If a protocol has a 80% voting weight on its gauge, he can capture 80% of all the bribes, both the ARB and its own bribes.
No matter who matches who, the end result I’ve shared is exactly the same. Feel free to clarify if I made a mistake. If that’s not the case, then there is no misunderstanding and maybe we just don’t have the same conception of efficiency.
it’s pretty impossible for a protocol to have 80% voting weight on their gauge, because there are voting optimizers and tons of other people voting. They would need to have 80% of the residual vote, which means the incentives were far below other gauges and did not get votes (extremely unlikely/implausible as the APR would be insanely high)
Overall have had an overwhelmingly positive experience with Ramses, and believe they deserve a grant and hope for its success.
Have voiced thoughts and concerns privately, but I think would be good to be addressed in public -
Would it be possible to release an outline or a model of how it would play out and the efficiency behind it, given current parameters, without assuming price goes up?
Statistics like ve voting apr, partner bribe recapture rate, emissions, weekly voting incentives to emission dollar value, etc would be helpful.
I think most people in this conversation agree that Ramses promotes efficient liquidity and has high volume, and is an addition to the network overall.
To me the question to voters are two things at large:
I truly believe that the flywheel works. But is it possible to say the same for average ecosystem participant? The average voter? Again, is arguing “well, the token will pump” as one of the fundamental features of why this grant is effective for the ecosystem convincing?
Unless liquidity is incentivized externally (which clearly isn’t the desire here), then money is being handed out exclusively to tokenholders while the liquidity providers earn the exact same amount as before (the weekly emissions).
To state otherwise would be assuming that since there are more incentives distributed to lockers, people will buy and lock, price will go up, incentives received by users will be worth more, people provide more liquidity, fees are higher, so on so forth.
Of course, the bull case is that as a result of this flywheel, more people will buy and lock, introducing new users who commit four years of a long term vested interest in the overall Arbitrum ecosystem.
It’s easy to convince a small subset of partners and believers that this model works, because we invested a lot of time into studying and learning about the system.
Many others won’t feel the same - and I hope that some projections with hard numbers can be offered by the team to clarify its vision and how it will help the ecosystem grow at large.
The only question that matters is:
- Does 1 ARB vote bribed generate more value than 1 ARB LP bribed for grant distribution?
According to past performance metrics, vote bribing has been way more efficient than LP bribing, so its natural that Ramses wants to try this route (its literally how the DEX works).
Thinking this is all about “flywheels” or making “RAM token pump” is very short-sighted. Its simply choosing what’s more efficient for grant distribution (whatever that means for RAM token – thats clearly not the goal).
So you agree with the data I’ve shared and the points I’ve raised, you simply think it’s not an issue. I can hardly see how it wouldn’t be the case.
One of the very first arguments mentioned in this thread was that 71% of the bribes were recycled. Just replace 80% with 71% if you want. Even if it was 60% or 50%, the issues and negative consequences would all be the same.
To be fair I don’t think it will benefit to any of us to endlessly argue. Ultimately, you’re totally free to ignore my comments and let the DAO decide. But a lot of them have been left unaddressed. Though I can get that it’s hard to not miss some at one point with the way forum discussions are structured, so I’ll gladly summarize them if you want me to.
Still, I don’t want to turn the thread into a complete battlefield more than it already is, even if I genuinely believe the data and insights I’ve shared are important to know.
I’ll just humbly suggest you to take a look at the other major AMMs applications, not a single one has asked to directly incentivize its token. Increase Ramses/RAM value by increasing the ecosystem value first, don’t ask for the opposite.
Lots of great discussion here. I’m from Swell, an Ethereum liquid staking protocol that has recently gone omnichain commencing with Arbitrum. Whilst I am sure there is still much to discuss and finesse in relation to the proposal including addressing abovementioned feedback, what I can say is that we’ve found Ramses to be an excellent partner and very helpful in our DAO’s push onto Arbitrum. The core team has consistently demonstrated their strategic committed to bringing liquidity and utility to our protocol and we look forward to continuing our collaboration.
Perl, Most of your criticism is not specific to Ramses, but to the solidly model in general. So these same criticisms can also be applied to the Velodrome grant application, along with your conclusion that it would not work well… except it did… by delivering a 4.5x multiplier for every $OP incentive spent–the single most effective grant application on that chain. If you have concerns about how bribe matching and grant incentives might work within a solidly model please review instances where it has already been attempted and review the results so you can better understand how the mechanism works.
