Request for a Maintenance Upgrades Working Group

We want to thank everyone contributing to this discussion, both here and on the working group call.

As it relates to an improved process, we believe it should address all cases where a full constitutional process is currently considered an overkill, whether due to relatively low risk or a proposal’s non-controversial nature. Examples of such proposals include token registrations or the currently-bundled constitutional AIP which covers three technical proposals.

An Optimistic Process

While our initial thought process led to optimistic governance as well, we believe there are several issues with that approach:

Firstly, all passed constitutional proposals currently enjoy the same broad legitimacy due to a DAO-wide consensus building and tokenholder vote. This legitimacy is something that can’t be replaced by an optimistic governance model, where proactive action of tokenholders isn’t necessary to execute a proposal, but rather stop it from executing.

  • This isn’t necessarily a blocker on its own, but something that may result in downstream effects such as increased (perceived or actual) exposure for council members.
  • The above, in turn, might result in increased difficulty for finding interested parties to participate in the framework.

Secondly, the composition and necessary checks on a new body and process aren’t an easily solvable problem. For example, a DAO expert position would require elections to be conducted regularly and the optimistic governance process would need to be set up and maintained independently of existing DAO processes, adding further complexity.

Thirdly, an issue with the council’s on-chain authority arises, since it will either:

  1. Have greatly limited on-chain decision making power by being able to only access the token registration contracts, OR
  2. Have broad on-chain decision making power so that it can propose maintenance upgrades as well.

The former allows for greater security, but goes against the guiding principle of introducing a process capable of covering all currently uncontroversial proposals blocked by the constitutional process. The latter introduces new risks to the system and essentially implements a secondary Security Council, on-chain function-wise.

Lastly, a risk of DOS attacks exists with the committee capable of creating a large number of proposals that would each need to be vetoed separately, thus overwhelming the tokenholders.

An Alternative Approach

As a result of the above, we’d like to propose an alternative approach to be explored. Namely, we believe that several low hanging fruits exist, with the potential to evolve further.

1. Firstly, we view proposal bundling as both a short and long term solution.

Short Term

In the short term, proposal bundling has proven to work in case of technical proposals, such as the previously-mentioned AIP or the Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep AIP. We believe that broad consensus-building and resulting tokenholder vote is useful even in the case of non-controversial technical proposals, and would recommend for the DAO to adopt a calendar-based approach to token registration proposal bundling. By utilizing (for example) a quarterly bundled vote (both on Snapshot and in a single payload on Tally), external teams would be able to predict better when their token registration is put in front of the DAO.

Medium to Long Term

Building on the above, we’d also like to propose for the DAO to explore an on-chain solution to accommodate a bundled proposal approach. Importantly, the short term solution doesn’t account for seemingly non-controversial proposals turning out to be controversial at the Snapshot or Tally voting stage. A bundle being struck-down due solely to one of the subproposals, constitutes a significant blow to the efficiency of the DAO, which would now need to repeat the entire process.

To counter the above, as well as change the on-chain framework in a way that is beneficial beyond the problem at hand, we propose:

  1. Adding an on-chain way for multiple proposals to be proposed in one transaction;
  2. Allowing for multiple proposals to be voted on in one transaction (without requiring to sign multiple times).

Thus, a delegate could propose multiple, separate proposals (subproposals) with separate payloads in one transaction which would resultingly follow the exact same lifecycle. Similarly, voters could vote on multiple subproposals within a single transaction. By updating the existing Tally UI, they should also be able to decide on a yay/nay/abstain vote at the bundle level, as well as at the level of each subproposal, giving more granularity over decisions and eliminating the risk of a bundle being struck down due to the inclusion of a controversial subproposal.

Importantly, the contract already supports users voting on multiple proposals in the same transaction, with the limitation of requiring multiple signatures (1 per each proposal) in the process (this is not true for proposers).

Consequently, a more lightweight approach can be considered, transitioning the complexity from necessary contract changes onto the UI. It would involve having the proposing delegate propose multiple subproposals separately, the governance UI being adjusted to display them as a single bundle, and the voters voting on a bundle in one transaction (but with multiple signatures).

Ultimately, we believe that the UX can be improved significantly on the UI level, regardless of what happens on-chain. We hope to open a discussion with delegates on this, since their perspective is critical, e.g., would the ability to vote on a bundle of pre-planned token registrations already be beneficial, while still requiring multiple signatures?

