[RAMSES] [FINAL] [STIP - Round 1]

[whereismymind]

Literally everything you just wrote has been addressed already. You look like a broken record at this point. I would bother to answer all of them but I suspect you will just reply the exact same thing for another 20 pages. I sincerely hope everyone stops engaging in this fruitless conversation.

[scott]

@Perl

Epoch #26 had 12k of bribes. Ramses first asked to inject ~160k ARB / epoch on top of it (2m grant). With the high range of the updated proposal (1.5m), that would be 125k ARB / epoch. It doesn’t make any sense.

Emissions to LPs are 35k / epoch. A 12k bribe / 35k emissions is a ok 1:3 ratio.
If you inject 125k ARB, you now have 137k bribe / 35k emissions, ie 1:0.25 ratio.
The only way for it to be arguably efficient, ie at least 1:2, is to rely on a 8x price increase of RAM.
To get back to the same 1:3 ratio, you would need to rely on a ~11x price increase.

Linear and biased thinking by @Perl. Arbitrum is spending tokens to grow, to expand the Arbitrum L2. So if there a chance to get a liquidity hub for tail assets with the ve(3,3) model and benefit Arbitrum it should be done.

pd: I think we should try to get our own Velodrome on Arbitrum. And not fund 5 different AMM, that LPs are going to be mercenaries with.

[whereismymind]

Those calculations don’t even make any sense anyway. When bribe matching, incentives increase, the protocols and bribers inject more of their own money to compete and match those bribes. Thats the whole point. The reward token going up isn’t necesarily a requirement, just the consequence. None of this is reflected in there.

Let’s not even mention that he used 2M ARB grant in the calculation which is false. The final grant size is dynamic based on how much bribers invested (and the update already reduces max size anyway).

E.g: protocols only bribe $500k during 3 months → Only $500k ARB would have been matched → rest gets returned to DAO.

Learning to read is a blessing.

[Perl]

@whereismymind

Literally everything you just wrote has been addressed already.

None of those have been addressed.

@whereismymind

the protocols and bribers inject more of their own money to compete and match those bribes

Yes, and they recover a large part of it (+ it’s not recycled), along with ARB: [RAMSES] [DRAFT] [STIP - Round 1] - #64 by Perl

@whereismymind

E.g: protocols only bribe $500k during 3 months → Only $500k ARB would have been matched → rest gets returned to DAO.

It doesn’t include the accumulated recovered ARB at the end of the 3 months.

@whereismymind

Learning to read is a blessing.

You’re getting rude despite being the one completely missing the point. I recommend you to simply let the team answers as you don’t seem to understand the mechanics.

This kind of answers is the reason why this thread has been painful to follow for everyone.

[whereismymind]

I recommend you to simply let the team answers as you don’t seem to understand the mechanics.

I’m afraid you are alone in this room. Everyone understand’s that recycling is precisely the feature that incentivizes protocols to inject more money (if protocols can’t vote and have bribe efficency why would they ever invest money?). This is quite literally how ve33 model works.

[whereismymind]

I find it strange that the DAO would be worried that high-integrity protocols (and Ramses themselves) would risk their reputation in not returning the remainders, but I understand the points risen nonetheless.

Anyhow, I hope there is a solution that acommodates to this model. I’m sure there must be one.

[wavebender]

Ramses team and community have repeatedly performed white hats and notified competing dexs of critical vulnerabilities rather than exploit them. I think they have earned a degree of trust and respect.

[whereismymind]

Just for reference, since its been mentioned several times, Ramses has one of the most spread distributions of voters in whole DeFi, you can check DefiWars dashboard and compare to other popular voting protocols like Convex or Velodrome. It’s literally at the top in terms of distribution. I’m not sure why people consider it to be highly concentrated when its less concentrated than most similar protocols?

source: Defi Wars

[stonecoldpat]

Hi all,

There is a maximum politeness policy enforced on the forum. Please keep all discussion civil.

[whereismymind]

There’s a lot of previous context before that message. Other people have also complained about this situation with this particular user. Nonetheless – I’m sorry if that was rude, I agree things should be civil. My bad.

