Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance.
Have a first question related to the amount posted here, 32K each month. This would put the annualized expenditure at $384k/year
As of today, we have in address for incentives around 7M arb equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$.
While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years.
In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year.
Was any thought put into this piece of feedback?
In my opinion, not only for this, but for any DAO program that requires to pay out in ARB, we should keep the reserve in stablecoin and buy back the ARB in the open market when is time to redistribute. It will introduce predictability in budgeting for long term program, and effectively negate any sell pressure for financing programs.
The main issue is operational; but with a more centralized approach like the one we are seeing is likely doable, if we do use twap prices for conversion at time of buyback that are “good enough” even in time of volatility.
We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september.
This is especially true due to this table
In here, I do see
- a quarterly budget in USD
- a payout cap in USD
But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB.
On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway?
It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period.
Finally, want to cross post in relation to the proposal that me and @jameskbh posted in the forum related to the extention of previous DIP.
While I want to be clear that the proposal was crafted in a weekend, after asking if this or any other DIP proposal would have been voted before the Christmas pause and without knowing it would have been put up for public discussion, I don’t personally feel like is necessary to go for a contemporary vote of both. The goal of the extention was, as mentioned in the original post, to give time to AF and other to craft this very proposal.
It seems like it has internalized most of the feedbacks of delegates; would also add how it lacks a bit some details, like rationality for certain decision, simulation based on the past year of activity, and projection on the future in different scenarios, but this part is also partially compensated by the flexibility of having OpCo ability to change parameters on a per quarter basis and eventually hire a service provider for management.
My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough.
As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios:
- in case the RAD proposal is discussed, goes on vote on snapshot the 4th of december, and the 11th we see that the vote fails
- in case the RAD proposals is not put up for a vote before the 11th of december (last legal date for votes accordingly to the pause we collectively decided upon that starts the 18th of the same month).
That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means
- consensus from most delegates
- predictability of payout that allows to growth the stash of active delegates
- avoid falling in an apathy of voters that, on a timeframe long enough, could create security issues.