Thank you for this analysis, considering that a good part of the members of this community have shown support in the post of @Frisson’s proposal, we believe it is a good starting point to begin discussions on the details (before its implementation, if approved).
We would like to mention that from our perspective the Delegate Incentive System (DIS) focuses on improving participation in governance more qualitatively than quantitatively. This means that in the first instance, one of the main goals of the program is to professionalize delegates so they can keep focusing on building for ArbitrumDAO.
We see the ARB Staking program as a solution to increase the number of delegated tokens, but despite contemplating issues such as the “Karma Score”, it’s hard to consider it as a possible replacement for the DIS because we would be ceding control of the incentives to a mere mathematical formula when today the DIS not only contemplates votes or the number of comments in the forum but also analyzes the impact of the latter, also ensuring that no one can “take advantage” of it.
It should also be mentioned that simply limiting delegate incentives to a mere “commission” of the Arbitrum DAO revenue could take away the predictability of the incentive itself, which defeats the purpose of the DIS. Despite this, we agree that interesting synergies can be generated between both programs: We could implement a mixed model in the future, where for example the top 50 delegates (according to the DIS table) get a fixed monthly amount in ARB as now and then in parallel a commission model like the one you have proposed for all the delegates is applied.
This is good information, extrapolating the new daily average mentioned here we would get about 1,800 ETH per year vs. the 12,000 ETH estimated in Frisson’s original proposal and vs. the 9,200 ETH per year that the DAO obtained in the 100 days pre-blobs.
Assuming that 50% of this revenue is distributed, that would be about 900 ETH ($2,250,000 at $2,500) among about 324,000,000 delegated ARBs ($162,000,000 at $0.5) leaving us with an estimated 1.4% APY.
It seems that further revenue sources could be needed to improve this stream and make the Staking more attractive, we are confident that in the future there will be more DAO-generated streams as proposed about MEV fees, validator fees, token inflation, the gas fee increase, treasury diversification initiatives and Orbit Chains fees.
It is an interesting solution until we can increase the number of ARBs delegating and voting. We would like to collaborate with such an initiative, it might be interesting to hear more opinions on this. At the moment it makes sense to give control of the delegate veto to the Security Council, which is mandated by the DAO to ensure the security of the treasury and the core protocol. We could also consider creating an anti-capture commission similar to the one implemented at Optimism.