a thoughtful work.
I voted in favor of the proposal because I believe it has achieved the main objective of the program, which is to reward delegates based on the quality of their contributions
I voted FOR this proposal. Without delegate incentives, I believe the DAO would be wholly unable to pass constitutional quorum, thus blocking critical upgrades such as Arbitrum Stylus.
Governance participation is trending downwards due to natural forces. If a token holder who is currently delegated to an active delegate sells ARB tokens, there is no fundamental reason for the buyer to delegate. Therefore it’s critical that the delegates we do have remain active.
I’m hoping we can help address underlying token holder apathy via ARB Staking, but regardless I strongly believe delegate incentives will remain a critical piece of the overall governance participation puzzle going forward.
We support this proposal as it has proven effective in enhancing delegate participation, which is crucial for the DAO’s success. Extending the program ensures we continue this progress while developing more comprehensive metrics to evaluate delegate performance. Additionally, considering a mix of USD and ARB for certain costs during this extension could offer better financial stability.
Voting FOR this - the program has been effective, and given the risks to governance of voter apathy, we need mechanisms like this (and @Frisson 's staking proposal) to make sure that participation continues.
It’s critical to keep the incentivized delegates who are actively contributing to the important DAO decision makings motivated with a short-term extension. We are excited about the updated v1.1 Delegate Incentive Program as well.
By the results presented, the Delegate Incentives system appear to have been cost-effective. Taking into consideration also the scope of the funds still available, we believe that an extension is warranted.
The two month term proposed appears to be sensitive, giving enough time to publish, discuss and approve version 1.1 of Delegate Incentive Program.
Furthermore, as a self-funded delegate Castle wishes to express the importance of programs like this one for us to be able to incentive our members to contribute to governance, making Arbitrum governance more fairly accessible by smaller delegates, increasing overall participation.
As a delegate who has been part of the program, I can personally attest to its positive impact. It has significantly contributed to my commitment as an active delegate, allowing me to stay up to date with the DAO and thoroughly analyze decisions before voting. Being part of this ecosystem takes time, and this program enables delegates to dedicate the necessary time and fully commit to the objectives.
I’ve also observed many others joining the Delegate Incentive Program and improving their delegate tasks as a result.
For me, this clearly demonstrates growth in governance activity and improved performance of the DAO as a whole within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I think this will provide a good bridge as the 6 month trial period is analyzed and improved upon for the “delegate system v1.1” is released for discussion. With no added cost to the DAO, there doesn’t seem to be much downside to continue to the program (of which I think has been fairly successful).
The SeedGov’s team has done great work on this project and I see no reason not to trust them to continue running the program during this period.
My only note would be I don’t want to see the next iteration be put on the backburner now that an extension has been made. I don’t believe this will happen, but in the interest of ‘keeping the feet to the fire’ on this moving forward I would not vote to extend this again if we are voting on another small extension again in a few months.
We’re voting FOR this extension to strategically bridge the gap to DIS v1.1. While we’d had preferred concrete metrics on delegate performance before voting, it buys some time to refine incentive structures. This stopgap measure mitigates potential governance paralysis, but we urge a swift transition to a more data-driven, performance-based model before extending the current program or switch to 1.1 that aligns delegate rewards with tangible DAO value creation.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the extension of the delegate incentives.
As outlined in the report SEED prepared, the delegate incentives program (DIP) did yield some positive results when it came to governance participation and engagement. We believe that continuing the program and refining it to have an even more significant positive impact is the right approach. We’re in favor of the extension proposal simply because it doesn’t make sense to stop the incentives before the v1.1 that SEED is already working on is introduced. The 2-month extension will give ample time for the second iteration of DIP to be finalized and implemented.
On the occasion of our rationale communication, we also wanted to provide feedback on DIP that could inform the creation of the second version.
The program manager (SEED in this case) should have the flexibility to alter the eligibility criteria and rewards calculation method monthly if needed. That way, we will allow adjustments to the ever-changing landscape within the DAO and be able to incentivize the ‘right’ actions and behaviors. The only prerequisite for the alteration should be a communication of the change in advance and a reason to support the change.