2. Secondly, we should make it as easy as possible for external teams to propose token registrations.

Teams coming to the DAO requiring a token registration vote should be able to easily understand how to approach it. One improvement here is the bundled proposal calendar. Another one is the recently-introduced token registration template, which can be used by anyone to generate a payload.

While there are certainly other improvements that can be made, the immediate next step would be to add the token registration template to the Tally interface so that payloads can be drafted there directly.

We again want to thank everyone for participating in this conversation and are looking forward to the upcoming working group call where further alignment can be reached.

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well then… this front-end really needs to be fully open source. and Tally’s isn’t.

First of all, I’d like to thank everyone in this working group for your participation. I believe that the discussion we had during the call and the broad range of ideas presented here in this thread prove that this is a pressing issue that needs addressing and that the DAO as a collective can help brainstorm ideas to address it.

We apologize for the delays in our response and follow-up steps. We were waiting for the vision from AF that was just presented. We were informed about it even before the call, so we felt there was no point in rushing this working group further before its publication.

The issue at hand has two aspects - a technical one and a logistical one.

We believe the most pressing technical issues have mostly been resolved with the Token Registration Template. When we were helping the SuperBoring team register their token, we asked the OCL team to help prepare and validate the on-chain transaction so that we wouldn’t have to take on the work and risk associated with creating one. The result was an OCL script to create a payload for token registration that not only streamlines the process of creating an onchain proposal, but also enables any delegate to recreate the payload and confirm that the onchain transaction performs only the intended function. Of course, the process can be further streamlined by integrating the script with the Tally UI, as mentioned in the AFs post.

However, UI changes do not solve the logistical issues. Right now the whole process is pretty burdensome to delegates and projects that want to register their tokens.

Taking the Superboring proposal as an example, they first had to figure out how this process even works in the DAO. Arbitrum documentation does not explain it clearly. When they published their proposal on the forum there was instantly a discussion about it (supporting the proposal), but no immediate action followed as no one is really responsible to push it further. It took two months before I helped them with putting the proposal for Snapshot (huge shoutout to @CupOJoseph as he was the spiritus movens there), and I had to do my own due dilligence to assess whether this is an honest, justified ask and not something malicious. From this point it took another three weeks before we went onchain and after that another month before the vote was executed.

tl;dr - in total it took them 5 months from publishing the proposal on the forum to having the token registered. In my opinion it’s a terrible result for a small maintenance change that is necessary for a team to keep building on Arbitrum, but I understand that different people can have different benchmarks.

It’s worth noting that neither Arbitrum Foundation nor Offchain Labs engaged with Superboring proposal on the forum before being explicitly asked by me to help with the process. And even later on I felt like we’re forcing both teams to do something they really don’t want to be involved with. IMaybe it’s just my perception, but I think they’d agree that they weren’t really the ones taking the initiative to solve this issue, even though it was months after the New Vision for Arbitrum was posted on the forum.

All those issues won’t be solved by simple UI tricks, bundling similar proposals into one transaction or introducing calendar for such proposals (actually this would most likely even make the whole process lengthier for individual proposals). Validating and signing 10 similar, template-based transactions takes a couple of minutes at best. Going through the whole governance process to even have 10 transactions to sign - takes days. I believe that we’re focusing on optimizing wrong parts of the process in this discussion.

To make it clear, I don’t fully neglect the UI improvements proposed by Arbitrum Foundation. I fully agree with adding the token registration template to Tally’s UI interface. But I think that the other suggestions are not addressing the real issues at hand that I tried to briefly describe above and I’m not sure if their implementation is really worth the cost. How many times we’ll use that in the next two years? I guess it will make verifying the actual payload even more complex than it is right now. For me it’s not a huge difference between 1. signing three different transactions and 2. signing one transaction and ticking off in the UI which parts I support and which I don’t, in fact it might be even more complicated.

I would also like to comment on AFs stance regarding the proposed special council to handle such issues:

The former allows for greater security, but goes against the guiding principle of introducing a process capable of covering all currently uncontroversial proposals blocked by the constitutional process.

I’m not sure why we need universal process vs dedicated single-purpose processes that solve one issue well. The token registration template is an example of such a dedicated, narrowly focused tool that solves one particular issue well with a low cost. In my opinion this approach makes total sense.