[Matt_StableLab]

Hello @North thank you for your application! Your submission officially meets all requirements to be considered for a snapshot vote.

As a reminder to the community, StableLab’s role is to ensure proposals meet the requirements in order to move to a vote. It is up to the delegates to choose which grants get funding and up to the multisig to enforce any violations of the grantee agreements that may arise once the grant funds start being distributed.

[kiryu_0x]

I think the OP/VELO model where people got a rebate in OP for locking was the best model. It is the most direct way to get people to lock and bid VELO (or RAM in this case) which increases emissions and gets more liquidity. It also highly disincentivizes selling the already locked veToken because the rebate will be in place(if rebate discount is 20%, probably have to sell already locked veTokens for 25-30% discount). If veTokens can be sold for very little markdown it doesn’t feel as bad for participants to sell them, and they aren’t effectively locked.

The model proposed here is still ok, i just think the way OP/VELO did it was the best way and I think the Arbitrum DAO should really consider it. Having a good 3,3 dex is a way to get people coming back to use the chain each week.

[whereismymind]

Yeah I agree that’s a nice flywheel model, thing is, anyone out of the ve33 model is quickly scandalized if any of the grant seems to benefit the ecosystem token, so I think that route will be even harder to push.

I feel like this proposal meets a reasonable “middle ground” where everyone can compromise a bit. Maybe in next rounds it would be easier to convince the community after good KPI metrics (like VELO achieved in likewise OP grants).

[mfer]

Thanks @Matt_StableLab for claryfing.

At this point I’d suggest Ramses team @North @Dog to allocate all the grant to LP direct incentives, not bribes.

I know it’s not the most indicate and capital efficient way to utilize the funds but this grant program has its limitations and its far from being highly efficient by design. It’s a quick patch.

If you read between lines I think Matt is giving you a hint. Hey, is just my opinion.

Assessing the context, guidelines, sentiment, etc. I think your best play is to ask for 750K ARB and incentivize the LP pools. Otherwise you are risking too much of being rejected by delegates.

I’d play the safe bet and secure the humble result. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

Another option is that you try to contact with delegates with the biggest voting power and ask them for advise. They will guide you to whatever they’ll be willing to support and vote in favor.

Up to you. Wish the best.

[Smith]

Governance working well when people are telling a project it’s being too efficient and it should dump the grants instead.

[kiryu_0x]

Yeah, I guess that is where I differ from a lot of people. A coin going up in price and creating a flywheel effect+hype for that chain’s DeFi ecosystem is never bad for the chain IMO.

[diablobiz]

We all recognize that Op’s success has been significantly contributed to by Velo. Op’s reasonable grants have facilitated Velo’s strong growth in price and TVL. Many of these grants support Velo’s liquidity provision, similar to Curve. Projects can pay VELO holders in exchange for VELO distributions, helping projects maintain liquidity without running into losses. This, in turn, attracts more users to participate in farming and other activities on Op.

Therefore, the proposed $1.7 million grant for ram makes sense. While Camelot is currently prioritized on Arbitrum, it has not achieved the same level of success as Velo has on Op. Hence, this grant serves as an experiment for both Camelot and Ram to shine on Arbitrum.

[Gattordo1]

Interesting! In 140 messages, we have:

• Team members of Solidly and Balancer complaining about the grant because it’s not an LP bribe, while RAM is attempting a new system.
• Pearl, seemingly ignoring all the answers he received, potentially because he dislikes them. All the concerns he has produced so far can essentially apply to any proposal.
• No one providing any substantial input apart from advocating for grants for LPs, enabling them to farm and dump without any issue.

[diablobiz]

let’s look at the data
-ram lives on arbitrum for 6 months

-September volume is 100m$

Eligible for lighthouse grant

-Solidly flywheel + onchain incentives =
Success has been proven by the velo and op models
Don’t fud when you don’t have data and solid arguments

[stonecoldpat]

Just a reminder to all. We enforce a maximum politeness policy and require all posts to actively contribute to the discussion.

There is no need for a back and forth. All information here will be used by delegates when they cast their vote.