The second version of DIP should last a full year instead of 6 months. That will give the program manager more time to refine the program and make it more predictable for delegates to rely on.
While we calculate the rewards for each delegate based on the participation rate on Snapshot and Tally and the posting on the forums, we want DIP v1.1 to make it clear that the responsibilities delegates who receive incentives have don’t stop there. Participating in governance is more nuanced and we should seek to give some flexibility to the program manager to assess overall participation.
Overall, we’re supportive of continuing the delegate incentives program given we keep experimenting and refining how we reward delegates for their active and responsible participation in governance.
We are currently working on v1.1 of the program, which will include significant changes that will improve the current program. This draft will be published as soon as possible to maximize discussion timing so delegates can contribute their ideas.
We want this extension to keep delegates incentivized while discussing the next version of the program. As stated in our Middle-Term Report, DIP has shown some good results, and while we think there’s still room for improvement, we believe v1.1 will address them nicely.
DAOplomats voted FOR the temporary extension of the delegates incentive program.
The delegates incentive program has had considerable impact in the overall governance participation within the DAO so we were supportive of extending the program pending v1.1 being worked on.
We also echo L2BEAT’s feedback on flexibility and would love the SeedLatem team to consider it as they put the v1.1 together.
Hey! Thanks for this valuable feedback. As we’ve mentioned before, we’re collecting feedback in order to make the proposal as collectively worked as possible.
We agree on this point. During the first iteration of the program, we took on an observer role to understand the dynamics and actions delegates took to receive compensation. As you mentioned, six months is not enough time to introduce changes without being sure they will have a positive impact on the DAO. In version 1.1, we will take a more active role and, in consensus with the DAO, propose changes to improve the program.
This is something worth considering. Although we’re already introducing rewards calculation in the v1.1, having the possibility to dynamically change it will be an upgrade considering the next version aims for a one year extension instead of a six month one.
That’s something we’ve been discussing a lot. While Forum Activity is something that needs constantly enhancing, a great delegate work also means being in the calls, participating in working groups and constantly checking the multiple chats delegates engage.
For this second version of the program, we’ll work to increase the activities that receive compensation. We also want delegates with high participation to be rewarded appropriately.
We’ve already published our Middle-Term Report and will publish a Final Report once the first iteration of the program is completed.
Firstly, thank you for this proposal idea. Like many others have mentioned, we also believe that the delegate incentive program has been highly productive and beneficial so far. It has helped to somewhat reverse the declining trend in interest towards governance. Additionally, the distribution of incentives to delegates has been handled with great care and attention. Extending this program by two months seems like a very reasonable duration.
As further feedback, while the program aims to activate all delegates, we believe it has not shown the desired impact on very small delegates. We do not have a solution for this yet, but we encourage active delegates to reflect on this matter, as efforts to attract new participants to the DAO and find ways to empower small delegates are crucial factors that will contribute the most to decentralization.
I believe the team working on V1.1 of the Delegate Incentive Program needs enough time to cover important factors, including ARB price fluctuations and low incentives for delegates, considering the complex nature of the forum at the moment.
I appreciate the effort to maintain delegate engagement through the temporary extension of the incentive system. However, I have reservations about this proposal due to the lack of robust evidence demonstrating its effectiveness so far. While it’s acknowledged that the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) has encouraged participation, there are concerns that it may disproportionately reward those who are more active but not necessarily aligned with the long-term goals of the DAO.
Additionally, the extension could inadvertently consolidate power among a small group of delegates, potentially leading to an imbalance in decision-making power. This is particularly concerning if the incentives continue to favor participation metrics without adequately assessing the quality and alignment of contributions to the DAO’s broader objectives. Without clear, data-driven results from the current program, extending it might reinforce existing issues rather than address them.
A more prudent approach would involve thoroughly analyzing the outcomes of the initial incentive program, identifying areas for improvement, and ensuring that any extension or new iteration of the program aligns incentives with meaningful, value-driven contributions to the DAO. This would help avoid the risk of centralizing influence and ensure that rewards are distributed in a manner that truly benefits the DAO’s governance and long-term health