Every Solidly fork systematically takes Velodrome example as a proof that the model works. Velodrome has been a great success, no doubt about it, but that has stopped being a valid argument for a while now. It’s not enough to ask for a 2m grant and just say “Velodrome has worked so our model is efficient so we will thrive”.
I would have a lot of things to say about Velo as well, including some similar criticism but that’s not the object of the discussion. ARB is not OP, Ramses is not Velodrome, September 2023 is not July 2022… Just stop using Velo as a shield.
PancakeSwap has billions of TVL, currently does hundreds of millions of daily volume, $300k of daily fees, $75k of daily revenue. They are second only to Uniswap, while being mostly on a single chain. This has been an insane success.
Does it make the “Pancake model” incredibly efficient and CAKE tokenomics a great flywheel?
If someone was forking Pancake and justifying they should get millions of grant directly injected into their own token because another iteration of the model works incredibly well, would anyone take him seriously?
No, because nobody ignores the context when analyzing it.
Sure, then can someone share for every Solidly fork launched on Arbitrum in 2023 how well it has performed by giving me for each the evolution of:
Sorry to say that results won’t be great past the first couple of weeks of their existence.
To be fair, compared to the other Solidly forks, Ramses has managed to set up a chunk of core liquidity that is generating interesting volume.
But that doesn’t change anything to the data I’ve shared and issues I’ve flagged during this long conversation.
Pancakeswap has nothing to do with what we are talking about, nor is much of the rest of this rubbish. We were discussing the effective symbiotic mechanism of grant distribution using the solidly model. There is not another example of this outside of Velodrome that I am aware of, and if you argue that the grant distribution via Velodrome was not a success you should let the OP foundation know so they can stop repeating it. These are not my claims, they have documented the effects and you can start by looking at their medium articles I suppose.
Your answer perfectly illustrates my point.
perl believes handing $ARB to LPs create more long term value to the ecosystem.
Ramses believes handing $ARB to devs create more long term value to the ecosystem.
Am I understanding this correctly?
Thank you for your research @Perl . I could not agree with you any more!
Despite some comments here from reputable people in the industry, I’m not convinced at all. This proposal is ridiculous ~ it feels like a last attempt to reanimate a dying patient. Ramses metrics vs. the proposed amount say it all… Plus, many of the comments here seem like derivable shills.
I’m in the against camp, anyone in favour of this must have some side benefit, as I believe that the grant is only beneficial for Ramses and their friends!
This is a common misconception with the model I believe. The ARB would not go to devs or anything of the sort, it would all eventually trickle down to ecosystem participants and users – since protocols will keep 0 ARB from this program and will keep distributing it.
Ramses has had ample time to prove that their tech is working and it’s clear that it’s not. Giving such a large amount of ARB into the hands of a protocol that has consistently underperformed in every metric after the initial pump sounds absurd. Just look at the metrics above, no incentives will make it work.
Wasn’t OATH already deployed on Arbitrum months ago? I swear I saw it somewhere. Correct me if I’m wrong pls
I knew I had seen OATH somewhere on Arb… You literally deployed it close to a year ago @bebis
I hope that delegates will see what is going on here, as at this point, I strongly believe that this grant proposal is solely designed to reanimate Ramses and benefit their friends, not the ecosystem. This really feels like a barbaric attempt to rob the DAO treasury.
EDIT: Great to see that my comment was flagged without any legitimate reason. It seems like the Ramses team wants to cover this up. Absolutely unprofessional and only proves my point.
Yes, I jumped the gun, protocols controlled by devs/DAO. I can understand the argument. Initially to a smallish set of known actors that are expected to act in good faith and then to circulate the $ARB to potentially wider ecosystem users over longer period of time, even after the grant period.
So even though directly incentivizing LPs that is known to attract short term mercenary capital, which will just farm, dump and leave once the grant is finish, is still a preferred solution according to perl?
Seems like Ramses’ TVL/Volume is super efficient compared to the rest. And that’s achieved without any grants and bridging capital from other chains. Numbers don’t lie.
And since you’re so concerned with TVL - it’s on the incline since the launch of CL, again - no grants or whales. Just tech.
And is this supposed to be the reason Ramses should receive up to a 1.5m grant? this makes no sense. It’s not just TVL ~ the market cap of RAM is currently at $260k. The requested grant amount is absolutely comical for the size of the project