The latter introduces new risks to the system and essentially implements a secondary Security Council, on-chain function-wise.

actually, we don’t need to introduce such a secondary Security Council, we already have a secondary Security Council (multisig that goes through simplified process that omits full DAO vote) since the DAO inception that was tasked to handle exact such issues in the DAO Constitution:

Non-Emergency Actions:

The Security Council may also approve and implement routine software upgrades, routine maintenance and other parameter adjustments in a non-emergency setting (such actions, “Non-Emergency Actions”), which require a 9-of-12 approval in order to take effect. Any Non-Emergency Action, after approval by the Security Council, will bypass Phases 1 to 3 of the AIP process and instead directly go through Phases 4 to 7 of the AIP process, to provide a delay before any Non-Emergency Action is deployed. The Security Council may optionally specify additional delays before deployment.

we even used it once to execute governance approved action to fix fee oversight in ArbOS 20. I find this argumentation even more surprising as I pointed that inconsistency with theory and practice in our DAO during the discussion on Security Council elections improvements and same Arbitrum Foundation commented in different place:

Right now, most upgrades go through the DAO as that is what gives an upgrade legitimacy. At some point, the Security Council may take a more proactive role, as outlined in the constitution, so it makes sense to preserve that optionality.

So to sum it up, Arbitrum Foundation is saying that it’s risky to introduce a secondary Security Council for maintenance updates even though we already have a secondary Security Council for maintenance updates but at the same time we don’t want to remove or clarify those maintenance update capabilities from this secondary Security Council because we foresee that at some point Security Council might actually use them proactively. I have to admit that I’m a bit lost in this logic.

One last thing - as I mentioned in the delegate chats already, we’ll be taking a more passive role in the DAO from now on, so I won’t be facilitating further calls for this Working Group. We encourage other delegates or AF to take the lead here if they see the value in discussing this further.

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Thank you @Arbitrum for this thoughtful and comprehensive response. The Token Registration Template in particular will be immensely helpful for teams looking to propose custom token gateway registrations moving forward, and we’re happy to explore how this template can be included on the Tally UI. Separately, the UI improvements outlined also has many merits, and I appreciate the deliberation and rigour that’s apparent in these recommendations. I’d like to build on both your ideas and @krst ‘s valuable observations to explore how optimistic governance could complement these improvements.

The Timeline Challenge

@krst ‘s experience with the SuperBoring proposal provides valuable data about where additional optimizations might help. The 5-month timeline, while partly due to the learning curve of a new process, highlights an opportunity to complement the proposed improvements with additional streamlining for routine maintenance tasks. While your proposed bundling approach and UI enhancements will certainly help, they still operate within the constitutional timeline framework.

The optimistic governance model proposed in my previous comment could serve as a complementary track rather than a replacement. How I’d like to think of it, is creating a “fast lane” for pre-validated, thoroughly audited maintenance tasks, while preserving the full constitutional process for everything else. The DAO would retain complete oversight through the veto mechanism, ensuring that legitimacy comes from both expert validation and delegate consent.

Preserving Legitimacy Through Design

Your point about legitimacy from DAO-wide consensus is important and worth addressing carefully. The optimistic model we’ve proposed maintains this legitimacy through:

  • Active DAO oversight via the veto mechanism (3% quorum threshold),

  • Technical validation from a qualified council / security council before proposals advance, and

  • Full transparency with all proposals visible and veto-able

As @krst @paulofonseca and @SEEDGov pointed out, the Security Council already has constitutional authority for routine maintenance that bypasses early AIP phases. An optimistic governance implementation essentially creates a more specialized, transparent framework for exercising similar powers.

Council Composition

Regarding council structure, we’re flexible on the specific implementation. Two viable paths exist:

  1. Leverage the existing Security Council for these maintenance reviews, adding this to their established responsibilities.

  2. Create a specialized technical council with OCL, the Arbitrum Foundation, and other security-focused technical partners.

Either approach could work. The key is having qualified technical expertise reviewing these changes. As for elections, I agree with the @Arbitrum Foundation’s instinct toward stability - similar to the Security Council improvements proposal, a 2-year term would provide continuity while preventing ossification. The critical elements are technical competence, clear conflict-of-interest policies, and accountability to the DAO through the veto mechanism - not frequent electoral cycles. Annual elections aren’t necessary for this type of technical role and could actually create unnecessary overhead.

Next Steps

I suggest we reconvene monthly to maintain momentum and ensure continued alignment between all stakeholders. For a start, I’m happy to continue driving this conversation moving forward, and am proposing to have a second call to primarily discuss what tactical next steps could be. Considering that we have Korea Blockchain Week and Token2049 coming up, we could look at the week of 6th October to be a good time to host this call.

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